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Abstract 
 
Disappointment and contempt are important moral emotions that have the 
potential to influence social behavior. However, these emotions and their behavioral 
consequences have yet to be explored in the context of evaluative beliefs about humanity. 
One purpose of this dissertation was to begin filling this gap in the literature by 
examining the psychological mechanisms that give rise to feelings of disappointment in 
and contempt for humanity, and the social behavior they influence. Disappointment was 
hypothesized to be associated with AI-discrepancy beliefs (e.g., humanity is not 
compassionate enough), as they imply the absence of a desired outcome or expectation. 
Contempt was hypothesized to be associated with AO-discrepancy beliefs (e.g., humanity 
is cruel), as they imply humanity fails to meet minimal moral standards. Causal 
attributions (Weiner, 2006), identification with all of humanity (IWAH; McFarland et al., 
2012), and implicit theories of personality (IT; Dweck, Chu, & Hong, 1995) were 
predicted to moderate these relationships. Finally, disappointment was predicted to 
promote prosocial behavior, while contempt was predicted to promote social avoidance.  
These predictions were tested in a serious of four studies. Proposed models of 
disappointment and contempt were tested in Study 1. Studies 2-4 tested the effects of 
discrepancies and proposed moderators experimentally. The results were mixed. The 
models of disappointment and contempt were not supported. Evidence was found 
suggesting AO-discrepancies can evoke both feelings of disappointment (Studies 2 and 3) 
and contempt for humanity (Studies 2, 3 and 4), while AI-discrepancies appear only to 
evoke feelings of disappointment (Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4). At times, IWAH might 
2 
moderate the effects of discrepancies on disappointment (Studies 1 and 2) and contempt 
(Studies 2 and 3). The proposed moderating effects of causal attributions and IT were 
largely unsupported. Finally, evidence was found suggesting disappointment and 
contempt might have unique effects on prosocial behavior and social avoidance, such that 
contempt seems to promote social avoidance, which might be influenced by IWAH, 
while disappointment is less likely to influence social behavior. The results of this work 
contribute to the literature and our understanding of beliefs about humanity, group 
identity, social emotions, causal attributions, and discrepancy theory. 
 
  
3 
Is that Disappointment or Contempt I Feel for Humanity? Actual/Ideal (AI) and 
Actual/Ought (AO) Discrepancy Beliefs in Humanity Might Have Unique Emotional 
and Behavioral Consequences 
What is the nature of humanity? Philosophers have battled over this question for 
centuries. More recently, psychologists have begun to study how everyday people answer 
this same question and how different answers might have unique consequences for the 
individual. Many aspects of people’s everyday lives are influenced by their beliefs about 
humanity. Beliefs about humanity influence political behavior (Rosenberg, 1956), trust in 
others (Sharma & Dubey, 1986), ethical research practices (Antes et al., 2007), 
intergroup dynamics (Haslam, 2006; Haslam et al., 2005; Loughnan & Haslam, 2007; 
Luke & Maio, 2009; Morton & Postmes, 2011), and prosocial behavior (Gill & Getty, in 
prep; Wrightsman, 1992). Beliefs about humanity have even contributed to some of the 
most appalling acts imaginable. Consider the example of Pekka-Eric Auvinen, a Finnish 
teenager, who began a “one-man war against humanity” by killing eight of his high 
school classmates before turning the gun on himself. According to his manifesto, his 
actions were motivated by feelings of alienation and contempt for humanity (see 
http://www.captaincynic.com/thread/76302/the-pekkaeric-auvinen-manifesto.htm). 
Clearly, beliefs about humanity can have important and, at times, devastating 
consequences.  
 Beliefs about humanity might be as diverse as the individuals who possess them. 
People form elaborate “philosophies” about humanity based on observed human 
interaction (Wrightsman, 1992). People differentiate what they believe are humanity’s 
essential characteristics, like warmth and responsiveness, from what they believe are 
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humanity’s unique characteristics, like civility and morality (Haslam, 2006). In short, 
beliefs about humanity represent a multifaceted network of schemata about humanity’s 
essential and unique characteristics.  
 Still, some scholars argue that research has neglected emotional responses to 
humanity and the evaluative beliefs these responses represent (Luke & Maio, 2009). The 
few studies that have examined evaluative beliefs focused on general positive responses 
compared to negative responses, which inadequately represents the spectrum of social 
emotions (Ekman, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b; Ekman & Friesen, 1971, 1986; Ekman & 
Heider, 1988; Haidt, 2003; Izzard, 1971; Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996). This lack of 
understanding represents a significant gap in the literature on beliefs about humanity. 
 One purpose of this dissertation was to begin filling that gap by examining the 
psychological mechanisms that give rise to feelings of disappointment in humanity and 
contempt for humanity, both of which are important social emotions with implications for 
moral judgment and social behavior (De Cremer, 2006; Ekman & Friesen, 1971, 1986; 
Ekman & Heider, 1988; Haidt, 2003; Lelieveld, van Dijk, van Beest, Steinel, & van 
Kleef, 2011; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Roseman, Antoniou & Jose, 1996; van Dijk 
& Zeelenberg, 2002; van Doorn, Heerdink, & van Kleef, 2012; Wubben, De Cremer, & 
van Dijk, 2009). To date, we have found no work examining the elicitors of these 
particular emotions as affective evaluations of humanity. These elicitors and also the 
behavioral consequences of each emotion will be examined here. 
 With insight from Self-Discrepancy Theory (SDT; Higgins, 1987, 1989; 
Petrocelli & Smith, 2005) and moral psychology (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 
2009), in this dissertation it is argued that perceived discrepancies between the way 
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humanity actually behaves and the way perceivers would ideally like humanity to behave 
and the ways perceivers believe humanity ought to behave will elicit feelings of 
disappointment in and contempt for humanity, respectively. The reason is that, in moral 
terms, discrepancies between humanity’s actual and ideal behavior (AI-discrepancies) 
likely constitute prescriptive moral violations, or the failure to activate prosocial 
behavior, while discrepancies between humanity’s actual and ought behavior likely 
constitute proscriptive moral violations, or the failure to inhibit immoral behavior 
(Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009).  
 Perceiving that humanity displays significant AI-discrepancies (e.g., not being 
compassionate enough) is hypothesized to create feelings of disappointment in humanity 
because it “signals the absence of a desired outcome” or behavior (Petrocelli & Smith, 
2005, p. 1628), the primary determinant of feelings of disappointment (Higgins, 1987; 
Petrocelli & Smith, 2005; Roseman, Antoniou & Jose, 1996; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 
2002). On the other hand, perceiving that humanity displays significant AO-discrepancies 
is hypothesized to create feelings of contempt for humanity, because AO-discrepancies 
signal that humanity fails to meet minimal standards of morality (proscriptive moral 
violation; Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). 
 I suspect that the effects of a given discrepancy on a given emotional response 
might depend on the cause to which one attributes to the discrepancy (Costarelli, 2012; 
Petrocelli & Smith, 2005; Weiner, 2006). In this case, the extent to which one attributes 
the cause of a given discrepancy to uncontrollable/stable characteristics (i.e., human 
nature), feelings of contempt might follow (Roseman et al., 1996), although this is more 
likely in instances of AO-discrepancies, as AO-discrepancies represent the failure to meet 
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minimum moral standards. In contrast, attributing discrepancies to controllable/unstable 
traits or characteristics (e.g., a lack of effort), feelings of disappointment might follow 
because such explanations imply that the discrepancy might be overcome in the future. 
Of course, this is more likely to occur in instance of AI-discrepancies, because such 
discrepancies imply high potential to obtain the desired outcome in the future (Covington 
& Omelich, 1981; Costarelli, 2012).  
 Other important psychological mechanisms might also moderate the relationship 
between a given discrepancy and the subsequent emotional response, but they might do 
so by influencing the type of causes to which one attributes the discrepancy. Specifically, 
identification with all of humanity (IWAH) (McFarland, Webb, & Brown, 2012) and 
implicit theories of moral characteristics (i.e., entity or incremental theory) (IT) are 
hypothesized to do just that (Costarelli, 2012; Chu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Dweck, 2008; 
Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Hewstone, 1990; Lau & Russel, 
1980; Pettigrew, 1979). In light of negative information about humanity’s behavior, 
strong-identifiers should be motivated to attribute that negative information to causes that 
minimize identity threat, like external causes or unstable characteristics of the group, like 
effort (Covington & Omelich, 1981; Costarelli, 2012; Hewstone, 1990). In the absence of 
an external cause, strong-identifiers might be forced to concede responsibility for the lack 
of positive behavior (in the case of AI-discrepancies) or the failure to meet minimum 
moral standards of behavior (in the case of AO-discrepancies) to humanity. When they 
do, strong-identifiers must attribute the discrepancies to aspect that do less damage to 
humanity’s—and their own—positive image. The literature suggests that attributing 
negative outcomes to unstable/controllable characteristics like effort, function to protect 
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positive identity (Costarelli, 2012), because they preserve positive potential (Covington 
& Omelich, 1981). If that is the case, attributing discrepant behavior to controllable 
causes might be appealing to strong-identifiers.   
 Implicit theories of moral characteristics (Dweck, 2008; Dweck, et al., 1995; 
Dweck & Leggett, 1988) are also hypothesized to moderate the relationship between a 
given discrepancy and the subsequent emotional response by influencing the causes one 
attributes to the discrepancy. The reason is that one’s implicit theory influences how he 
or she will interpret the cause of a given moral discrepancy (Dweck, 2008; Dweck, Chu, 
Hong, 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Specifically, implicit theories influence the extent 
to which one attributes the cause of a given discrepancy to uncontrollable/stable 
characteristics versus controllable/unstable characteristics (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). 
Entity-theorists generally attribute moral behavior (or the lack thereof) to 
uncontrollable/stable characteristics, while incremental-theorists generally attribute 
moral behavior (or the lack thereof) to more controllable/unstable characteristics. In other 
words, entity-theorists are thought to attribute discrepant behavior to underlying 
characteristics (i.e., a flawed nature), while incremental-theorists focus on the potential to 
develop the preferred ideal or ought behavior in the future. In this sense, incremental-
theorists should have a tendency to attribute discrepant behavior to controllable/unstable 
characteristics. Thus, incremental-theorists are hypothesized to attribute 
controllable/unstable causes (i.e., lack of effort) to discrepant behavior, especially in light 
of AI-discrepancies. On the other hand, entity-theorists are hypothesized to attribute 
uncontrollable/stable causes (i.e., flawed human nature) to discrepant behavior, especially 
in light of AO-discrepancies.   
8 
 In sum, a “core” model is proposed in which perceived moral discrepancies in 
humanity lead to negative feelings for humanity. The extent to which perceived moral 
discrepancies lead to negative feelings towards humanity will depend on the extent to 
which one identifies with all humanity, and implicit theories, because of the causes these 
characteristics lead one to attribute to the discrepant behavior. In other words, the 
moderating effects of both identification with humanity and implicit theories of moral 
characteristics should be mediated by causal attributions. See Figure 1. 
 Thus, a model of feelings of disappointment in humanity is proposed in which 
perceived AI-discrepancies in humanity (i.e., humanity is not compassionate enough) 
evoke feelings of disappointment in humanity. However, identification with all of 
humanity and implicit theories should moderate the effect of AI-discrepancies on feelings 
of disappointment, respectively, because these characteristics might lead observers to 
attribute the perceived AI-discrepancies to humanity’s controllable/unstable 
characteristics. See Figure 2.  
 In contrast, a model of feelings of contempt for humanity is proposed in which 
perceived AO-discrepancies in humanity (i.e., humanity is immoral) evoke feelings of 
contempt for humanity. However, identification with all of humanity and implicit 
theories should moderate the effect of AO-discrepancies on feelings of contempt, 
respectively, because these characteristics might lead observers to attribute the perceived 
AO-discrepancies to humanity’s uncontrollable/stable characteristics (i.e., human nature). 
Identifying with all of humanity in particular will motivate one to maintain a favorable 
impression of humanity, so he/she will not attribute AO-discrepancies to 
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uncontrollable/stable characteristics. An entity theory will attribute the discrepancies to 
uncontrollable/stable characteristics, because they are theory-consistent. See Figure 3. 
To position these proposed models within the pertinent literature, a review of the 
literature on lay beliefs about humanity will be presented. Then, research on 
disappointment and contempt will be discussed in order to argue for their distinction. 
Further, research on self-discrepancy theory and moral psychology will be discussed in 
order to provide additional insight for examining potential predictors of these emotions in 
a group context. Next, attribution theory will be discussed in order to explain how 
different causal attributions might change the meaning of a given discrepancy, thereby 
changing the emotional response. Several psychological mechanisms hypothesized to 
moderate the relationship between discrepant beliefs and disappointment in and contempt 
for humanity by altering the cause to which one attributes to a perceived discrepancy will 
be introduced. Finally, a series of studies designed to test these proposed relationships is 
presented.  
Human Traits and Feelings about Humanity: Two Frameworks for Examining Lay 
Attitudes toward Humanity 
As attitudes reflect both cognitive and affective information (Mackie & Smith, 1998; 
Zajonc, 1968; Zanna & Rempel, 1988), it is little surprise that the scientific study of lay 
beliefs about humanity has arguably developed within two similar frameworks, one based 
on cognitive information and one based on affective information. Research within the 
framework based on cognitive information focuses on the traits that lay perceivers 
believe constitute human nature or “humanness” more broadly (i.e., beliefs about human 
aggressiveness, conformity, morality, and civility; Gill & Getty, in prep; Haslam, 2006; 
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Haslam et al., 2005; Kanter & Mirvis, 1989; Rosenberg, 1956; Wrightsman, 1992). The 
framework based on affective information focuses on lay perceivers’ feelings toward 
humanity, or the extent to which people express positive versus negative emotions 
towards humanity (Gill & Getty, 2010; Getty, 2012; Luke & Maio, 2009). Research 
within each framework has illuminated many important facets of everyday life, including 
political beliefs (Rosenburg, 1956), group dynamics (Luke & Maio, 2009; Morton & 
Postmes, 2011), de- and infra-humanization (Haslam, 2006; Haslam et al., 2005; 
Loughnan & Haslam, 2007), and prosocial behavior (Gill & Getty, in prep).  
The human traits framework. The human traits framework examines people’s 
answers to the question “what are humanity’s characteristics?” In other words, this 
framework focuses on the trait content of people’s schemata about humanity and the 
effects holding different beliefs might have on social thoughts and behavior. Work within 
this framework is directly descended from classic epistemology, which asked: “what is 
human nature.” Plato (1987), Confucius (as cited in Stevens & Haberman, 2004), Hobbes 
(1651/1988), and Rousseau (1761/1913/2010) presented various arguments about human 
aggression. Their respective answers to this question, they suggested, were necessary to 
determining a proper form of government, one that would either suppress humanity’s 
natural aggressive tendencies, or promote humanity’s natural cooperative tendencies.  
To summarize, Plato and Hobbes argued that either in part (Plato) or in whole 
(Hobbes), human nature is essentially aggressive and dominance-seeking, motivated by 
selfish needs (Hobbes 1651/1988, Stevens & Haberman, 2004). In their view, a 
complementary government should consist of “philosopher kings” with knowledge of the 
“good” in order to guide the masses (Plato) or heavy-handed rulers in order to control a 
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naturally aggressive populace (Hobbes). In contrast, Confucius and Rousseau each held 
optimistic views of human nature, arguing that humanity has a natural tendency to seek 
mutually beneficial relationships, with each other and nature (Stevens & Haberman, 
2004), and, therefore, government and philosophy should help people reach harmony and 
peace.  
While these great thinkers provide learned insight, they do not profess what 
everyday people believe are the fundamental characteristics of humanity. Therefore, 
some scientists shifted the discussion away from the great thinkers’ ideas about human 
nature to what everyday people believe about human nature, because understanding these 
everyday beliefs could ultimately illuminate how such beliefs affect people’s everyday 
lives. 
Like early philosophers, the scientific study of lay beliefs about humanity 
examined the links between beliefs about the characteristics of humanity and political 
attitudes and behavior (Rosenberg, 1956). Morris Rosenberg (1956) was the first modern 
scientist to address this relationship. He proposed that people, because of diverse life 
histories, develop different beliefs about humanity; and that understanding the nature of 
these differences might explain the diversity of political thought. Rosenberg’s theory was 
based on the idea that attitudes about people, or humanity more generally, were strong 
predictors of “attitudes towards the principles, practices and policies of a political 
system” (p. 690). For example, he suggested that if a voter believed that humanity is 
fundamentally bad (i.e., having a misanthropic belief about human nature), that voter 
would likely support political initiatives to curtail laziness (oppose welfare). On the other 
hand, if the voter believed that people are fundamentally good, that voter would likely 
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support political initiatives to help folks get back on their feet during hard times (support 
welfare).  
Rosenberg (1956) developed the Faith in People Scale (FPS). The FPS is thought 
to measure general misanthropic beliefs about humanity, or the extent to which one 
believes humanity is generally untrustworthy, unhelpful, selfish, uncooperative, and/or 
indifferent to the needs of others. When Rosenberg examined the relationship between 
FPS responses and questions about political ideology, he found that misanthropic beliefs 
about humanity did indeed predict political beliefs and behavior. He found that 
misanthropists were likely to dehumanize politicians by likening them to puppets 
controlled by special interests, motivating misanthropists to support strong restrictions on 
candidates for public office. He also found that, regardless of political affiliation, 
misanthropists supported strong governmental control over labor, reflecting their belief 
that government is an “instrument of power designed to suppress” (p. 693).  
Rosenberg’s seminal work has been a guiding force in the study of political 
ideology across many disciplines. Studies addressing confidence in public institutions, for 
example, have been strongly influenced by Rosenberg (Pharr & Putman, 2000; Newton & 
Norris, 2000), as have studies addressing the decline of political capital (Paxton, 1999), 
beliefs about political legitimacy (Weatherford, 1992) and political alienation (Seeman, 
1975). The consensus among these scholars is that gauging misanthropy is an important 
indicator of people’s political beliefs and behavior.  
Lawrence Wrightsman (1966, 1974, 1992) is another key contributor to this 
framework. Wrightsman suggested that via a long process of socialization, people 
develop lay “philosophies” of human nature. He suggested that these “philosophies” were 
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a special case of “implicit personality theory” comprised of implicit attitudes based on 
the way people perceive human interaction.  
Wrightsman (1964, 1974, 1992) conceptualized lay beliefs about human nature as 
varying along six dimensions: (1) Trustworthiness versus untrustworthiness (2) Strength 
of Will and Rationality versus External Control and Irrationality, (3) Independence 
versus Conformity to Group Pressure, (4) Altruism versus Selfishness, (5) Complexity 
versus Simplicity, and (6) Variability versus Similarity. 
The culmination of Wrightsman’s theory was the Philosophies of Human Nature 
Scale (PHN). The PHN has been adopted in several research programs illustrating the 
diversity of beliefs about human nature by both undergraduates and graduate students 
from institutions around the United States (Bayless, 1971; Wilkinson & Hood, 1973; 
Wrightsman, 1992), social workers (Dretz & Dretz, 1969, as cited by Wrightsman, 1992), 
and racial groups (Johnson, 1969, as cited by Wrightsman, 1992). 
Beyond documenting the diversity of beliefs about humanity that people hold, 
Wrightsman’s theory has been instrumental in several areas of social psychological 
research. Trustworthiness, Wrightsman’s most pervasive and influential dimension, has 
contributed to scientific research in a number of areas, including cross-cultural studies of 
trust (Sharma & Dubey, 1986) and economic exchange among Chilean, Colombian, 
Mexican and Swedish populations (Ahmed & Salas, 2009). Antes et al.’s (2007) work 
presented an intriguing set of studies on ethical decision-making among graduate 
students. They found a relationship between beliefs about trustworthiness and unethical 
decision-making. Their findings suggested that young researchers who believe that 
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people are naïve, trusting, and generally act in good faith are more likely to act 
unethically, perhaps due to heightened confidence that they will not get caught.  
It might seem that these six dimensions represent distinct categories of trait 
beliefs. However, a factor analysis of the PHN discovered only two factors (Wrightsman, 
1974). The first of those factors tapped positive beliefs about human nature, labeled 
“Beliefs that People are Conventionally Good.” The second tapped negative beliefs about 
humanity, labeled “Cynicism.” However, these factors imply that cynicism and 
admiration are orthogonal, which is inconsistent with previous work suggesting that these 
beliefs represent a single dimension (Rosenberg, 1956). 
Wrightsman’s (1992) view that selfishness and altruism are polar opposites on a 
single dimension is also questionable. Classically, Comte (1851/1875; see Batson & 
Shaw, 1991, for a review) considered the two to be “distinct motives within the 
individual” (Batson & Shaw, 1991, p. 108). Gill and Getty (in preparation) have similarly 
argued that beliefs about human prosociality (i.e., altruism) and selfishness are 
independently represented in lay beliefs about human traits and separating the two better 
serves the study of lay beliefs about human nature because it more accurately represents 
the reality of people’s beliefs. That is, people have a tendency to believe that humanity 
has a natural inclination to act compassionately, while simultaneously possessing an 
equal and natural tendency to act selfishly. People do not conceive of these dimensions in 
“either/or” terms, and thus presumably think of human behavior as governed by 
competing motives of selfishness and compassion, either one of which might dominate in 
a particular context. Indeed, Gill and Getty’s work has confirmed that beliefs about 
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selfishness, compassion, and aggressiveness represent orthogonal dimensions of lay 
beliefs about human nature.  
 Haslam and colleagues (Haslam et al., 2005; Haslam, 2006) provide a unique 
perspective on lay beliefs about humanity. Haslam and colleagues did not examine 
individual differences in beliefs, but rather focused on what “people generally believe.” 
In their view, people distinguish between essential human traits (what Haslam and 
colleagues call “human nature”) and traits associated with human uniqueness. Traits 
associated with human uniqueness, arguably, set humans apart from other animals (i.e., 
secondary emotions, morality, civility, refinement, etc.); they are acquired characteristics 
that vary in content and degree from one society to another, or from one individual to 
another without any particular valence (Demoulin et al., 2004; Haslam et al., 2005). 
Human nature, in contrast, is comprised of essential characteristics (i.e., emotional 
responsiveness, warmth, cognitive openness, depth, individuality, agency) that everyone 
possesses “deep down, despite superficial variation,” which set human beings apart from 
cold, unfeeling and unthinking machinery (Haslam, 2006, p. 256).  
 In three studies, Haslam et al. (2005) set out to support this theoretical distinction 
of humanness beliefs. In each study, participants rated several personality traits as either 
unique to humans (operationally defined as “not found in other species”), or as a 
characteristic of human nature (as described above). In all three studies, the same pattern 
emerged: traits associated with one category of humanness were either uncorrelated or 
negatively correlated with the other. Furthermore, characteristics marked as essential to 
human nature were associated with affective traits, such as emotional responsiveness, 
warmth, openness, agency, independence and depth, mapping on to Wrightsman’s six 
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dimensions. Characteristics of human uniqueness were associated with traits linked to 
cognitive complexity: civility, morality, rationality and refinement. Moreover, 
participants rated the traits associated with human nature as inherent, developing early, 
universal, highly prevalent and acting as causal forces of behavior. Uniquely human 
characteristics were not perceived as inherent. Unique human characteristics were seen as 
less prevalent, less universal and developing later than essential characteristics. In sum, 
Haslam and colleagues provide evidence that lay beliefs about humanness are 
multifaceted, consisting of beliefs about both essential and unique characteristics.  
 The motivation for Haslam and colleagues to formally develop the two-
dimensional model of humanness was to address questions pertaining to de- and infra-
humanization (Haslam et al., 2005; Haslam, 2006). Dehumanization is the denial of 
humanness to others, manifesting in many ways. Some of dehumanization’s blatant 
manifestations are the objectification of women (Fredrick & Roberts, 1997; LeMonchek, 
1985; MacKinnon, 1987) and describing others as akin to animals or vermin (Chalk & 
Johassohn, 1990; Haslam, 2006; O’Brien, 2003). A more subtle form of dehumanization, 
however, is infra-humanization (Leyens et al., 2001; Leyens et al., 2003): an intergroup 
phenomenon involving denying some but not all humanness to outgroups. 
 Historically, infra-humanization has been characterized as the denial of unique 
human emotions (e.g., love, affection, suffering, etc.) to outgroup members, while 
strongly associating these same emotions with one’s ingroup (Gaunt, Leyens & 
Demoulin, 2002; Haslam, 2006; Paladino et al., 2002). Outgroups are seen as possessing 
the capacity for basic, primary emotions (e.g., joy, fear, anger, sadness), emotions shared 
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with other animals (Cahajic, Brown & Gonzalez, 2009), but not “higher” feelings and 
emotions.  
A unique contribution of Haslam’s (2006) model is that it provides for 
characterizing infra-humanization (or dehumanization more broadly) in ways that go 
beyond the denial of unique human qualities. The denial of unique human qualities is just 
one type of dehumanization, “animalistic dehumanization”(p. 255), the target of which 
can be outgroups and also individuals within a group. Animalistic dehumanization can be 
as extreme as describing a group as vile, debased, inept creatures, uncouth, with little 
intelligence, higher-emotional experience or moral fiber. On the other hand, de- and 
infra-humanization via the denial of essential human qualities, or “mechanistic 
dehumanization” (Haslam, 2006, p. 255) could also be extreme, for example, 
characterizing someone as a cold, calculating machines with little will or desire to seek 
new experiences.   
Beyond de- and infra-humanization studies, Haslam and colleagues’ two-
dimensional model of humanness has been influential in several other lines of research 
including value importance as a function of human nature  (Bain, Kashima & Haslam, 
2006; Bastian et al., 2010), bioethics (Wilson & Haslam, 2009), self-enhancement 
(Haslam & Bain, 2007), economic inequality as a function of biased self-perception 
(Loughnan et al., 2011), social emotions such as guilt and guiltlessness (Xu, Begue & 
Shankland, 2011, moral decision-making (Cikara, Farnsworth, & Fisk, 2010), and 
judgments of moral status (Bastain et al., 2010).  
 In sum, research within the human traits framework has concerned itself with 
people’s answer to the question “What are humanity’s characteristics?” Because of 
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diverse learning histories, people develop varying beliefs about the key traits that 
humanity possesses. People distinguish between the specific traits they consider essential 
to humanity, those that might be shared with other species, and those they consider 
unique to humanity, like morality, civility and refinement. This work has broadened our 
understanding of how beliefs about humanity’s traits influence political beliefs and action 
(Rosenberg, 1956), trust in others (Sharma & Dubey, 1986), ethical research practices 
(Antes et al., 2007), prosocial behavior (Gill & Getty, in prep), and de- and infra-
humanization (Haslam, 2006; Haslam et al., 2005; Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). Finally, 
this work has provided preliminary insight about how trait beliefs might influence the 
feelings we express towards humanity.  
The feelings toward humanity framework. Clearly there has been extensive 
research examining the cognitive components of lay beliefs about humanity. However, 
until recently, very little work has examined emotional responses to humanity. Indeed, 
Luke and Maio (2009) have argued that the theorists reviewed above examined only 
beliefs about a “specific quality of humanity,” while neglecting the importance of 
emotional response to humanity and the evaluative beliefs they represent (Luke & Maio, 
2009, p. 598). Their solution was to develop the Humanity Esteem Scale (HES; based on 
the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale) to measure more encompassing positive versus 
negative attitudes about humanity, or the extent to which people express like versus 
dislike for humanity as a whole. Humanity esteem has been linked to differences in 
discrimination, such that people with low humanity esteem might be more likely to show 
ingroup favoritism in hiring practices than those with high humanity esteem (Luke & 
Maio, 2009, Study 2). The authors also demonstrated that humanity esteem is malleable, 
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and could be increased by exposing participants to media images that promote social 
values and decreased by exposing participants to media images that threaten societal 
values, like terrorist activities (Study 3a & 3b).  
In sum, research within the feelings framework has thus far studied non-specific 
positive versus negative attitudes towards humanity. Some evidence within this 
framework suggests that perceived incongruence betweens social values and the extent to 
which people act on those values influence feelings towards humanity (Luke & Maio, 
2009). As compelling as these findings might be, research on feelings towards humanity 
has failed to consider the possiblity that people experience a spectrum of emotions (e.g,. 
love, hate, fear, contempt, anxiety) each with its own elicitors and behaviorial 
consequences (i.e., approach/avoidance; prosocial/antisocial behavior; revenge versus 
forgiveness, etc. (Ekman, 1992a, 1992b; Ekman & Friesen, 1971, 1986; Ekman & 
Heider, 1988, Haidt, 2003; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Roseman, Antoniou & Jose, 
1996; Smith, 1993, 1999; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002). The pertinent question, then, is 
whether there is reason to believe that people might express unique emotions towards 
humanity. 
 The examination of this question has a parallel in the literature on intergroup 
attitudes. While in the past it has been customary to conceptualize such attitudes in terms 
of global negativity versus positivity (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Dijker, 1987; Dijker et al., 
1996; Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996; Fiske, 1998; Macrae, Stangor, & 
Hewstone, 1996; Mackie & Smith, 1998), Elliot Smith and colleagues have presented a 
theory of intergroup emotions that suggests people in fact express a wide range of 
intergroup emotions (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Mackie & Smith, 1998a, 1998b; 
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Schneider, 1996; Smith, 1993, 1999). For example some outgroups “attract” feelings of 
contempt, which is associated with segregation and social avoidance, while other 
outgroups attract feelings of anger, associated with a tendency to “move against” the 
outgroup (Mackie et al., 2000, p. 602).  
 While many people might express a wide range of emotions towards humanity, 
just as they might do toward outgroups, feelings of disappointment in and contempt for 
humanity are of particular interest. Both emotions, while on the negative side of the 
spectrum of potential emotions, could have far different patterns of associated behavioral 
and social outcomes. Expressions of disappointment in humanity might be associated 
with fostering prosocial consequences, as disappointment in other has been linked to 
signaling the potential for establishing cooperation (De Cremer, 2006; Hoffman, 1963; 
Krevan & Gibbs, 1996; van Doorn et al., 2012 Wubben et al., 2009). Contempt for 
humanity might be associated with fostering antisocial consequences like social 
avoidance, as it has been linked to segregation and groups moving away from each other 
(Mackie et al., 2000). 
 Both disappointment and contempt are important emotions with important 
implications for moral judgment and behavior (De Cremer, 2006; Ekman & Friesen, 
1986; Matsumoto, 2005; Matsumoto & Smith, 2004; Roseman, Antoniou & Jose, 1996; 
van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002; van Doorn et al., 2012; Wubben et al., 2009). However, 
the unique elicitors and behaviorial consequences of disappointment and contempt have 
not been directly compared in this literature, nor has work examined the elicitors of these 
particular emotions as affective evaluations of humanity. This lack of understanding 
represents a significant gap in the literature on beliefs about humanity. Thus, this 
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dissertation is the first to directly examine and compare the elicitors of disappointment 
and contempt in the context of emotional evaluations of humanity.  
Disappointment and Contempt: Unique Negative Emotions? 
Do disappointment and contempt represent unique negative emotions? In order to 
answer that question, we must consider whether unique emotions exist at all, and, if they 
do, how they might be distinguished. Ortony and Turner have argued that emotions are 
fundamentally the same, only varying by degree of valence, arousal, and pleasantness 
(see Ekman, 1992b for a review; also see Dijker, 1987; Dijker et al., 1996; Ortony & 
Turner, 1990). However, the majority view advocates for the existence of unique 
emotions that reside within categories of “basic” emotions (Ekman, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 
1994b; Ekman & Friesen, 1971, 1986; Ekman & Heider, 1988, Haidt, 2003; Izard, 1977; 
Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Roseman, Antoniou & Jose, 1996; van Dijk & 
Zeelenberg, 2002). In this sense, each basic emotion, like anger, happiness, sadness, fear, 
and disgust represent “linguistic exemplars of emotion ‘families’” (Matsumo & Ekman, 
2004, p. 529) in which family members share “common characteristics” (Ekman, 1992a, 
p. 172), including similar “appraisals, antecedent events, probable behavioral responses,” 
and of course, facial expressions (Ekman, 1992a, p. 170; Izard, 1971).  
Disappointment. Disappointment resides within the sadness family of emotions, 
and is associated with feelings of emptiness and dashed hopes (Levine, 1996; Matsumoto 
& Ekman, 2004; van Kleef et al., 2010; van Doorn et al., 2012). Disappointment is 
associated with a facial expression similar to sadness, characterized by drooping eyes 
with the inner corners of the eyebrows drawn to the center of the forehead and the corners 
of the mouth turned down (Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972; Kaiser & Wehrle, 2001; 
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van Doorn et al., 2012). The key determinant of disappointment is the disconfirmation of 
a positive expectation or outcome (Carroll et al., 2007; De Cremer, 2006; van Dijk & 
Zeelenberg, 2002; Wubben et al., 2009).  
Researchers have identified three different “senses” or kinds of disappointment: 
(1) Disappointment when a positive expectation for the self is not met, such as when one 
expects to earn an “A” on an exam but instead earns a “D” (Bell, 1985; Frijda, 1986; van 
Dijk and Zeelenberg, 2002); (2) Disappointment for others when they fail to meet 
positive expectations for themselves, such as when your friend expects a “B” and earns 
an “F” on the same exam (Carroll et al., 2007; Petrocelli & Smith, 2005); and, finally, (3) 
Disappointment in others when they fail to meet a positive expectation held by the one 
feeling disappointment, such as when parents express disappointment in their child after 
he/she is expelled from school for cheating (De Cremer, 2006; Hoffman, 1963; Krevan & 
Gibbs, 1996; Patrick & Gibbs, 2007, 2012; Wubben et al., 2009). It is this last form of 
disappointment that is the focus of this examination.  
While there is surprisingly little work that directly examines feeling of 
disappointment in others, the results are very interesting. Disappointment seems to be 
associated with attributions of causal instability (De Cremer, 2006; Hoffman, 1963; 
Krevan & Gibbs, 1996; Patrick & Gibbs, 2007, 2012; Wubben et al., 2009). That is, when 
people express disappointment in others, they usually attribute the eliciting, disappointing 
event to unstable characteristics of the target. Furthermore, disappointment in others has 
been associated with a wide range of behavioral tendencies, including inaction, as well as 
an approach orientation of recuperative responding, like disciplinary action (i.e., 
disciplinary action so as to correct behavior). Inaction is often associated with 
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expressions of disappointment in others in the moment of the event (van Dijk & 
Zeelenberg, 2002). That is, when we feel disappointment in someone, we might be 
unsure how to respond, so we do not respond. While in the context of disappointment in 
one’s ingroup, or in parent-child dyads, this initial inaction is often followed by a delayed 
recuperative response (De Cremer, 2006; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002).  
 Contempt. While Haidt (2003) suggest that contempt belongs in the family of 
anger-related emotions—which would distinguish it from disappointment—Paul Ekman 
and colleagues, and others, suggest that contempt is the exemplar of its own family of 
associated emotions—a basic emotion—with its own unique facial expression, appraisals, 
antecedent events, and behavioral consequences (Ekman & Friesen, 1986; Ekman & 
Heider, 1988; Izard, 1977; Matsumoto, 2005; Matsumoto & Ekman, 2004). Indeed, tight, 
unilaterally raised lips characterize the contempt expression, and this expression, 
Matsumoto (2005, p. 92) noted, has been recognized as contempt by “individuals from 
Estonia, Greece, Hong, Kong, Japan, Turkey, the United States, West Germany, Sumatra, 
Italy, Vietnam, Poland, Hungary, Great Britain (including Scotland), and India (Biehl et 
al., 1997; Ekman & Friesen, 1986; Ekman & Heider, 1988; Haidt & Keltner, 1999; 
Matsumoto, 1992; Ricci-Bitti, Brighetti, Garotti, & Boggi-Cavallo, 1989; Rosenberg & 
Ekman, 1995; Wagner, 2000).” 
Contempt is also associated with its own unique pattern of appraisal determinants 
that differentiate it from disappointment and its stepbrothers, anger and disgust 
(Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996). Contempt is associated with feelings of moral or 
intellectual superiority over others who are perceived as failing to meet a minimum 
standard of morality or intelligence (Ekman, 1994a. 1994b; Izard, 1977; Haidt, 2003). 
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Contempt is often expressed towards individuals who interfere with our own desired 
outcomes (Ekman, 1994a. 1994b; Izard, 1977; Haidt, 2003), as when a an individual in 
another car is too busy texting to pay attention to traffic, impeding one’s own ability to 
merge. Contempt has also been shown to have devastating effects on romantic 
relationships (Gottman, 1993). Other work also suggests that contempt is often expressed 
towards others who have no immediate implications for the self, like when a target is 
seen as incompetent or unintelligent (Hutcherson & Gross, 2001). While some 
researchers have argued that contempt has no clear behavioral tendency (see Haidt, 
2003), Gottman (1993), Roseman et al. (1996), and Mackie et al. (2000) clearly 
demonstrated that contempt involves an avoidance orientation, characterized by avoiding 
romantic partners, individuals, and outgroups for whom one feels contempt.  
 While there is clear evidence suggesting that disappointment and contempt are 
unique emotions, it is unclear when humanity will be the target of their expression. The 
literatures on Self-Discrepancy Theory and moral psychology might provide further 
insight about when most people might express disappointment in versus contempt for 
humanity.   
Self-Discrepancy Theory: Actual-Ought and Actual-Ideal Discrepancies are a 
Primary Cause of Negative Emotional Responses to Self and Ingroup 
 When will people experience disappointment in and/or contempt for humanity? It 
was proposed that both emotions begin with perceived discrepancies between what 
humans are actually doing and what one would ideally like them to be doing or what one 
thinks they ought to be doing or ought not to be doing. Once perceived, these 
discrepancies constitute evidence from which humanity is judged, which lead to moral 
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emotions (disappointment and contempt). The literatures on Self-Discrepancy Theory 
(Higgins, 1987) and the psychology of proscriptive and prescriptive moral violations 
(Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009) might provide theoretical support for these 
proposed relationships.  
 Self-Discrepancy Theory (SDT; Higgins, 1987). SDT posits that two basic 
evaluative representations of the self and of groups exist, the ought and the ideal 
representations, and people are thought to compare the perceived actual self or actual 
group against those representations (SDT; Higgins, 1987). Any resulting discrepancies 
give rise to unique negative emotions.  
 The ought self is the representation in which the self meets the “normative” or 
minimum standard of “attributes that someone (yourself or another) believes you should 
or ought to possess (i.e., a representation of someone’s [or your own] sense of your duty, 
obligations, or responsibilities)” (Higgins, 1987, p. 321). For example, if a person’s 
behavior does not infringe on the rights of others, that person might infer that he/she is 
meeting their own minimum obligation, or standard, as an upstanding citizen of their 
community.  
 The ideal self is the representation of the self in which the self possesses the 
attributes he or she (or others) would ideally like to possess (i.e., desires, aspirations, 
hopes, dreams) but which are not considered mandatory or required. That is, one might 
wish to possess highly compassionate characteristics or to be an altruistic “hero,” even 
though failing to do these things is generally considered acceptable.  
 Higgins (1987, 1989) suggested that different types of discrepancies arouse 
different negative emotions. When one perceives an actual-ought (AO) discrepancy, SDT 
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suggests that he or she will experience agitation-related emotions, such as fear, anxiety, 
and/or nervousness as a signal of potential negative consequences. In contrast, when one 
perceives a significant actual-ideal (AI) discrepancy, SDT predicts that he or she will 
experience dejection-related emotions, such as sadness, hopelessness, and/or 
disappointment, because such discrepancies signal the absence of a desired, positive 
outcome or expectation (Petrocelli & Smith, 2005). Higgins seems to suggest that the 
negative emotions aroused by these discrepancies are not due to the discrepancy per se, 
but to the perceived consequences of those discrepancies. Findings from several studies 
support this pattern of emotional responding to AO and AI self-discrepancies (Bizman, 
Yinon, & Krotman, 2001; Petrocelli & Smith, 2005; Strauman & Higgins, 1987, 1988; 
Strauman, 1989, 1992).  
Of specific interest to the question at hand are the findings of Bizman, Yinon, and 
Krotman (2001) who examined SDT in the context of group-based emotions. They 
examined the emotional experiences of Israeli participants whose beliefs about their 
nation were highly discrepant from their ought and ideal representations of their nation. 
Indeed, as SDT would predict, they found that AO-discrepancies predicted group-based 
agitation-related emotions, while AI-discrepancies predicted group-based dejection 
related emotions.  
As it stands, given the findings in the literature on SDT, are important moral 
emotions. To further substantiate the claim that AO and AI-discrepancies give rise to 
these moral emotions, we must consider evidence from the morality literature that one 
could reasonably argue that feelings of disappointment in humanity and feelings of 
contempt for humanity could stem from perceiving that humanity is falling short of some 
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ideal (AI-discrepancy) or minimum standard (AO-discrepancy), respectively. However, 
disappointment and contempt might suggest these discrepancy beliefs do in fact represent 
moral judgments. Work on proscriptive and prescriptive morality might provide that 
evidence. 
 Proscriptive and prescriptive morality. Janoff-Bulman and colleagues’ (2009) 
work on proscriptive and prescriptive morality is particularly relevant to understanding 
when people might express feelings of disappointment in and/or contempt for humanity 
as a function of AI and AO-discrepancies. These authors suggest that lay perceivers 
conceive of morality as rules, norms, and intuitions that motivate the avoidance of 
negative outcomes while encouraging positive outcomes. In this way, morality comes in 
two forms: (1) proscriptive morality, which discourages bad behavior (i.e., “should nots,” 
like lying, stealing, intentionally harming, etc.) and (2) prescriptive morality, which 
encourages prosocial behavior (i.e., “shoulds,” like being caring/compassionate, 
considerate, honest, hard working, etc.). In this sense, moral principles such as “I must 
not lie” and “I must tell the truth,” which appear the same, are actually perceived quite 
differently. 
 Lay perceivers acknowledge the importance of both proscriptive and prescriptive 
moral behavior, and perceive violations of the two as equally serious, or morally 
“weighty.” However, there is a negative bias, such that people are more attuned to 
proscriptive morality than prescriptive morality, responding with greater disapproval to 
proscriptive violations than prescriptive violations (Study 1, Study 5). Furthermore, 
adherence to proscriptive morality is seen as dutiful, while prescriptive morality is more a 
matter of choice, although at times it, too, can be dutiful (e.g., parental childcare 
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obligations). However, they also find that people give more “moral credit” to others who 
perform prescriptive moral acts than those who refrain from proscriptive violations, 
whether the prescriptive act was performed out of a sense of duty or desire. They 
conclude then, that to be perceived as a moral person, one must refrain from proscriptive 
violations. However, to be seen as a highly moral person, one must also strive to perform 
positive moral acts.  
 Tying this work back to SDT, Janoff-Bulman and colleagues’ describe 
proscriptive and prescriptive morality as intimately related to Higgins’ (1987) conception 
of the ought and ideal representations of the self, others, and groups. Consider first the 
apparent overlap between lay perceptions of proscriptive morality and the ought 
representation. Both involve meeting minimum standards of conduct and the avoidance 
of negative consequences (Higgins, 1987; Janoff-Bulman et al, 2009; Studies 3 & 4). 
Now, consider the apparent overlap between lay perceptions of prescriptive morality and 
the ideal representations. Both describe fulfilling one’s potential by going beyond the 
minimal standard in order to activate positive outcomes. Thus, proscriptive morality 
appears to be the driving force behind the ought representation, while prescriptive 
morality appears to be the driving force behind the ideal representation. Therefore, AO-
discrepancies are likely akin to proscriptive moral violations, while AI-discrepancies are 
likely akin to prescriptive moral violations.  
  When will people express disappointment in and/or contempt for humanity? 
Given the literature reviewed above, it seems that disappointment in humanity might be a 
direct result of perceiving that humanity, in general, falls short of prescriptive moral 
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ideals, while contempt for humanity might be a direct result of perceiving that humanity, 
in general, fails to inhibit proscriptive moral violations.  
Attributions Might Change the Meaning of Discrepancies 
 The findings discussed above are compelling, yet some researchers question the 
consistency with which AO- and AI-discrepancies are associated with the emotions 
predicted by SDT (Bruch, Rivet & Laurenti, 2000; Petrocelli & Smith, 2005; Szymanski 
& Cash, 1995). For example, Bruch, Rivet and Laurenti (2000) found a relationship 
between AI-discrepancies and emotions related to depression, but were unable to find a 
relationship between AO-discrepancies and anxiety, as SDT would predict. Szymanski 
and Cash (2005), in the context of women’s body image, found no relationship between 
AO-discrepancies and agitation-related emotions, nor could they find the hypothesized 
relationship between AI-discrepancies and dejection-related emotions. Clearly, there are 
inconsistencies here. An important question to ask, then, is this: When discrepancies are 
unrelated to the specific emotions posited by SDT, is it possible that there is a moderating 
variable in play that changes the meaning of the discrepancy thereby changing the 
emotional response? 
Research within the domain of Attribution Theory provides evidence that might 
help to answer this important question. Bernard Weiner (1985; also see Weiner, 2006 for 
a complete review) proposed a theory acknowledging a number of mediating variables 
between an observed behavior and the responses elicited in an observer. Specifically, 
Weiner suggested that the cause to which one attributes to an observed behavior—
discrepant behavior in this case—influences the nature of the emotion felt by the observer 
(Weiner, 2006). Once an observer scrutinizes the properties of the chosen cause of the 
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observed behavior—especially suffering and controllability implications (see Gill, 
Andreychik, & Getty, 2013)—these properties bring about a unique emotional response 
(i.e., anger, sympathy). Finally, after an emotion is elicited, the explainer responds 
behaviorally (i.e., approach, avoid, etc.). Weiner generalized this sequence as one of 
thinking  feeling  action.  
There are several causes that one might use to explain an observed behavior, each 
of which might carry with it a unique emotional consequence. The most notable 
characteristic that differentiates families of explanations is the internal-external causal 
distinction (Andreychik & Gill, 2009; Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1985; 2006; Gill & 
Andreychik, 2010; Gill, Andreychik, Getty, 2013). For example, an observer might infer 
that a discrepant behavior was actually caused by external forces working against the 
actor, as when person A acts violently and his violent behavior is caused by a history of 
abuse suffered at the hands of person B. Person B’s abuse is therefore the ultimate 
“external” caused of person A’s transgressions.  In cases like this, observers often 
respond to person A with compassion and with less blame and anger than when the cause 
to which one attributes is internal to person A; that is, when the cause resides solely 
within person A (Andreychik & Gill, 2009; Gill & Andreychik, 2010; Gill, Andreychik, 
& Getty, 2013; Weiner, 2006; Zucker & Weiner, 1993). 
Within the internal family of explanations, causes might very along several 
dimensions, including the global-specificity dimension (Bradbury & Fincham, 1990, as 
cited by Gill & Andreychik, 2010), mental-state inferences of desires, beliefs, and 
valuings (Malle, 1999, 2004), and the linked dimensions of controllability and stability. 
Controllability in particular has been a guiding topic of much research and is often 
31 
framed as the most important mediator of people’s emotional reactions to the acts and 
outcomes of others (see Weiner, 2006; also see Gill, Andreychik, & Getty, 2013, and 
Mullen & Skitka, 2009, for competing views).  
Weiner and Kukla (1970) presented early evidence highlighting the important 
implications of both controllability and stability. Participants were placed in the role of an 
educator and asked to react to the performance of a fictitious student who failed to 
achieve academically. The participants were informed that the student either (a) had low 
intelligence (uncontrollable/stable) or (b) did not exert effort (controllable/unstable). The 
authors found that participants experienced more anger and responded more punitively in 
the low effort condition than in the low intelligence condition. The authors concluded that 
the key difference between the two conditions was that the student-target in the low effort 
condition had more control over his academic outcome than the student-target with low 
intelligence. Indeed, additional studies by a number of researchers have concluded that in 
response to a negative outcome, the degree to which an actor could have done otherwise 
is directly related to the extent to which an explainer will respond with anger and 
punishment (see also Meyer & Mulherin, 1980; Reisenzein, 1986; Weiner, Perry, & 
Magnusson, 1988).  
Given insight from Attribution Theory, one could infer that emotional responses 
to moral discrepancies might differ depending on whether they are attributed to external 
versus internal causes, or within the internal distinction, controllable/unstable versus 
uncontrollable/stable causes. With this insight, Petrocelli and Smith (2005) suggested that 
AO and AI-discrepancies take on different meaning in the context of different causal 
attributions; that is, different emotions are elicited depending on the cause of the 
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perceived discrepancy. They suggested that when one attributes the AO or AI-
discrepancy to internal causes (“choices, lack of motivation, attitudes”), the pattern of 
emotional responding is consistent with SDT. Thus, they predicted that one would 
experience agitation-related or dejection-related emotions to the extent that the AO or AI-
discrepancy was caused by one’s own (or the ingroup’s) actions, characteristics, or 
nature.  
 When one attributes a discrepancy to external causes (“bad luck, unfair situations, 
other people”), Petrocelli and Smith posited a different pattern of emotional responding. 
For example, they proposed that externally caused AO-discrepancies would elicit anger-
related emotions, because an external force blocked one’s (or the ingroup’s) ability to 
meet the minimum standard or obligation. In this case, it’s not the effect of the perceived 
discrepancy (i.e., a negative outcome) per se that elicits the emotion, but the perception 
that the discrepancy is foisted on the self/ingroup from without. In contrast, externally-
caused AI-discrepancies are posited to elicit “emotions of discontent” (i.e., 
dissatisfaction), because the lack of a positive outcome/event is due to external situations 
(p. 1630).  
 Indeed, Petrocelli and Smith (Study 1) found evidence supporting the pattern of 
relationships just described. Furthermore, in Study 2, they sought to extend these findings 
to the group level, examining the emotional consequences of AI and AO-discrepancies 
regarding the ingroup (Americans). They found for the most part, the same pattern of 
relationships noted above; however, this pattern was most strongly evident among 
participants who strongly identified with the group.  
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 Petrocelli and Smith did not examine whether controllability/stability implications 
of internal causes also influence emotional responses to discrepancies. Applying their 
insights to the question of emotional responses towards humanity, one could predict that 
perceived AI-discrepancies in humanity could evoke feelings of disappointment in 
humanity (a dejection-related emotion) to the extent that the cause of the discrepancy is 
perceived internal to humanity, and this might be especially true among participants who 
strongly identify with humanity on a group level.   
 However, given insight from research in the Social Identity domain, strong-
identifiers should respond differently to distinct internal causes (Costarelli, 2012). That 
is, strong-identifiers should be far more likely to accept explanations suggesting a 
discrepancy is due to controllable/unstable characteristics, not because they relieve the 
group from responsibility (as would be the case with external causes: the preferred 
explanations for strong-identifiers), but because (a) uncontrollable/stable causes might 
suggest that there is something inherently wrong with the group, which strong-identifiers 
are unlikely to accept, and (b) controllable/stable causes suggest that the behavior is 
malleable, and therefore the group might overcome the discrepancy in the future: There is 
the potential for the group (or an individual) to rectify the pattern of behavior (Covington 
& Omelich, 1981).  
 Finally, because Petrocelli and Smith did not examine feelings of contempt, we 
can only speculate as to how their finding might apply to feelings of contempt for 
humanity.  We can imagine that AO-discrepancies could potentially evoke feelings of 
contempt for humanity among weak-identifiers, because weak-identifiers will likely 
attribute the cause of those discrepancies to internal, uncontrollable/stable characteristics 
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of humanity, a key determinant of contempt. One thing to note about these presumptions 
is that they appear counter to Weiner and Kukla’s (1970) findings that suggest observers 
respond with less negativity (i.e., less anger and blame) to uncontrollable/stable causes. 
However, Weiner and Kukla did not examine contempt.  
Given the research reviewed above, contempt and anger, while similar, represent 
distinct emotions with their own unique facial expressions, “appraisals, antecedent 
events, [and especially] probable behavioral responses” (Ekman, 1992a, p. 170; Izard, 
1971; Mackie et al., 2000). Beyond specific facial expressions, contempt is associated 
with inferring stable characteristics in an offending party (i.e., the target’s core nature), 
while anger is associated with the personal implications of the specific offense (Roseman, 
Antoniou & Jose, 1996). Further, contempt is associated with avoiding or otherwise 
distancing the self from an offending party, while anger is associated with approaching 
the offending party with the desire to punish. Thus, the suggestion that contempt might be 
elicited from AO-discrepancies caused by uncontrollable/stable characteristics (especially 
among weak-identifiers) is not incongruent with Weiner and Kukla, it is presented in 
addition to their insight. It might be that discrepancies attributed to uncontrollable/stable 
causes have several potential emotional consequences: they might lead us to forgo blame 
and punishment, but express contempt in their place.  
 Armed with Attribution Theory, Petrocelli and Smith provide evidence suggesting 
that causal attributions shape the meaning of perceived discrepancies and the subsequent 
emotional response. However that might be, they did not examine the role of 
controllability/stability implications of internal explanations. Petrocelli and Smith do, 
however, provide room for speculation about those implications as well as suggest at 
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least one psychological mechanism that might lead to these specific attributions (ingroup 
identification). Nevertheless, they did not specifically test for psychological mechanisms 
that might determine when a specific cause will be attributed. Therefore, to build on this 
work, two potential mechanisms (identification with all of humanity, implicit theories of 
personality) that might determine when humanity’s moral discrepancies will be attributed 
to specific causes will be examined.  
Identification with Humanity and Implicit Theories: Motivational and Cognitive 
Determinants of Attributions for Discrepancies  
 Attributions shape the meaning of discrepancies, thereby modulating their relation 
to emotional responses. The question now is what are the factors that influence the 
attributions people make for humanity’s AO- and AI-discrepancies. It was predicted that 
two factors would be important: (1) Identification with all of humanity (IWAH or, feeling 
a part of, love toward, and concern for all humans everywhere; McFarland, Webb, & 
Brown, 2012), and (2) Implicit theories of personality (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; 
Dweck, 2008; Dweck, Chu, Hong, 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). These predictions will 
be elaborated on below.  
 Identification with all of humanity. Do people identify with all of humanity? If 
so, is there evidence suggesting that those who strongly identify with humanity might 
respond to discrepancy beliefs about humanity in a similar manner as strong-identifying 
Americans did in the study by Petrocelli and Smith (2005)? Potentially. 
 Identifying with all of humanity suggests an emotional and personal connection to 
one’s species, just as strong-identifying Americans might feel an emotional and personal 
connection to their nation. In fact, McFarland, Webb, and Brown (2012) found that 
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identification with all of humanity is distinct from universalism, characterized by a sense 
of human self-categorization while showing concern for others on a global scale. 
Identification with all of humanity is positively associated with knowledge of global 
concerns, voluntary exposure to humanitarian concerns, and support for international 
charities. In contrast, identification with all of humanity is negatively associated with 
authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996) ethnocentrism (Pratto & Glasford, 2008) and social 
dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994) (Study 7).  
 How might identification with all of humanity moderate the relationship between 
perceived discrepancies and feelings of disappointment in humanity and/or contempt for 
humanity?  Insight from Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Taylor, 1979) suggests 
that there might be motivational factors driving the moderating force behind 
identification with all of humanity. SIT suggests that people have a strong need or desire 
to affiliate with a valued group, and when they do so, that group affiliation becomes a 
part of their positive self-image. Thus, strong-identifying group members should be 
motivated to attribute discrepant behavior to causes that minimize the potential threat to 
their positive self-identity (Mackie & Smith, 1998; Mackie, Smith, & Ray, 2008; Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979). Thus, identification with all of humanity might moderate the effect of 
discrepancies on a given emotional response through the clever use of causal attributions. 
  Human identity might moderate the relationship between discrepancy beliefs and 
a social emotion via causal attributions. First, the hypothesized relationship between AO-
discrepancies and contempt for humanity should be evident when identification with 
humanity is low, because strong-identifiers should be motivated to attribute those 
discrepancies to unstable characteristics or even external causes, as they work to protect 
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one’s positive self-identity in the face of negative information about one’s ingroup 
(Costarelli, 2012). Second, the hypothesized relationship between AI-discrepancies and 
disappointment in humanity should be evident when identification is high, because 
strong-identifiers might have greater positive expectation of humanity, despite attributing 
the discrepancies to unstable characteristics. In other words, compared to people who 
only weakly identify with humanity, people who strongly identify with humanity will 
want humanity to “be all it can be,” to reach its potential, its ideal desirable state, which 
is beneficial for the group—Learning that humanity is falling short of that goal should be 
met with greater feelings of disappointment. Furthermore, the moderating effects of 
human identity on this relationship might be partially or completely mediated by causal 
attributions. Thus, when strong-identifiers are given information that humanity is not 
“being all it can be,” they should be highly motivated to attribute those discrepancies to 
controllable/unstable causes, signaling hope for change in a positive direction.    
 Implicit theories of personality. Carol Dweck and colleagues suggest that 
people have domain specific implicit theories that influence how they interpret domain 
relevant behavior, which influence their causal attributions (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; 
Dweck, 2008; Dweck, Chu, Hong, 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). For example, in the 
moral domain, they suggest that these theories influence the extent to which people 
believe morally relevant behavior is related to malleable personal characteristics (Dweck 
& Leggett, 1988). Entity-theorists emphasize traits, attributing moral behavior (or the 
lack thereof) to stable characteristics, while incremental-theorists focus on mediating 
factors, attributing moral behavior (or the lack thereof) to more malleable characteristics 
(Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995). It stands to reason, then, that one’s implicit theory will 
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influence how he or she will interpret the cause of a given discrepancy (Dweck, 2008; 
Dweck, Chu, Hong, 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Specifically, incremental-theorists 
are hypothesized to attribute discrepancies to controllable causes (i.e., lack of effort). On 
the other hand, entity-theorists are hypothesized to attribute discrepancies to 
uncontrollable causes (i.e., flawed human nature).   
The Current Proposal 
 The work reviewed above provides theoretical support for the argument that when 
humanity is perceived as not behaving compassionately enough (i.e., AI-
discrepancies/prescriptive moral violation), because of unstable, controllable 
characteristics, feelings of disappointment in humanity might emerge. It also supports the 
argument that when humanity is perceived as failing to meet minimal levels of moral 
behavior (AO-discrepancies/proscriptive moral violation), because of stable 
characteristics (i.e., humanity has a flawed, “evil” nature), feeling of contempt might 
emerge. Furthermore, this work supports the proposed moderators (identification with all 
of humanity, implicit theories of personality) of the effect of a given discrepancy on its 
associated negative emotion.  
 Specifically, identification with all of humanity (IWAH; McFarland, Webb, & 
Brown, 2012) is predicted to moderate the effects of both AI and AO-discrepancies. 
While strong-identifiers might favor external explanations (Gill & Andreychik, 2010), 
external explanations might not always be available or reasonable. In these cases, strong-
identifiers should be motivated to rely on those internal explanations that preserve one’s 
positive self-image. The most obvious choice, then, is to attribute the discrepancies to 
unstable causes, as they are known to provide an “identity-protecting function” 
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(Costarelli, 2012, p. 47). Of course, this pattern of responding is most likely to occur 
when the discrepancies in question are AI-discrepancies, as they imply the absence of 
desired behavior or outcome, the primary determinant of feelings of disappointment (De 
Cremer, 2006; Higgins, 1987; Petrocelli & Smith; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002; Wubben 
et al., 2009;)
1
. 
 A similar pattern of responding as those described for strong-identifiers might 
emerge for perceivers who have an implicit incremental theory as compared to those who 
have an implicit entity theory (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Dweck, 2008; Dweck, Chu, 
Hong, 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Entity-theorists attribute morally relevant 
behavior to stable/uncontrollable characteristics, while incremental-theorists attribute 
morally relevant behavior to unstable/controllable characteristics. Thus, entity-theorists 
should attribute discrepant behavior to underlying characteristics (i.e., a flawed nature), 
while incremental-theorists should focus on the potential to cultivate appropriate 
behavior. In this sense, incremental-theorists should have a tendency to attribute 
discrepant behavior to unstable, controllable characteristics.    
 A series of studies designed to test these hypotheses is presented below. First, the 
results of a pilot study are reported, which was conducted in order to construct measures 
of disappointment in and contempt for humanity. Study 1 tested the proposed models of 
disappointment and contempt via regression techniques in which all relevant variables 
noted above were measured and subjected to—for lack of a better term—quasi-mediated 
moderation analysis (Aiken & West, 1991; Baron & Kenny, 1986; Muller, Judd, & 
Yzerbyt, 2005; Preacher & Hayes, 2008; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007).  
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 Studies 2 through 4 employed experimental manipulations in which manipulated 
discrepancies were paired with a single manipulated moderator and two measured 
moderators in order to better establish causal relationships between variables of interest. 
In Study 2, causal attributions were manipulated. In Study 3, common humanity was 
manipulated (as a manipulation of IWAH; McFarland et al., 2012). Finally, in Study 4, 
implicit theories were manipulated (Dweck, Chu, & Hong, 1995). Every study examined 
whether the discrepancies manipulation affected feelings of contempt and disappointment 
and tested whether these effects were moderated by identification with all of humanity, 
implicit theories, and causal attributions, regardless of whether the moderators were 
manipulated and/or measured. It was expected that participants in the AO-discrepancies 
condition would report significantly stronger feelings of contempt than participants in the 
AI-discrepancies and Control conditions. This effect was predicted to be pronounced 
among (a) weak-identifiers, (b) entity-theorists, and/or (c) when AO-discrepancies were 
attributed to human nature. In contrast, it was expected that participants in the AI-
discrepancies condition would report significantly greater feelings of disappointment in 
humanity than participants in the other two conditions, especially among (a) strong-
identifiers, (b) incremental-theorists, and/or (c) when AI-discrepancies were attributed to 
controllable causes.  
 Further, Studies 2 through 4 included behavioral measures to test for the effects of 
disappointment in and contempt for humanity on social behavior. In Studies 2 and 3, 
participants were given the opportunity to write a response to the discrepancy 
information. In Study 4, participants were given the opportunity to donate a sum of 
money to UNICEF. For both measures, it was predicted that disappointment in humanity 
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would be associated with prosocial behavior (greater word-count in defense of humanity, 
more dollars donated) as a means of recouping moral credit for humanity, while contempt 
would be associated with social avoidance (low word-count/no defense of humanity, few 
dollars donated) in order to maintain distance between the self and humanity.  
Pilot Study: Measure Development 
 The purpose of this pilot study was to develop independent measures of feelings 
of disappointment and contempt for humanity.     
Method 
 Participants. Ninety-seven Lehigh University students (48 females) (Mage= 19.24 
years old) participated in exchange for partial course credit in an introductory psychology 
course.   
 Procedure. Twenty-four negative emotion adjectives were sourced from 
www.merriam-webster.com and www.thefreedictionary.com, including disappointment 
and contempt. Some adjectives were selected based on their suggested similarity to 
disappointment (i.e., dispirited, frustration, irritation, dissatisfaction) or contempt (i.e., 
aggravation, scorn, disgust, loathing). The remaining adjectives were expected to be 
unrelated to disappointment or contempt, but were included for exploratory purposes and 
to provide further evidence that disappointment and contempt are separate from other 
negative emotions.  
 The measure included the following instruction: “Please circle a number that best 
describes the frequency you feel the following emotions towards people as a whole.” 
Participants then rated their experience of each emotion adjective on a 1-5 scale, 
anchored on “Never” and “Very Often.” See Appendix A. 
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Results 
 Exploratory factor analysis with maximum likelihood (ML) extraction and 
promax rotation was used to examine the structure and relationship of these adjectives. 
Examination of the scree plot (see Figure 4) suggested a six-factor solution with 
eigenvalues greater than one (11.31, 2.36, 1.83, 1.34, 1.29, 1.05), which explained 68.4% 
of the variance in the data (factor 1: 40.41%, factor 2: 8.34%, factor 3: 6.52%, factor 4: 
4.80%, factor 5: 4.6%, factor 6: 3.75%). A change in chi-squared test confirmed that the 
six-factor solution was more appropriate than the five-factor solution (∆X2(23) = 50.89, p 
< .01).  
 Examination of the pattern and structure matrices made it clear that contempt and 
disappointment loaded on independent factors (disappointment on factor 1 and contempt 
on factor 2).
2
 However, as seen in Table 1, several of the adjectives loaded strongly on 
multiple factors. For example, “anger,” “displeasure,” and “upset” loaded strongly on 
factors 1 and 2, while “let down” loaded strongly on factors 1 and 6; “loathing” loaded on 
factors 2 and 3. Because “anger,” “upset” and “displeasure” loaded strongly on factors 
associated with both disappointment and contempt, they were removed from further 
consideration. “Let down” was considered and ultimately retained in the measure of 
disappointment. In previous research, disappointment has been described as a member of 
the family of “sadness emotions,” with which feeling let down is clearly associated 
(Levine, 1996; Matsumoto & Ekman, 2004; van Kleef et al., 2010; van Doorn et al., 
2012). Similarly, as both loathing and contempt are associated with an intense aversion 
toward a target, it, too, was retained in the factor associated with contempt. Finally, as the 
goal was to develop measures of disappointment and contempt, items loading on factors 3 
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through 6 were removed from the final measurement tools, as the EFA results suggested 
these items were less likely to uniquely capture feelings associated with disappointment 
and/or contempt. 
 The final result of the analysis was two, five-item measures of disappointment in 
humanity (disappointment, frustration, irritation, let down, and dissatisfaction; α = .85; M 
= 2.51, SD = .79) and contempt for humanity (contempt, scorn, aggravation, loathing, and 
disgust;
3
 α = .84; M = 3.35, SD = .79; factor 2), which together explained 54.26% of the 
variance associated with the 10 items that made it into the final emotion scales (factor 1: 
44.81%; factor 2: 9.45%). Given their shared negativity, the measures of contempt and 
disappointment were related (r = .58, p < .0001).  
Discussion 
 The objective of this pilot study was to create independent measures of contempt 
for and disappointment in humanity. The results suggest that feelings of disappointment 
and contempt can be viewed as discrete negative emotions, although they do share 
significant negativity. Indeed, several emotion adjectives were associated with both 
disappointment and contempt. These adjectives were removed from further consideration 
in hopes of controlling for some of that shared negativity. Nevertheless, the measures 
remained correlated. Further control will need to be incorporated in subsequent analyses. 
Shared negativity will be controlled for in two ways: (1) contempt and disappointment 
items will be presented separately and counterbalanced; (2) by including both emotions in 
all regression equations.  
 Limitations. One significant limitation was the relatively small sample size used 
to conduct the EFA. Indeed, Costello and Osborne (2005) suggest that EFA is a “large 
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sample” analysis and that a participant to item ratio of 20:1 is preferred. Here the 
participant-to-item ratio was only 4:1. While low, this ratio is not outside of the norm of 
published studies that used EFA. Indeed, in their review of the literature, Costello and 
Osborne (2005) found that 62.9% of published analysis over a two-year period had a ratio 
of 10:1 or less and that nearly 17% used a ratio of 2:1. Nevertheless, the small sample 
size in this study might result in difficulty replicating these exact results.  
Study 1: A Test of Two Models 
 The purpose of Study1 was to provide initial empirical support for the proposed 
models of disappointment in and contempt for humanity. See Figures 2 and 3. Insight 
from Baron and Kenny (1986), Aiken and West (1991), Kraemer, Wilson, Fauiburn, and 
Agras (2002), and Muller, Judd and Yzerbyt (2005) guided analysis of these data. The 
techniques were “guided” and not replications of their techniques, because the proposed 
models do not exactly fit with the types of mediated moderation or moderated mediation 
models these authors describe. Their techniques simply informed the plan for analysis. 
These authors describe models in which the effect of X on Y occurs because of some 
mediating variable (Me), which is induced by X, and the extent to which X induces Me, 
or Me affects Y, is moderated by an additional variable (Mo), which is uncorrelated with 
X (Kraemer et al., 2002; Muller et al., 2005). The reason X and Mo should be 
uncorrelated is that there is an assumption that the moderating variable comes before the 
“treatment” variable X. That is, Mo represents a situation, context, or some relatively 
stable characteristic that was present prior to X affecting Y (Kraemer et al., 2002; Muller 
et al., 2005). If X and Mo covary, then the proposed moderation cannot take place. 
Finally, according to Muller et al. (2005), both moderated mediation and mediated 
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moderation take this same form; the only difference is a matter of emphasis: if the 
researcher is ultimately interested in moderation, it is a mediated moderation model. If 
the researcher is ultimately interested in mediation, it is a moderated mediation model.  
 The most important distinction between this form and the one proposed is that it 
does not identify an intervening “mediator” (Me) between discrepancies (X) and the 
emotional response (Y). Rather, it proposes that two variables (identification with all of 
humanity, implicit theories) moderate the effect of discrepancies on the emotional 
response, and the moderating effects of these two variables are carried (mediated) via an 
additional moderator (causal attributions). Thus, because moderation is proposed to take 
place via a mediating moderator, for lack of a better term, the proposed model is 
described as a “quasi-mediated moderation” model. The core model can be represented 
with four equations: 
 ER1 =  B 10 + B 11(D) + B 13(IWAH) + B 14(IT) + B 15(A) + B 16(D*IWAH) +  
  B17(D*IT) + B 18(ER2) + ε1      (1)  
 A =  B 20 + B 21(IWAH) + B 23(IT) + ε2     (2) 
 ER1 =  B 30 + B 31(D) + B 32(IWAH) + B 34(IT) + B 34(A) + B 35(D*IWAH) +  
  B36(D*IT) + B 37(D*A) + B 38(ER2) + ε3    (3) 
 BR =  B 40 + B 41(ER1) + B 42(ER2) + ε4      (4) 
 Emotional responses are the outcome variables in Equations 1 and 3. In this 
example, the emotional response (ER1) is contempt. Equation 1 includes five 
standardized predictor variables, including perceived discrepancies (D), identification 
with all of humanity (IWAH), implicit theory (IT), and causal attributions (A). In 
Equation 1, the first four variables were used to create several interaction terms, 
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including perceived moral discrepancies by identification with all of humanity 
(D*IWAH), and perceived moral discrepancies by implicit theories interaction (D*IT). 
Equation 2 includes the same standardized IWAH and IT terms, but here they predicted 
causal attributions. Equation 1 also included a term for controlling for shared negativity 
between contempt and disappointment (ER2). In this example, “ER2” is disappointment.   
 Equation 2 was included to demonstrate that IWAH and IT predict the expected 
mediating moderator (i.e., causal attributions (A)). In addition to all the previously 
described standardized terms and interaction, the perceived discrepancy by causal 
attributions interaction term (D*A) was included in Equation 3 to predict ER1. Equation 
3 will be critical for demonstrating causal attribution’s (A) potential quasi-mediating 
effects of both IWAH’s and IT’s moderating effects. Finally, behavioral response (BR) is 
the outcome variable in Equations 4. Equation 4 includes two standardized predictor 
variables, representing the two types of emotional responses of interest, disappointment 
(ER1) and contempt (ER2). Similarly, as one’s identification with humanity is 
significantly related to one’s identification with his or her community and country, as per 
the instructions of McFarland and colleagues (2012), the effects of identification with 
community and country will be controlled for by using a standardized residual of 
identification with humanity regressed on identification with community and country, so 
as to isolate identification with humanity, which is intertwined with community and 
national identities. 
 Now, we can apply these equations to the predicted core model. Recall the 
proposed core model (Figure 1): perceived moral discrepancies in humanity (D) lead to 
negative feelings expressed toward humanity (ER). The extent to which perceived moral 
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discrepancies lead to negative feelings towards humanity will depend on the extent to 
which one identifies with all humanity (D* IWAH), and one’s implicit theory (D*IT), 
because both identification with humanity (IWAH) and implicit theories (IT) are expect 
to influence the types of causes one attributes (A) to perceived discrepancies (D). Thus, 
the moderating effects of both identification with humanity (i.e., D*IWAH) and implicit 
theories (D*IT) will be carried (mediated) by causal attributions (D*A). Finally, the 
specific negative emotions (i.e., contempt [ER1] and disappointment [ER2]) are expected 
to lead to unique behavioral responses (BR). Note that only the key pathways of the 
models are depicted in Figures 1-3. Additional pathways (e.g., the paths from IWAH and 
IT to ER) are omitted for clarity.  
 Thus, a model of feelings for disappointment should demonstrate that perceived 
AI-discrepancies in humanity (i.e., humanity is not compassionate enough) evoke 
feelings of disappointment in humanity; however, AI-discrepancies might only do so if 
the perceived cause of the discrepancy were controllable/unstable characteristics. The 
relationship between AI-discrepancies and feelings of disappointment in humanity might 
also depend on the extent to which one identifies with all of humanity or the extent to 
which one is an incremental theorist, because both are likely to lead to the perception that 
controllable/unstable characteristics are, indeed, the cause of AI-discrepancies.  
In contrast, a model of feelings of contempt for humanity should demonstrate that 
perceived AO-discrepancies in humanity (i.e., humanity is immoral) evoke feelings of 
contempt in humanity; however, AO-discrepancies might only do so if the perceived 
cause of discrepancies were uncontrollable/stable characteristics (i.e., human nature). 
Again, the relationship between AO-discrepancies and feelings of contempt might also 
48 
depend on identification with humanity and one’s implicit theory. Strong-identifiers 
should be motivated to maintain a favorable impression of humanity. They might do so 
by refusing to attribute AO-discrepancies to uncontrollable/stable characteristics, as these 
attributions question humanity’s—one’s own—positive self-image. On the other hand, an 
entity theorist will likely attribute AO-discrepancies to uncontrollable/stable 
characteristics, because such explanations are theory-consistent. 
 Finally, feelings of disappointment in humanity are expected to motivate 
prosocial behavior, as a form of recuperative response, while feelings of contempt for 
humanity are expected to motivate social avoidance. 
Method 
 Participants. Three hundred participants were recruited on-line, via the 
Mechanical Turk interface created by Amazon and paid $.50 for their participation. 
Twenty-three participants were excluded from the analysis after failing the attention 
check question (described below), leaving 277 participants (146 females). All participants 
were American citizens over 18 years old (M = 39.66, SD= 14.21), and the majority of 
participants were well educated (i.e., 64% held a bachelor’s degree or higher) and 
Caucasian (80.8%). All participants provided informed consent prior to their 
participation. 
 Procedure. Participants were first introduced to a study of “social beliefs and 
judgments.” After participants provided informed consent, they were presented with an 
“attention check” question in which they were instructed NOT to answer the question and 
skip forward, to demonstrate that they read the instructions carefully. Twenty-three 
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participants failed to read the instructions and answered the question. These participants 
were excluded from the following analyses.   
 So as to confirm the proposed relationship between AI-discrepancy beliefs and 
prescriptive moral violations, and between AO-discrepancy beliefs and proscriptive 
moral violations, like Petrocelli and Smith (2005), the session began by explaining to 
participants the characteristics of ought and ideal beliefs. Participants were given the 
same brief statements used by Petrocelli and Smith, but modified to represent beliefs 
about humanity rather than the self. For ought beliefs, participants read: 
 “Your ought representation of humanity is the representation of humanity in 
which all people fulfill their duties and obligations. It’s defined by people behaving in the 
ways you believe people should or ought to behave. It’s not necessary that people 
actually behave this way now, only that you believe people ought to behave this way.” 
 For ideal beliefs, participants read: 
 “Your ideal representation of humanity is the representation in which all people 
behave in a way you’d really like them to behave. It’s defined by the way you would 
ideally like people to behave. It’s not necessary that people actually behave this way now, 
only that you want people to behave this way.” 
 With each description, participants were given several examples of moral proscriptions 
(e.g., lying, stealing, intentionally harming, etc.; see Appendix F) and moral 
prescription/AI-discrepancy (e.g., being caring/compassionate, considerate, honest, hard 
working, etc.; see Appendix G) used by Janoff-Bulman et al. (2009). Participants then 
rated the extent to which they believed humanity “should not” participate in each 
proscriptive behavior and the extent to which they believe participate “should” participate 
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in each prescriptive behavior on a 1-7 scale.  
  The assumption of the measure was that if participants believed that proscriptive 
moral violations were behaviors that humanity “should not” do and prescriptive moral 
violations were behaviors humanity “should” do, then if humanity behavior is seen in 
violation of those beliefs, then humanity is in a discrepant state between the actual and 
ought and/or actual and ideal. It was reasoned, then, that if one commits a prescriptive 
violation, his or her actual self is discrepant from his or her ideal self. If one commits a 
proscriptive moral violation, then his or her actual self is discrepant from his or her ought 
self.  Thus, responses to the “should not” behaviors were averaged to form a composite 
score representing ought beliefs (M = 4.34, SD = .48), while responses to the “should” 
behaviors were averaged to form a composite score representing ideal beliefs (M = 4.37, 
SD = .46). As mean should/should not beliefs were well above the midpoint of the scale, 
the pattern of means suggests that participants strongly believed behaviors associated 
with moral proscriptions (e.g., lying, cheating, stealing, etc.) should be avoided while 
behaviors associated with moral prescriptions (e.g., being compassionate, caring, being 
kind, etc.) should be enacted.  
  Next, participants’ discrepancy beliefs were measured for each ought and ideal 
behavior. Participants rated the extent to which they believe people in general fail to meet 
their moral obligations (AO-discrepancies) or fail to enact highly moral behavior (AI-
discrepancies). For example, in response to dishonest behavior, participants responded to 
a 1-7 scale anchored with “People completely meet the obligation to avoid dishonest 
behavior” and “People completely fail to meet the obligation to avoid dishonest 
behavior.” In response to compassionate behavior, participants respond to a 1-7 scale 
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anchored with “People always act compassionately” and “People often fail to act 
compassionately.” See Appendix H. The 13 actual/ought discrepancy-belief items were 
averaged to create a score representing AO-discrepancy beliefs (M = 4.60, SD = 1.06, α = 
.93). Similarly, the 12 actual/ideal discrepancy belief items were averaged to create a 
score representing AI-discrepancy beliefs (M = 4.73, SD = 1.08, α = .93). Mean responses 
indicated that, on average, participants believe humanity often fails to meet moral 
obligations and often fails to activate ideal, moral behaviors.  
 Next, participants rated the extent to which they agreed with some of potential 
causes of the different discrepancies on 1-7 scales with appropriate anchors (see 
Appendix H). They rated whether human nature was to blame for AO-discrepancies (M = 
4.03, SD = 1.97, α = .97) and AI-discrepancies (M = 3.92, SD = 1.92, α = .93); whether 
people have control over their AO-discrepancies (M = 6.01, SD = .78, α = .93) and AI-
discrepancies (M = 5.95, SD = .75, α = .92); whether people choose to make AO-
discrepancies (M = 6.02, SD = .78, α = .93) or AI-discrepancies (M = 6.02, SD = .78, α = 
.95); or whether external factors are the cause of AO-discrepancies (M = 4.53, SD = 1.26, 
α = .93) and AI-discrepancies (M = 4.65, SD = 1.23, α = .94).  
 These responses were subjected to an exploratory factor analysis with ML 
extraction and promax rotation. The scree plot (see Figure 5) suggested that a three-factor 
solution with eigenvalues greater than one (3.45, 1.75, and 1.69) explained 99.97% of the 
variance in the data. Factor 1 included choice and control items for both AO and AI-
discrepancies (factor loadings were .911 and higher). Factor 2 included external items for 
both AO and AI-discrepancies (.912, .916). Factor 3 included human nature items for 
both AO and AI-discrepancies (.887, .896). Thus, items loading on each factor were 
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combined to create composite scores reflecting the belief that (1) people have 
Control/Choice over their discrepant behavior (Factor 1; M = 6.00, SD = .73), (2) Human 
Nature is a cause of discrepant behavior (Factor 2; M = 3.98, SD =1.28), and that (3) 
External forces cause discrepant behavior (Factor 3; M = 4.59, SD = 1.21), respectively. 
It is important to note that only one causal attribution term was listed in the previously 
proposed model equations. Previously, attributions of human nature and controllability 
were thought to be opposite ends of the same type of attribution; that was not the case 
here. While questions pertaining to human nature and questions pertaining to 
control/choice were negatively correlated (r = -.18, p = .003), the correlation was too 
weak to warrant collapsing them into one term. Thus, model Equations 1, 2, and 3 were 
modified to include both attributions of human nature (AHN) and attribution of 
control/choice (ACC):
 4
 
 ER1 = B10 + B11(D) + B 13(IWAH) + B14(IT) + B15(AHN) + B16(ACC) +   
  B17(D*IWAH) +B18(D*IT) + B 40(ER2) + ε1     (1m)  
 AHN  ACC = B 20 + B 21(IWAH) + B 23(IT) + ε2     (2m) 
 ER1 = B 30 + B 31(D) + B 32(IWAH) + B 33(IT) + B 34(AHN) + B 35(ACC) +  
         B 36(D*IWAH) + B 37(D*IT + B 38(D*ACC) + B 39(D*AHN) +  
  B 40(ER2) + ε3        (3m) 
 Next, participants rated their feeling of disappointment in humanity (M = 3.21, SD 
= .82, α = .93) and contempt for humanity (M = 2.5, SD = .79, α = .83; four-item 
measure) using the same measures described in the pilot study.
5
 While disappointment 
and contempt items consistently loaded on unique factors, disappointment and contempt 
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remain significantly correlated (r = .69, p < .001). Therefore, their shared negativity was 
controlled for in subsequent analyses.  
 Next, the remaining hypothesized moderators were measured. Identification with 
all of humanity was measured using the Identification with All Humanity Scale (IWAH; 
McFarland Webb, & Brown, 2012; see Appendix I). The IWAH is purported to provide a 
relatively reliable gauge of the extent to which people resonate with their community (M 
= 2.89, SD = .81, α = .91), country (America; M = 3.08, SD = .73, α = .88), and humanity 
(M = 3.83, SD = .83, α = .91). The IWAH consists of 9 items for each group, including 
“How often do you use the word ‘we’ to refer to people in your community, Americans, 
people all around the world?” and “How close do you feel to people in your community, 
Americans, people all around the world?” Per the suggestion of McFarland and 
colleagues, the standardized residual of identification with humanity (IWAHr) regressed 
on community identity and American identity was used as the measure of human identity, 
so as to control for the effects of community and American identities.  
 Implicit Theory (IT) was measured using the Implicit Theories of Stability of 
Personality Scale (e.g., Everyone is a certain kind of person, and there is not much they 
can really do to change that), an 8-item measure developed by Levy and Dweck 
(unpublished measure; see Appendix J) and used by Gill and Andreychik (in press) who 
found it had good internal consistency (α = .93). After appropriate reverse coding, the 
measure is structured such that high scores indicate an entity theory, while low scores 
indicate an incremental theory. The measure had good reliability (M = 3.47, SD = 1.41, α 
= .95).  
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 Finally, because it was expected that disappointment and contempt would be 
related to differences in social behavior, specific questions about participants’ social lives 
were included. Specifically, participants were asked about their approach (helping others, 
active socializing) and avoidance behaviors (not seeking socialization, ignoring requests 
for socialization, avoiding opportunities to help, etc.) (See Appendix K). After 
appropriate reverse coding, the measure had acceptable reliability (M = 4.32, SD = 1.13, 
α = .75). On average, participants were quite social.  
Results 
 Relationships among variables. Initial data analysis began by examining the 
simple relationships among the variables of interest. As seen in Table 2, contempt and 
disappointment and AI- and AO-discrepancy beliefs were highly correlated; therefore, 
they were controlled for in subsequent analyses. Also of note, age turned out to be an 
important correlate of many of the constructs of interest. Indeed, older adults expressed 
less contempt for humanity (r = -.20, p = .001), they were less likely to be entity-theorists 
(r = -.13, p = .04), less likely to attribute moral discrepancies to human nature (r = -.20, p 
= .0009), and somewhat less likely to believe that people typically fail to meet moral 
standards (r = -.11, p. = 07). Because age was significantly related to feelings of 
contempt and contempt-relevant constructs, it was included as a covariate.  
Contrary to predictions, both feelings of disappointment in humanity and feelings 
of contempt for humanity were associated with social avoidance. It could be that 
disappointment only leads to positive social behavior among strong-identifiers, those who 
might be motivated to recoup humanity’s moral credit. To test this, IWAHr and the 
interactions between IWAHr and the two emotions were added to model Equation 4: 
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BR = B40 + B41(ER1) + B42(ER2) + B43(IWAH) + B44(ER1*IWAH) +  
  B42(ER 2*IDH)+ ε4        (4m)  
 Finally, the relationship among the proposed moderating variables (i.e., IWAHr, 
implicit theory, causal attributions) was examined. Several of these variables were 
correlated, violating Muller et al.’s suggestion that predictor variables should not be 
correlated with moderating variables. The strength of these correlations was modest at 
best, so it was appropriate to continue with the analysis while monitoring potential 
multicollinearity via VIF tests. 
 Testing Equation 2. Causal attributions (controllability and human nature, 
respectively) were first regressed on standardized versions of IWAHr and implicit theory. 
The model of attributions of controllability was significant, accounting for 4.5% of the 
variance (R
2
 = .045, F(2, 274) = 6.48, p = .002). Examination of the coefficients 
suggested that implicit theory alone predicted attributions of controllability (B = -.16, 
t(274) = -3.57, p = .0004). Finally, the overall model of attributions of human nature was 
not significant (R
2
 = .015, F(2, 274) = 2.19, p =.12). However, further examination of the 
coefficients suggested that implicit theory was the lone significant predictor of 
attributions of human nature (B = .16, t(274) = 2.08, p = .04). IWAHr did not 
significantly predict either type of attribution (ts < 1, ps = .99). In all, the test of Equation 
2 suggested that entity-theorists often explain moral discrepancies in terms of stable 
characteristics (i.e., a flawed nature), and less a matter of choice, which is consistent with 
Dweck and colleagues’ work (Dweck, 2008; Dweck et al., 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 
1988; Dweck & Molden, 2008). These results partially support the prediction that entity-
theorists are likely to perceive that moral discrepancies result from uncontrollable/stable 
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characteristics. Unfortunately, these results do not support the predicted relationship 
between attributions and identification.
6
    
Testing the two models.
7, 8
  
 Disappointment. See Figure 6. Testing began by examining feelings of 
disappointment in humanity using hierarchical regression analysis with standardized 
versions of the variables of interest: AI-discrepancy beliefs, IWAHr, implicit theory, 
attributions of human nature, and attributions of controllability while controlling for 
feelings of contempt and AO-discrepancy beliefs. Step 0 involved regressing 
disappointment on AI- and AO-discrepancy beliefs, controlling for contempt. The 
analysis was highly significant, predicting 51% of the variance in disappointment (R
2 
= 
.51, F(3, 271) = 93.76, p < .0001). However, contempt accounted for the “lion’s share” of 
the variance (B = .54, t(271) = 14.97, p < .0001). After contempt, only AO-discrepancy 
beliefs predicted changes in disappointment (B = .10, t(271) = 2.00, p = .054). Contrary 
to predictions, AI-discrepancy beliefs failed to predict feelings of disappointment (B = 
.07, t(274) = 1.29, p = .20).  Step 1 involved regressing disappointment on all the main 
effects. This model was significant, predicting 51% of the variance in disappointment (R
2
 
= .51; F(7, 267) = 40.02, p < .0001). Examination of the regression coefficients revealed 
that AI-discrepancy beliefs did not predict feelings of disappointment  
(B = .07, t(267) = 1.21, p = .23. Similarly, implicit theory (B = -.04, t(267) < -1.19, p = 
.23), IWAHr (B = -.02, t(267) < -1, p = .54), and attributions of human nature (B = .04, 
t(267) = 1.16, p = .25) and controllability (B = .01, t(267) < 1, p = .76) failed to 
significantly predict feelings of disappointment in humanity. However, AO-discrepancy 
beliefs were a marginal predictor of disappointment (B = .1, t(267) = 1.18, p = .07). Note: 
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VIF was less than 2 for all predictors; thus, it was not likely that multicolinearity was 
contributing to the poor results. 
 Step 2 involved testing the remainder of Equation 1 noted above, which meant 
adding the A-I discrepancy beliefs by IWAHr and the AI-discrepancy beliefs by implicit 
theory interactions to the regression equation. Adding these two-way interactions 
marginally contributed to the model (ΔR2 = .01, ΔF(2, 265) = 2.75, p = .08), predicting 
52% of the variance in disappointment (R
2
 = .52, F(9, 265) = 31.87, p < .001). 
Examination of the regression coefficients revealed that the AI-discrepancy beliefs by 
IWAHr was significant (B = .09, t(265) = 2.04, p = 04; see Figure 7), while the AI-
discrepancy beliefs by Implicit Theory was not (B = .03, t(265) = .76, p = 45).  
 The effects of AI-discrepancy beliefs were then examined at high (+1 SD) and 
low (-1 SD) levels of IWAHr, via simple slope analysis. When IWAHr was low, AI-
discrepancy beliefs were a poor predictor of disappointment in humanity (B = -.02, t(265) 
< 1, p = .8). However, when IWAHr was high, AI-discrepancy beliefs were a significant 
predictor of disappointment in humanity (B = .17, t(265) = 2.22, p = .03). Thus, as 
predicted, people who feel a strong connection to all of humanity also feel a strong sense 
of disappointment when they believe humanity often fails to act prosocially.   
 Finally, Equation 3 was tested by adding the AI-discrepancy beliefs by 
attributions of human nature and the AI-discrepancy beliefs by attribution of 
controllability interactions. If these interactions were significant, it would suggest that the 
effect of AI-discrepancy beliefs on disappointment was moderated by causal attributions. 
Further, if causal attributions mediated the moderating effects of both IWAHr and 
implicit theory (had both interactions been significant), then the AI-discrepancy beliefs 
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by IWAHr and the AI-discrepancy beliefs by implicit theory interactions should be 
significantly reduced after adding the AI-discrepancy by attributions interactions.   
 Adding the attribution interactions marginally contributed to the model (ΔR2 = 
.01, ΔF(2, 263) = 2.79, p = .06), predicting 53% of the variance in disappointment in 
humanity (R
2
 = .53, F(11, 263) = 27.31, p < .001). Examination of the regression 
coefficients revealed that the AI-discrepancy beliefs by attributions of controllability 
interaction was significant (B = -.13, t(263) = -2.67, p = .008; see Figure 8); however, the 
AI-discrepancy beliefs by attributions of human nature was not (B = -.04, t(263) = -1.05, 
p = .3). 
 Again, using simple slope analysis, the effects of AI-discrepancy beliefs were 
examined at high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) levels of attributions of controllability. 
Contrary to predictions, when attributions of controllability were low, AI-discrepancy 
beliefs significantly predicted feelings of disappointment in humanity  
(B = .23, t(263) = 2.77, p = .006) but failed to do so when attributions of controllability 
were high (B = -.02, t(263) = -.31 , p = .76). These findings are difficult to interpret, but 
an attempt to do so will be presented in the discussion section. 
 Finally, if causal attributions mediate the moderating effects of identification with 
humanity and implicit theory, then adding the AI-discrepancy beliefs by attributions 
interactions should result in the AI-discrepancy beliefs by IWAHr interaction and the A-
discrepancy beliefs by IT interaction to drop in significance. This, however, was not the 
case. The AI-discrepancy beliefs by IWAHr interaction became slightly more significant, 
while the AI-discrepancy beliefs by implicit theory interaction was statistically 
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unaffected. These results, thus, failed to support the predicted quasi-mediating 
relationship with regards to feelings of disappointment.  
 Contempt. See Figure 9. Testing the model of contempt for humanity began in the 
same way as the model of disappointment, by using hierarchical regression with 
standardized versions of the variables of interest: A-O discrepancy beliefs, IWAHr, 
implicit theory, attributions of human nature, and attributions of lack of effort, while 
controlling for feelings of disappointment and AI-discrepancy beliefs. Step 0 involved 
regressing contempt on AI- and AO-discrepancy beliefs, controlling for disappointment 
and age. The analysis was significant, predicting 50% of the variance in contempt (R
2 
= 
.50, F(4, 270) = 68.10, p < .0001). However, like contempt, disappointment accounted 
for the “lion’s share” of the variance (B = .54, t(270) = 14.94, p < .0001). Age was also a 
significant predictor of contempt (B = -.11, t(270) = -3.13, p = .002).
9
 Contrary to 
predictions, AO-discrepancy beliefs failed to predict feelings of contempt (t(270) < 1, p = 
.78).  Step 1 involved regressing contempt on only the main effects. This model was 
significant, predicting 51% of the variance in contempt (R
2
 = .51; F(8, 266) = 34.97, p < 
.0001). Examination of the regression coefficients revealed that, beyond disappointment 
and age, only implicit theory marginally predicted contempt (B = .07, t(266) = 1.68, p 
=.09). AO-discrepancy beliefs (B = .01, t(267) < .1, p = .96), AI-discrepancy beliefs (B =  
-.01, t(267) < .1, p = .8),  IWAHr (B = .06, t(267) = 1.41, p = .16), attributions of human 
nature (B = .07, t(267) = 1.57, p = .11) and controllability (B = .04, t(267) = 1.41, p = 
.16), respectively, failed to significantly predict feelings of contempt for humanity. Note: 
VIF was less than 2 for all predictors, thus multicolinearity might not have had a 
contributing factor. 
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 The second step in testing the model of contempt involved adding the two-way 
interaction noted in Equation 1 above. Adding these two-way interactions did not 
significantly contributed to the model (ΔR2 = .0). Indeed, neither the AO-discrepancy 
beliefs by IWAHr nor the AO-discrepancy beliefs by implicit theory was significant (B = 
-.03, t(264) < 1, p = .56; B = -.06, t(264) = 1.35, p = 14). 
 The final step in testing the model of contempt consisted of including the AO-
discrepancy beliefs by attributions of human nature and AO-discrepancy beliefs by 
attributions of controllability interactions (Equation 3). If these interactions were 
significant, it would suggest that the effect of AO-discrepancies on contempt is 
moderated by causal attributions. Furthermore, if causal attributions mediate the proposed 
moderating effects of both IWAHr and implicit theory, then the latter should be 
significantly reduced. Unfortunately, the additional attribution interactions had no effect 
on the model (Bs < .04, ts(262) < 1, ps > .60); nor did their inclusion effect the 
significance of the IWAHr and IT interactions. In all, the results do not favor the 
proposed model. The results failed to support the prediction that causal attributions of 
human nature and/or controllability moderate the effects of AO-discrepancy beliefs on 
contempt for humanity. Finally, the results failed to support the predicted mediating 
effect of causal attributions.  
 Social avoidance and prosocial behavior. It was proposed that feelings of 
disappointment in humanity and feelings of contempt for humanity should have different 
associated behavioral tendencies. Specifically, it was proposed that disappointment in 
humanity should be associated with prosocial behavior, while contempt for humanity 
should be associated with social avoidance. However, given that both emotions turned 
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out to be associated with social avoidance, it was further hypothesized that identification 
with humanity might moderate these associations. That is, strong-identifiers might be 
motivated to behave prosocially when they feel disappointment in humanity, as a form of 
recuperative response. In contrast, weak-identifiers might be especially likely to avoid 
social behavior when they experience feelings of contempt. Thus, Social Behavior was 
regressed on disappointment, contempt, IWAHr, and the appropriate two-way 
interactions. While the model significantly predicted 11.3% of the variance in Social 
Behavior (R
2
 = .113, F(5, 271) = 6.94, p < .0001), contrary to predictions, in this model, 
contempt failed to uniquely predict Social Behavior (B = -.09, t(271) = -.95, p = .32), 
while feelings of disappointment did predict a decrease in Social Behavior (B = -.27, 
t(271) = -2.95, p = .003). In contrast, IWAHr predicted an increase in Social Behavior (B 
= .14, t(271) = 2.10, p = .04). The IWAHr by disappointment was not significant (B = -
.14, t(271) =  -1.52, p = .13), but the IWAHr by contempt was marginal B = .17, t(271) = 
1.74, p = .08). For exploratory purposes, the nature of this interaction was examined by 
looking at the effects of contempt at high (+1SD) and low (-1SD) levels of IWAHr via 
simple slope analysis. The test revealed that among weak-identifiers, contempt 
significantly predicted a decrease in prosocial behavior (B = -.25, t(271) =  -.1.97, p < 
.05). However, contempt was no longer significant among strong-identifiers (B = .08, 
t(271) <  1, p = .6). See Figures 10. 
 One additional alternative is that disappointment leads to a recuperative response, 
but only among participants who perceive discrepancies as controllable. To test this 
alternative, Social Behavior was regressed on attributions of controllability, 
disappointment, and their interaction. The analysis suggested that participants who 
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believe humanity has control over their discrepant behavior were also more socially 
engaged (B = .13, t(273) = -2.00, p = .05), and this effect was moderated by 
disappointment (B = -.11 t(273) = -2.02, p  = .04). Follow-up analysis revealed that the 
effect of controllability on social behavior was only significant when disappointment was 
low (B = .23, t(273) = 3.05, p = .003), contradicting the alternative hypothesis. It seems 
that the negative effects of disappointment outweigh the positive effect of attributions of 
controllability on social engagement. See Figure 11.    
Discussion 
 A tale of two models. The purpose of Study 1 was to provide an initial test of the 
proposed models of feelings of disappointment in and contempt for humanity and their 
associated patterns of social behavior.   
 Disappointment. A quasi-mediated moderation model of disappointment in 
humanity was proposed. It was hypothesized that AI-discrepancy beliefs would be 
positively associated with feelings of disappointment in humanity. It was further 
hypothesized that identification with all of humanity (IWAHr) and implicit theory (IT), 
respectively, would moderate the nature of this association. Finally, causal explanations 
that point to controllable causes were hypothesized to mediate the moderating effect of 
IWAHr and IT. In sum, the proposed model would have predicted that for a strong-
identifier or incremental theorist, AI-discrepancy beliefs would be more strongly 
associated with a general feeling of disappointment, because such traits would lead one to 
explain these moral discrepancies as due to controllable factors. Finally, the model would 
have predicted that these general feelings of disappointment would lead one to seek 
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chances to recoup moral credit for humanity, manifested as a tendency towards social 
approach and prosocial behavior.   
 While nearly all of the proposed predictions tested in the model were unsupported 
by the data, AI-discrepancy beliefs were positively associated with feelings of 
disappointment among strong-identifiers. This finding is consistent with findings of 
Petrocelli and Smith (2005, reviewed above).  Here, however, we expand on their 
findings by demonstrating that human identity works in very similar ways as other forms 
of social identity, including one’s national identity.  
 It was also revealed that the effects of AI-discrepancy beliefs on feelings of 
disappointment were moderated by attributions of controllability, albeit not in the 
predicted direction. Indeed, AI-discrepancy beliefs led to feelings of disappointment 
when AI-discrepancies were believed to be uncontrollable. This is difficult to interpret, 
especially when attributions of human nature had no effect. It could mean that if one 
believes that people have little control over being highly compassionate towards each 
other, and therefore lack the potential to become more compassionate towards each other, 
he or she might feel disappointment in humanity because humanity is unable to benefit 
from future prosocial behavior. On the other hand, it could be that participants interpreted 
the failure to be prosocial as the inability of prosocial behavior to create positive 
outcomes. In other words, people could be misinterpreting the lack of prosocial behavior 
as an inability to create positive change in the world, much like when people refuse to 
donate to charity because they do not believe their donation will go to those who really 
need it. Thus, their failure is not due to controllable causes, but due to the belief that their 
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efforts are futile. Perhaps, then, when causal explanations are made explicit (Study 2) 
rather than rated, the predicted relationship might manifest.   
 Contempt. A similar quasi-mediated moderation model was proposed for feelings 
of contempt for humanity. It was hypothesized that AO-discrepancy beliefs would be 
positively associated with feelings of contempt for humanity. It was further hypothesized 
that one’s identification with all of humanity (IWAHr) and one’s implicit theory (IT), 
respectively, would moderate the nature of this association. Finally, causal explanations 
that point to human nature as the source of humanity’s AO-discrepancies would mediate 
the moderating effects of IWAHr and IT. In sum, this model predicted that among weak-
identifiers and/or entity-theorists, AO-discrepancies would be more strongly associated 
with feelings of contempt, because such traits would lead one to explain these moral 
discrepancies as a function of human nature. Finally, this model predicted that feelings of 
contempt would lead one to avoid positive social engagement. 
 Did the results of Study 1 support the proposed models of contempt for humanity? 
Unfortunately, they did not. None of the predictions tested in the model were supported 
by the data. There could be several explanations for the lack of support, which will be 
discussed below in the limitations section.  
 Social avoidance and prosocial behavior. It was originally predicted that 
contempt and disappointment would have different effects on prosocial behavior. 
Disappointment was thought to motivate prosocial behavior, as a recuperative response, 
while contempt was thought to lead to social avoidance. However, in this study, it was 
disappointment that was directly associated with social avoidance; contempt was not. 
Indeed, the effect of contempt on social avoidance was moderated by identification with 
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all of humanity. Strikingly, contempt had no effect among strong-identifiers, but it did 
predicted social avoidance among weak-identifiers. This finding is rather straightforward 
as contempt is often associated with avoidance of those for whom one feels contempt 
(Gottman, 1993; Mackie et al., 2000; Roseman et al., 1996). Finally, the association 
between contempt and a tendency towards social avoidance was influenced by the 
strength with which one identifies with humanity. 
 As a revision to the original model, it was proposed that perhaps disappointment 
would predict prosocial behavior, but only among strong-identifiers. The results did not 
support this revision. One explanation could be that participants’ persistent beliefs, 
feelings, and behavioral tendencies were being measured. Having a persistent feeling of 
disappointment in humanity might “eat away” at one’s motivation to recoup humanity’s 
moral credit, leading to social avoidance. This could be similar to a sports fan whose 
team always loses. The persistent belief that one’s team is a “losing” team, for example, 
might be associated with the persistent, albeit mild, feeling of disappointment in his or 
her team. The persistent feeling might in turn lead him or her to avoid engaging in social 
activity centered on the team (i.e., watching games with other people).  
 Perhaps feelings of disappointment lead to prosocial behavior among strong-
identifiers when feelings of disappointment are evoked as a response to new, threatening 
information. Consider the sports fan. If having a long-standing belief that his team 
performs well and is faced with evidence to the contrary (i.e., the Oregon Ducks lose to 
the Arizona Wildcats), he might be more motivated to explain away the poor 
performance (“There was a solar flare. They didn’t put the effort in this time. They’ll do 
better next time!”). Having done so—after a few days moping—he can once again look 
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forward to the next game, ready to fully support his team anyway he can, anywhere he 
can, with whomever he can. Thus, in the case of beliefs about humanity, prosocial 
behavior might only be a recuperative response among strong-identifiers when the 
opportunity is presented relatively soon after an unexpected disappointing event or soon 
after unexpected disappointing information is presented. This possibility will be 
addressed in Studies 2 through 4.   
 One final alternative hypothesis was tested: disappointment would motivate a 
recuperative response among participants who believe humanity’s discrepant behavior is 
highly controllable, and therefore could change. While such beliefs did predict social 
engagement, feelings of disappointment seemed to interrupt the relationship. Indeed, 
these participants were less engaged as a function of feelings of disappointment, which, 
again, contradicts the alternative hypothesis.  
 Enduring beliefs might also explain these findings. Participants who believe 
humanity has a high degree of control over its discrepant behavior and reported strong 
feelings of disappointment might do so because they also believe that humanity has a 
long history of being morally discrepant when, in Weiner’s language, they “could do 
otherwise,” when humanity could be less discrepant. These participants might be less 
engaged, not because they believe humanity cannot change its behavior, but because they 
believe humanity apparently refuses to change its behavior. Again, this might be different 
when participants are reacting to new information rather than reporting enduring beliefs. 
This possibility will also be addressed in Studies 2 through 4.  
 Beyond the two models. While the data failed to support many predictions, there 
was evidence of other potentially interesting relationships. First, older adults seem to 
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express less contempt for humanity, they are less likely to be entity-theorists, and are less 
likely to attribute humanity’s moral failings to human nature. These findings could 
suggest that as people grow older and have more experiences, good and bad, they gain an 
appreciation for the human condition. Perhaps, over time, as folks survive and thrive 
through trials and tribulations, they gain an appreciation for humanity’s ability to adapt. 
On the other hand, perhaps these relationships do not reflect change over time at all, but 
some kind of cohort effect. Perhaps older generations simply believe that people have 
more control over their outcomes, express less contempt for others who fail morally, and 
less are likely to blame human nature. However it might be, the relationship between age 
and these phenomena are interesting and potentially worthy of study, but they are beyond 
the scope of this work. Nevertheless, as age seems to be an important variable, it will be 
included as a covariate in subsequent analyses where appropriate.  
 The general belief that moral discrepancies are caused by human nature was 
positively associated with both feelings of disappointment and contempt. These findings 
contribute to the literature on attribution theory, and in particular to the findings of 
Weiner and Kukla (1970). While Weiner and Kukla found that when negative behavior 
was attributed to controllable/stable causes (a lack of effort), negative emotional 
responses like blame and anger increased. This work demonstrates that when negative 
behavior is attributed to uncontrollable/stable causes, other negative emotions (i.e., 
disappointment and contempt) might be activated or even increased.  
 Although unsupported by the literature on disappointment, these findings are 
consistent with the literatures on both contempt (Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996) and 
implicit personality theory (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Dweck, 2008; Dweck, Chu, 
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Hong, 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Dweck & Molden, 2008). Contempt is often 
associated with uncontrollable/stable causes, which is often one’s flawed nature 
(Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996)—entity-theorists by definition make these same 
causal attributions (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Dweck, 2008; Dweck, Chu, Hong, 
1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Dweck & Molden, 2008).  
 It comes as no surprise, then, that IT was directly associated with contempt and 
directly associated with attributing the cause of moral discrepancies to human nature 
(averaged across both discrepancy type). Indeed, entity-theorists have been associated 
with having excessively negative emotional responses to moral violations  (Dweck & 
Molden, 2008). When entity-theorists bring to mind negative aspects of humanity, like 
moral discrepancies, they might automatically associate those deficiencies to stable 
characteristics of humanity, its nature. But they might also have an equally automatic 
tendency towards expressing negative emotions. This could explain why the IT by human 
nature attributions interaction had no effect: IT was doing it all—IT influenced emotions 
and explanations. 
 But why might attributions of human nature be associated with feelings of 
disappointment? The literature on disappointment does not address this relationship per 
se. Upon reflection, this finding is relatively uninteresting in and of itself.  As 
disappointment is associated with the lack of some positive expectation or outcomes, 
when one has the enduring belief that some lack of positive expectation or outcome 
was/is due to human nature, one might be even more disappointed because the desired 
outcomes or expectations are even less likely to occur in the future, unless one believes 
that humanity’s nature can change or be overcome. Given the strong relationship between 
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disappointment and contempt, and the fact that both disappointment and contempt were 
associated with the belief that a flawed human nature is the cause of moral discrepancies, 
the relationship might only demonstrate that such beliefs predict feeling a general 
negativity towards humanity.  
 Limitations. Why did the data fail to support the predicted quasi-mediated 
moderation models of disappointment in and contempt for humanity? There could be 
several reasons. First, the “shared negativity” between contempt and disappointment 
might have made it difficult to detect a strong signal from individual predictors. 
Unfortunately, there is little one can do to overcome this difficulty beyond continuing to 
control for the effects of each emotion. One might be able to “boost the signal” of each 
emotion by presenting participants with discrepant information in an experimental 
design.  
 AI- and AO-discrepancy beliefs were also highly correlated, making it difficult to 
isolate their unique emotional consequences. However, this, too, might be overcome by 
using an experimental design. The subsequent studies adopt such a design.  
 Correlations between proposed predictors and moderators might have seriously 
impacted this study. Indeed, many of the predictions were based on the hypotheses that 
discrepancy beliefs were independent of IWAH, attributions, and IT. This was not 
exactly the case; these constructs appeared to covary. If two variables vary together, 
neither one can moderate the other. Of course, this covariance might have been due to the 
fact that emotions were being measured in the context of enduring discrepancy beliefs, 
rather than responses to new discrepancy information. The moderating effects of IWAH, 
attributions, and IT might only be evident when responding to new discrepancy 
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information. This possibility will be explored in Studies 2 through 4 when discrepancies 
are manipulated rather than measured.   
  While there was minimal support for a few of the proposed model components, 
many components were not supported by the data. Of course, the study design might have 
been a disadvantage; including similar beliefs and similar emotions in the model might 
have introduced a lot of statistical noise. Using an experimental design will, hopefully, 
reduce some of that noise and help isolate the individual effects. Studies 2 through 4 
adopted experimental designs. 
Study 2: Experimentally Manipulated Moral Discrepancies and Causal Attributions 
 The primary purpose of Study 2 was to examine the effects of discrepancy beliefs 
and causal attributions on disappointment and contempt when both are experimentally 
manipulated. In addition, Study 2 provided another opportunity to test the proposed 
moderating effects of identification with humanity (IWAHr) and implicit theory (IT). 
Thus,   
 Finally, an additional analysis using emotional responses to predict prosocial 
behavior was conducted.  However, in light of the findings of Study 1 that suggested 
disappointment might lead to social avoidance rather than prosocial behavior, the original 
hypothesis was modified. Specifically, the prosocial effects of disappointment might be 
evident only among strong-identifiers, because strong-identifiers should have a vested 
interest in recouping moral credit on behalf of humanity. Finally, the possibility that 
controllability perception might moderate the extent to which disappointment relate to 
prosocial responding was also tested. 
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Method 
 Participants. Three hundred participants were recruited on-line, via the 
Mechanical Turk interface created by Amazon, and paid $.50 for their participation. 
Twenty-four participants were excluded from all subsequent analyses after failing the 
attention check question (described below), leaving 276 participants (151 females). All 
participants were American citizens over 18 years of age (M = 36.15, SD = 12.96; Min = 
18, Max = 72; range = 54), the majority of whom were well educated (i.e., 58% held a 
bachelor’s degree or higher) and Caucasian (80.36%). All participants provided informed 
consent prior to their participation. 
 Procedure. Participants learned that they were taking part in a study investigating 
“social judgments and feelings” in which they would read about some behaviors and 
report their impressions and feelings regarding the reading material. The information 
participants read was adapted from materials used by Andreychik (2009) to manipulate 
social explanatory styles. Mechanical Turk randomly assigned participants to one of three 
discrepancy conditions and one of three explanations conditions.  Participants were 
randomly assigned to read an excerpt from an article purporting to document theories 
about “patterns of human behavior,” based on several scholarly sources. In that passage, 
participants learned that humanity, in general, fails to meet moral standards (AO-
discrepancies condition), fails to live up to moral ideals (AI-discrepancies condition), or 
general demographic information about humanity (Discrepancies-Control condition). 
Causal information was also manipulated within each passage. Participants learned that 
the pattern of behavior was either attributed to human nature (Human Nature condition) 
or due to explicitly controllable causes (Controllability condition); participants in the 
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control condition were given no such causal information (Control/neutral condition). 
Note that participants in the Discrepancies Control condition were given similar causal 
information (or no causal information) as those in the AI- and AO-discrepancies 
conditions, but that information was presented as about behavior in general (see 
Appendix L). See Table 3 for cell sizes. 
 After reading their assigned passage, participants provided their emotional 
responses via the measures of disappointment and contempt that were previously 
described, but in the context of how they felt “right now” (see Appendices M & N). 
Presentation of the contempt and disappointment items was counterbalanced. On average, 
participants reported relatively low levels of both disappointment (M = 2.87, SD = 1.12, α 
= .85) and contempt (M = 2.05, SD = .88, α = .88). Again, disappointment and contempt 
were strongly associated (r = .68, p < .0001).  
 Next, implicit personality theory (or IT) was measured using the Implicit Theories 
of Stability of Personality Scale (ITSPS). After appropriate reverse coding, the measure is 
structured such that high scores indicate an entity theory, while low scores indicate an 
incremental theory. The measure had good reliability (M = 3.53, SD = 1.36, α = .95), and 
indicated that, on average, participants were entity leaning.   
 Participants then completed the Identification with All Humanity Scale (IWAH; 
McFarland Webb, & Brown, 2012; see Appendix I) as the relevant measure of social 
identity. The IWAH provides a relatively reliable gauge of the extent to which people 
resonate with their community (M = 2.92, SD = .8, α = .90), country (America; M = 3.00, 
SD = .66, α = .85), and humanity (M = 2.84, SD = .75, α = .87). Standardized residual 
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scores (IWAHr) were used to isolate human identity from community and American 
identities. 
 As a final portion of Study 2, participants were given the opportunity to act 
prosocially. Prior to debriefing, participants were asked if they were willing to contribute 
to a collection of written responses to the information they read about. They were told 
that the collection of responses would be sent to the editor of the periodical in which the 
target article had been published. They were asked to indicate whether they agreed or 
disagreed with the information and to identify “possible solutions” to the issues put forth 
in the article. Participants were free to write at length or not to write at all. Responses 
were coded for prosociality in three ways: (1) word-count, (2) providing a potential 
solution to the problems they read about (binary coding used: providing a solution or 
not), and, finally, (3) writing “in defense” of humanity (coded on a 1 to 5 scale). For 
example, if a participant agreed with the article and provided no solution (i.g., “I agree 
that, on average, the findings of that study are accurate. Most people won't engage in 
altruistic behavior if a more self-serving option is available”) their “in defense” response 
was coded as a 1 (i.e., they did not write in defense of humanity).  
 If a participant mostly agreed with the article and provided a single vague 
solution, their response was coded as a 2. For example, statements like “If given the 
chance, people will engage in immoral behaviors, especially if they know they won’t get 
caught. To fix this is a hard problem. People often fall into negative patterns of society 
rather than postive [sic] ones” were coded as a 2.  
 If a participant responded with only vague solutions, but did not agree nor 
disagree with the article, their response was coded as a 3. For example, “The article had 
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a premise that humanity is depraved. However, no consideration is included about the 
millions of acts of charity, assistance and kindness that occur every day. Is it human 
nature? Is it our economic construct? There are many variables to consider. The best we 
could do is raise our children as positive as possible” was coded as 3.  
 If participants somewhat agreed with the content of the article, but provided a 
concrete solution, their response was coded as a 4. For example, “Although I think human 
nature is inherently flawed in character, I feel that much of the violent crime in the world 
is exacerbated by the conditions people live in; if we can raise the quality of life people 
experience, some of this ‘innate’ immoral behavior will go away.” 
 If a participant disagreed with article and provided a rebuttal, the response was 
coded as a 5. For example, “The article makes it seems [sic] that humans are inherently 
immoral or bad, but I disagree with this. There are many reasons for someone to not be 
generous or donate, and not all of those reasons are immoral ones.”  
 Two independent raters, blind to conditions and hypothesis, scored the responses 
using the scale described above. The proposed scale had acceptable inter-rater reliability 
(Krippendorff’s alpha = .73; Freelon, 2013). 
Results 
 Primary analysis: Attributions and discrepancies. The primary focus of Study 2 
was to examine the interaction effects of experimentally manipulated discrepancy 
information and experimentally manipulated causal attributions on feelings of contempt 
for and disappointment in humanity. These interactions were tested in a 3(Discrepancies: 
AI, AO, Control) X 3(Causal Attribution: human nature, controllability, Control/neutral) 
factorial analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with emotional responses (disappointment in 
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and contempt for humanity) as the primary dependent variables.
11
 Each emotion was 
included as a covariate when the influence of the other was being examined; age was 
included as an additional covariate.  
 The test revealed a significant main effect of the discrepancies manipulation on 
both contempt (F(2, 265) = 4.30, p = .02) and disappointment (F(2, 265) = 4.88, p = 
.008). See Table 3 and Figure 12. Planned contrasts revealed that, as predicted, 
participants in the AO-discrepancies condition reported greater feelings of contempt for 
humanity than participants in both the AI-discrepancies condition (t(265) = 2.90, p = 
.004) and the control condition (t(265) = 2.00, p = .05), which were not significantly 
different from each other (t(265) = 1.01, p = .32). These findings suggest that contempt 
was a unique response to AO-discrepancies.  
 Planned contrasts revealed that with respect to disappointment, participants in the 
AI-discrepancies and AO-discrepancies conditions were statistically indistinguishable 
(t(265) = 1.03, p = .30). However, while participant in the AO-discrepancies condition 
were marginally more disappointed in humanity than participants in the control condition, 
t(265) = 1.87, p = .06, participants in the AI-discrepancies were significantly more 
disappointed in humanity than participants in the control condition (t(265) = 3.08, p = 
.002).    
 Unfortunately, contrary to predictions, these effects were not moderated by causal 
attributions. Indeed, the test failed to support the predicted two-way interaction between 
the discrepancies and attributions manipulations (p = .92). See Figures 13 and 14. 
 IWAHr. Next, the extent to which identification with all of humanity (IWAHr) 
moderated the effects of the discrepancies manipulation on contempt and disappointment, 
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controlling for the effects of each emotion and age was examined using ANCOVA with 
IWAHr dummy coded to create two groups, one associated with strong-identifiers (≥ 
1SD) and one associated with weak-identifiers (See Table 4). The analysis revealed that 
IWAHr moderated the effect of the discrepancies manipulation on contempt (see Table 
4). Indeed, the effect of the discrepancies manipulation was significant among strong-
identifiers (F(2, 66) = 9.42, p = .0003), but not among weak-identifiers (F(2, 66) = 2.38, 
p = .10). Contrary to predictions, Tukey’s post hoc test revealed that strong-identifiers in 
the AO-discrepancies condition (M = 2.59, SD = .17) expressed more contempt for 
humanity than strong-identifiers in both the control condition (M = 1.93, SD = .17) (p = 
.007) and the AI-discrepancies condition (M = 1.64, SD = .14) (p < .001), while weak-
identifiers expressed similarly levels across all three conditions (ps = .58, 53, 54). See 
Figure 15.  
 There was also a significant effect of IWAHr within the AO-discrepancies 
condition (F(1, 268) = 8.66, p = .005) and within the AI-discrepancies condition (F(1, 
268) = 5.37, p = .02). See Figure 15. In the AO-discrepancies condition, strong-identifiers 
reported stronger feelings of contempt than weak-identifiers (M = 1.91, SD = .16) (p = 
.005). In the AI-discrepancies condition, weak-identifiers (M = 2.18, SD = .18) reported 
stronger feelings of contempt than strong-identifiers (M = 1.64, SD = .16) (p = .02). The 
effect of IWAHr on contempt was not significant in the discrepancies control condition 
(p = .59).  
 The analysis revealed that the effect of discrepancies on disappointment was 
moderated by IWAHr (F(2, 66) = 5.57, p = .006).  As predicted, the effect of the 
discrepancies manipulation was significant among strong-identifiers (F(2, 66) = 6.28, p = 
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.002), but not among weak-identifiers (F(2, 66) = 1.25, p = .29). Strong-identifiers in the 
AI-discrepancies condition (M = 3.32, SD = .19) expressed greater disappointment in 
humanity than strong-identifiers in the control condition (M = 2.60, SD = .23) (p = .01) 
and strong-identifiers in the AO-discrepancies condition (M = 2.26, SD = .25) (p = .002), 
while weak-identifiers expressed similar levels of disappointment across all three 
conditions (ps = .20, .16, .73). See Figure 16.  
 Also, there was a significant effect of IWAHr within the AI-discrepancy condition 
(F(1, 66) = 7.67, p = .007) and within the AO-discrepancies condition (F(1, 66) = 3.90, p 
= .05). In the AI-discrepancies condition, strong-identifiers reported stronger feelings of 
disappointment than weak-identifiers (M = 2.44, SD = .25). In the AO-discrepancies 
condition, weak-identifiers (M = 2.92, SD = .22) reported stronger feelings of 
disappointment than strong-identifiers. See Figure 16. No other effect were significant 
(ps > .60).  
 Implicit Theory (IT). Next, implicit theory of personality (IT) was examined. 
The effect of the discrepancies manipulation on feelings of contempt and disappointment 
moderated by IT, while controlling for the effects of each emotion and age, was tested. 
However, the effect of this interaction was not significant on contempt (F(2, 268) = .19, p 
= .82; see Figure 17), but approached significance on disappointment (F(2, 268) = 2.38, p 
= .09; Figure 18). Because the main effect was not significant, Tukey’s HSD adjustment 
to alpha was used in the follow-up analysis. Taking a closer look at the interaction effect 
on feelings of disappointment revealed that the only significant difference detected was 
between entity-theorists (+1 SD) and incremental-theorists (-1 SD) in the control 
condition (F(1, 268) = 3.11, p = .02; see Figure 18), suggesting that incremental-theorists 
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generally express less disappointment in humanity than entity-theorists, until they are 
confronted with negative information about humanity. No other effect was significant (ps 
> .34). 
 Prosocial behavior. Prosocial behavior was measured by asking participants to 
provide open-ended responses to the information they read about. They were free to not 
respond or respond at length. They were asked to indicate whether they agreed or 
disagreed with the information they read about and to provide ideas for solutions to the 
problems they read about. Because participants in the neutral condition did not write in a 
response to any discrepant or “negative” information about humanity, their responses 
were excluded from the following analyses.  
 Prosocial behavior was operationally defined in three ways: (1) whether 
participants provided a solution to the problem they read about (coded as either 0 or 1; 
34.32% provided solutions); (2) whether they responded in defense of humanity (M = 
2.42, SD = 1.44), and (3); the total word-count (M = 52.14, SD = 45.98). Five outliers had 
word-counts that exceeded three standard deviations from the mean and were therefore 
excluded from the analysis, resulting in only minor changes in the descriptive data: 
Word-count (M = 47.06, SD = 35.6), in defense (M = 2.40, SD = 1.43; inter-rater 
reliability: Krippendorff’s alpha = .73); 33.54% of the remaining participants provided a 
solution.   
 Solutions to the problem. Testing began by examining whether participants 
provided a “solution” to the problem they read about as a function of discrepancies 
manipulation, feelings of disappointment, contempt, IWAHr, and all two and three-way 
interactions in a logistic regression analysis. Following the suggestions of Field (2009), -
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2LL (i.e., -2 log-likelihood) was the measure of model fit, as its distribution mimics the 
χ2 distribution. The -2LL tests the difference between the intercept-only model and the 
model with the selected indicators. The results of the test suggested that this model fit the 
data well (-2LL (12) = 18.43, p =.10).  Unfortunately, the only variable that almost 
approached significance was IWAHr (B = .31 χ2(1) = 2.61, p =.11), suggesting that 
strong-identifiers might have been more likely to provide solution to the problems they 
read about. No other effects were significant (ps > .19). 
 One alternative hypothesis that was explored in Study 1 was that disappointment 
might lead to prosocial behavior among participants who believe humanity has control of 
their discrepant behavior. Here that hypothesis was tested again, but with new discrepant 
information, rather than enduring beliefs. Thus solution was regressed on discrepancies 
manipulation, attributions manipulation, and disappointment in an additional logistic 
regression. Again, the model was a good fit to the data (-2LL χ2(11) = 14.88, p =.19). The 
attributions manipulation was a significant predictor of providing a solution (χ2(2) = 7.90, 
p = .02). Participants in the controllability condition were far more likely to provide a 
solution than participants in the Control/neutral condition (e
B
= 1.73, χ2(1) = 4.87, p = 
.03). However, this effect was not moderated by feelings of disappointment (χ2(2) < 1, p 
=.69). No other was significant (χ2s < 1, ps > .33). 
 Writing in defense of humanity. Next, “In defense” was regressed on the same 
combination of variables and interactions as in the analysis of “solution” in a multiple 
regression analysis. While the overall model provided a poor fit to the data (R
2
 = .11; 
F(15, 152) = 1.32, p = .20), IWAHr significantly predicted defending humanity (B = .51, 
t(152) = 2.66, p  = .009), suggesting that strong-identifiers were more defensive than 
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weak-identifiers. Furthermore, the effect of IWAHr was moderated by contempt (B = .55, 
t(152) = 2.01, p  = .05). Follow-up simple slope analysis revealed that when contempt 
was low, IWAHr had no effect on defending humanity (B = -.04, t(152) = -.15, p  = .88), 
but when contempt was high, IWAHr was associated with defending humanity (B = 1.06, 
t(152) = 2.71, p  = .007). As we can see in Figure 19, when contempt was low, strong and 
weak-identifiers were similarly defensive. However, strong-identifiers were relatively 
unaffected by strong feelings of contempt, while weak-identifiers become far less 
defensive. This effect was qualified by the discrepancies manipulation (B = -.76, t(152) = 
-2.26, p  = .03), which suggested that the pattern described was only evident in the AO-
discrepancies condition. No other effects were significant (ps > .16).  
 The alternative hypothesis that disappointment might lead to prosocial behavior 
among participants who believe humanity has control of their discrepant behavior was 
tested again using writing in defense of humanity as the dependent variable. “In defense” 
was regressed on the discrepancies manipulation, the attributions manipulation, 
disappointment, and all two and three-way interactions in a multiple regression analysis. 
Unfortunately, these effects were not significant (attributions by disappointment, F(2, 
156) = 2.33, p = .12; all other effects Fs < 1.45, ps > .24). 
 Word-count. As a final test of prosocial behavior, participants’ word-count (i.e., 
the number of words participants contributed to the collective response) was examined 
with the same combination of variables and interactions described in the previous two 
analyses, with one addition.  Because participants’ responses were not necessarily meant 
as a prosocial response (by either writing in defense of humanity or by providing a 
potential solution), but as an opportunity to reaffirm the negative information they read 
81 
about, writing in defense of humanity was included as an additional potential moderator 
in the multiple regression analysis. The model predicted 18.7% of the variance in word-
count (R
2
 = .187, F(19, 148) = 1.79, p = .03). It turned out that defending humanity was 
the only significant predictor of word-count (B = 13.47, t(148) = 2.30, p = .02), 
suggesting that participants motivated to defend humanity used more words to do it. No 
other effect approached significance (ps > .13).  
 Again, the alternative hypothesis regarding the interaction of attributions and 
disappointment was tested here. Word-count was regressed on the discrepancies 
manipulation, the attributions manipulation, disappointment, writing in defense, and all 
two-, three-, and four-way interactions in a multiple regression analysis. The main effect 
of the attributions manipulation was significant (F(2, 144) = 6.15, p = .003), and the 
attributions manipulation by disappointment interaction was marginally significant (F(2, 
144) = 2.84, p = .06). This interaction was explored by examining the effect of 
attributions manipulation at low (-1SD) and high (+1SD) levels of disappointment (see 
Figure 20). When, disappointment was low, participants in the controllability condition 
(M = 67.83, SD = 59.88) responded with significantly more words than participants in the 
neutral condition (M = 44.95, SD = 39.11; B = .46, t(144) = 2.58, p = .01), but 
statistically indistinguishable from participants in the human nature condition (M = 45.24, 
SD = 33.34; B = .28, t(144) = 1.60, p = .11). When disappointment was high, these 
groups did not significantly differ from each other (ts < 1.1, ps  > .27). As a final test, the 
effects of disappointment within each attributions condition were examined; however, no 
significant effect could be detected (Fs < 2.4, ps > .13).  
 No other effects in the analysis could be detected Fs < 2.16, ps > .12).
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Discussion 
 Study 2 had several objectives. The primary objective was to take an experimental 
approach in order to examine the interaction effect of manipulated discrepancies and 
causal attributions on feelings of disappointment in humanity and contempt for humanity. 
The second objective was to further test the potential for identification with all of 
humanity and implicit theory, respectively, to moderate the effect of the discrepancies 
manipulation on feelings of disappointment and contempt. The third was to determine 
whether the moderating effects of causal attributions depend on IWAHr and IT. The 
fourth and final objective was to further examine the effects of disappointment and 
contempt on prosocial behavior.  
 Disappointment. People typically express feelings of disappointment when faced 
with the disconfirmation of a positive expectation or outcome (Carroll et al., 2007; De 
Cremer, 2006; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002; Wubben et al., 2009). People express 
disappointment in a target when the target fails to meet a positive expectation held by the 
one expressing disappointment (De Cremer, 2006; Hoffman, 1963; Krevan & Gibbs, 
1996; Patrick & Gibbs, 2007, 2012; Wubben et al., 2009). In this case, when the 
expectation that people are generally good to one another is disconfirmed, observers were 
expected to express feelings of disappointment in humanity. This hypothesis was 
confirmed.  
 Indeed, when participants in the AI-discrepancies condition learned that people 
often fail to be kind to one another (i.e., rampant prescriptive moral violations, Janoff-
Bulman et al., 2009), they expressed elevated feelings of disappointment in humanity, as 
compared to participants in the control condition who were not given such information. 
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However, the hypothesis that elevated feelings of disappointment would be unique to AI-
discrepancies was not confirmed. It turned out that participants in the AO-discrepancies 
condition who learned that humanity has a pervasive tendency towards murder, lying, 
cheating, stealing and all manner of sordid behavior (i.e., rampant proscriptive moral 
violations, Janoff-Bulman, et al., 2009) also expressed elevated feelings of 
disappointment, as compared to participants in the control condition, although to a lesser 
degree. Disappointment in the AO-discrepancies condition was only marginally greater 
than the Control condition, yet statistically indistinguishable from disappointment 
expressed in the AI-discrepancies condition.  
 Why might this be? Learning that people often fail to act prosocially is an obvious 
case of disconfirmation of expected positive outcomes (e.g., the benefits of cooperation). 
However, failing to meet the most basic moral standards (i.e., refraining from murder, 
lying, cheating, stealing, and all manner of sordid behavior) might constitute the 
disconfirmation of an expectation. So what might be happening here is that AI- and AO-
discrepancies are touching two sides of the same disappointment coin: outcomes on one 
side, expectations on the other. These findings seem to build on SDT theory (Higgins, 
1987, 1989), which suggests unique discrepancies beget unique emotions. Here we have 
an example of unique discrepancies evoking the same emotion.  
 Of course, disappointment in the AO-discrepancies condition was less 
pronounced than disappointment in the AI-discrepancies condition. The reason could be 
that AO-discrepancies evoke other negative emotions that interfere with the 
disappointment signal. This possible explanation will be fleshed out further when 
contempt is discussed. 
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 Attributions. The effect of AI-discrepancies on disappointment was predicted to 
be moderated by causal attributions, such that the effect would be greatest after learning 
that persistent prescriptive moral violations were due to controllable causes. Such 
explanations imply that people possess the potential to behave with highly prosocial 
intentions but fail to do so. This later prediction, however, was not supported by the data. 
Nor was the effect of AO-discrepancies on disappointment moderated by causal 
attributions. While one might be tempted to suggest that these findings contradict those of 
Petrocelli and Smith (2005), who demonstrated that the effects of discrepancies were 
affected by causal attributions, it is important to note that they were comparing the effects 
of internal versus external causal attributions, not different aspects of internal 
explanations. Nevertheless, the potential reasons for this lack of evidence will be 
discussed in the limitations section below.  
 IWAHr. AI-discrepancies were expected to lead to feelings of disappointment 
among strong-identifiers. This prediction was confirmed. Consistent with Petrocelli and 
Smith (2005), strong-identifiers in the AI-discrepancies condition reported stronger 
feelings of disappointment in humanity than strong-identifiers in the Control condition, 
while weak-identifiers expressed similar levels of disappointment across conditions. 
Furthermore, strong-identifiers expressed greater disappointment for humanity that weak-
identifiers in the AI-discrepancies condition. Explicitly stating that humanity fails to be 
highly moral is likely more disconcerting to a strong-identifier, because strong-identifiers 
should have higher positive expectation for humanity. When they learn that humanity is 
not living up to that high expectation, the difference between humanity’s actual state and 
ideal state is far greater that it would be among weak-identifiers.  
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 Finally, within the AO-discrepancies condition, weak-identifiers expressed 
greater disappointment in humanity than strong-identifiers. This raises the questions as to 
whether the weak-identifiers were driving this effect. Perhaps rather than weak-identifiers 
being genuinely more disappointed in humanity, perhaps strong-identifiers were 
preoccupied by feelings of contempt, evoked by the widespread proscriptive moral 
violations described in the AO-discrepancies condition. This possible explanation will be 
discussed further in relation to contempt. 
 Implicit Theory (IT). The effects of the discrepancies manipulation was expected 
to be moderated by implicit theory of personality (IT). The AI-discrepancies condition 
was predicted to evoke stronger feelings of disappointment among incremental-theorists 
than among entity-theorists. While there was a marginal interaction between IT and the 
discrepancies manipulation, the nature of the effect was not consistent with predictions. 
Incremental- and entity-theorists’ reported disappointment was only significantly 
different in the control condition. This finding seems to suggest that incremental-theorists 
generally express less disappointment in humanity than entity-theorists, until they are 
exposed to negative information about humanity. When confronted by damning 
information about humanity, implicit personality theory seems to have little influence on 
the emotions one will express in response to that information.   
 Contempt. People typically express contempt when they feel moral or intellectual 
superiority over those whom they perceive as failing to meet a minimum standard of 
morality or intelligence (Ekman, 1994a, 1994b; Izard, 1977; Haidt, 2003). In this case, 
when one perceives that people are morally bankrupt, it was hypothesized that he or she 
would express feelings of contempt for humanity. This hypothesis was confirmed.  
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 Indeed, participants in the AO-discrepancies condition who learned that humanity 
is often murderous and otherwise morally broken responded with significantly greater 
contempt for humanity than participants in both the AI-discrepancies and Control 
conditions. This is important because it shows that AO-discrepancies uniquely evoke 
contempt. This finding is also important because it contributes to the SDT literature 
(Higgins, 1987, 1989), demonstrating that AO-discrepancies evoke emotions beyond 
those that have thus far been discussed in that literature.  
 Attributions. It was also predicted that the effect of AO-discrepancies would be 
exacerbated when participants learned that humanity’s moral depravity was due to human 
nature, implying that humanity is morally flawed and will stay that way. Unfortunately, 
this prediction was not confirmed. The effects of AO-discrepancies were unaffected by 
causal attributions. The potential reason will be discussed in the limitations section 
below. 
 IWAHr. It was also predicted that the effects of AO-discrepancies on feelings of 
contempt would depend on the extent to which one identifies with humanity (IWAHr). 
This hypothesis was confirmed, although not in the predicted direction. Strong-identifiers 
were predicted to resist feeling contempt for humanity in light of AO-discrepancies; they 
actually became quite contemptuous, even more so than weak-identifiers. This finding 
might be consistent with work suggesting that contempt is at times expressed towards 
those who interfere with one’s desired outcomes (Haidt, 2003). Indeed, strong-identifiers 
should have the desire to be affiliated with a humanity that is highly moral. Evidence to 
the contrary might threaten their positive self-image.  Thus, when strong-identifiers are 
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confronted with such information, they might be left with only two options: defend 
humanity or abandon it. The latter choice seemed to have been preferred in this study. 
 These findings resemble what Petrocelli and Smith (2005) described as a “reverse 
causal path,” in which strong-identifiers abandon their group identification upon learning 
highly negative information about their group. Of course, this finding is only indirect 
evidence, because IWAHr was measured after participants reported their emotional 
responses. A pre-test measure might have helped to confirm the reverse causal path; 
however, one could argue that such effects are only the results of regression towards the 
mean. 
 An alternative explanation could be that strong-identifiers might have identified 
with the victims of murder, rape, etc., rather than construing the information as to suggest 
that all of humanity is morally bankrupt. In these scenarios, there are a lot of bad people 
doing terrible things, but there are far more good people who are the victims of those 
deeds. Thus, contempt among strong-identifiers might have been directed at the 
perpetrators of the immoral behavior rather than humanity. However, one could argue 
that if they were feeling contempt for the perpetrators as a subset of humanity, then they 
should not have responded with contempt for people more generally. As it is, the question 
was asked about emotions in response to “people as a whole,” not just the perpetrators, so 
it is difficult to accept this alternative explanation at this time. 
 A future perspective-taking study might help to clarify which of these alternatives 
is taking place.  Participants could be given an instruction to take the perspective of the 
victims in these scenarios or given no perspective-taking instruction at all; a third group 
could be given a manipulation intended to activate a sense of oneness with humanity. All 
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participants could rate their emotional response to humanity. If participants automatically 
relate to the victims, we would likely expect that participants in the perspective-taking 
condition and the no-instructions condition to respond with similar levels of contempt for 
humanity, while participants in the activated-humanity condition would respond with 
significantly less contempt for humanity than participants in the other two conditions. A 
follow-up question could ask participants to rate the extent to which they identified with 
the victims in the story and with humanity a whole when making their ratings. If 
participants in the no-perspective-taking-instructions condition rate their identification 
with the victims at a similar level as participants in the perspective taking condition, and 
participants with an activated sense of oneness with humanity reject the victim, one might 
be convinced that participants were indeed identifying more with the victims in these 
scenarios rather than humanity, unless given specific instruction, which influenced their 
feelings of contempt for humanity. 
 Implicit Theory (IT). It was further hypothesized that the effects of AO-
discrepancies on feelings of contempt would be moderated by IT. It was predicted that 
AO-discrepancies would lead to contempt among entity-theorists. This prediction was not 
supported by the data. The reason AO-discrepancies did not have an effect on contempt 
among entity-theorists could be that the discrepancy information was nothing new 
beyond what entity-theorists perceive of humanity (Dweck & Molden, 2008). In contrast, 
as we saw with disappointment, incremental theorist responded to discrepancies much in 
the same manner as entity-theorists; we only found a significant difference between the 
two in the Control condition. It seems that expressions of contempt are similar between 
entity-theorists and incremental-theorists. In short, implicit personality theory (IT) did not 
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moderate the effects of the discrepancies manipulation. Of course, as in the previous 
study, IT was measured, and the effects of measured IT could be very subtle. In Study 4 
we will take a closer look at IT via experimental manipulation to determine if any 
potential effects might be amplified through priming. 
 Prosocial behavior. It was predicted that one important distinction between 
contempt and disappointment would be their unique relationships with prosocial 
behavior. Consistent with theory, feelings of contempt should be associated with social 
avoidance and a deficit in prosocial behavior. On the other hand, disappointment could be 
associated with prosocial behavior—an attempt to recoup moral credit on behalf of 
humanity. However, given findings from Study 1 that suggested disappointment was 
associated with a decrease in prosocial behavior, the hypothesis was modified by 
incorporating identification. It was reasoned that disappointment might only motivate a 
recuperative response among strong-identifiers who have something to gain 
psychologically from their association with a seemingly highly moral humanity. Thus, it 
was predicted that feelings of disappointment would motivate strong-identifiers to act 
prosocially if given the opportunity.  
 To test these hypotheses, participants were asked if they would be willing to write 
a response to the discrepancy information they read about. Responses were then coded 
for providing a “solution” to the problem they read about, writing “in defense” of 
humanity, and, finally, their overall word-count.  It turned out that strong-identifiers were 
somewhat more likely to provide a solution to the problem they read about, but this was 
not driven by their reported emotions. Furthermore, strong-identifiers were more 
defensive in their responses overall. In the AO-discrepancies condition, strong-identifiers 
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unwaveringly defended humanity despite strong feelings of contempt, while weak-
identifiers did not. Finally, defending humanity might have contributed to longer word-
counts, which is not all that interesting.  
 These findings have some potential. First, as suspected, identification with 
humanity was related to prosocial responding in light of negative information about 
humanity. Indeed, strong-identifiers provided more solutions and were more defensive 
than weak-identifiers. Furthermore, while it was predicted that identification and 
disappointment would interact to predict prosocial behavior, it turned out that contempt 
was the emotion interacting with identification. Specifically, contempt caused weak-
identifiers to waver in their defense of humanity, while strong-identifiers remained strong 
in the face of strong feelings of contempt. The reason could be, as suggested above, 
strong-identifiers should be motivated to see their group as highly moral and valued—
their own positive self-identity might depend on it. Thus, it would make sense that they 
would try and defend their group/identity when faced with damning information about 
the group. So in a sense, remaining defensive on behalf of humanity might have been an 
attempt to reverse the “reverse causal path.” 
 The final explored alternative hypothesis was that feelings of disappointment and 
controllability might interact, such that disappointment might only lead to a prosocial 
response among participants in the attribution of controllability condition. Regardless of 
the measure of prosocial responding, this hypothesis was not supported. What is 
interesting, however, is that a similar pattern emerged here, for word-count, as was 
evident in Study1. Participants in the controllability condition provided more words to 
the written response than participants in the Control condition, but only when 
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disappointment was low. When disappointment was high, these groups did not 
statistically differ from one another. This effect is obviously counter to the prediction that 
disappointment would lead to a recuperative response among participants who might 
believe that change is possible. But it might also suggest that people who believe change 
is possible might act prosocially as long as they do not experience strong feelings of 
disappointment. Of course, we must be cautious and not put too much stock into this 
findings. This effect of feelings of disappointment on participants in the controllability 
condition was isolated to one indicator of prosocial behavior. This effect will need to be 
tested and replicated in further studies in order to gauge its validity.  
 Limitations. The primary focus of Study 2 was to examine the effects of 
manipulated discrepancy information on feelings of disappointment in and contempt for 
humanity, and to further determine if these effects could be moderated by manipulated 
causal attributions. Unfortunately, Study 2 might have failed in this regard. Indeed, causal 
attributions had no detectable effect on feelings of disappointment, regardless of IWAHr 
or IT. One explanation could be that the causal attributions manipulation missed its mark, 
failing to convince participants. Unfortunately, a manipulation check was not included in 
the study so this possible explanation is only speculative. Nonetheless, if attributions 
were at least somewhat convincing, they might have been confounded with IWAHr and 
IT. Furthermore, while the causal attributions were manipulated, they were always 
internal. In previous research, in which attributions moderated the effects of discrepancy 
information, causal attributions were either internal or external (see Petrocelli & Smith, 
2005). When participants learned that AI-discrepancies were due to external causes, they 
expressed greater feelings of disappointment for the group than when they were due to 
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internal causes. Of course, a different sense of disappointment (i.e., disappointment in 
humanity) was targeted here.  
 The findings of Study 2 were more complicated than expected. On the positive 
side, Study 2 did demonstrate that when discrepancy information is manipulated, 
interesting emotional consequences could be tracked. In the context of disappointment in 
and contempt for humanity, AO-discrepancies evoked both feelings of contempt and 
disappointment; AI-discrepancies only evoked disappointment. The effects of AI and 
AO-discrepancies on contempt and disappointment were moderated by identification 
with humanity directly, with emotional responses being more pronounced among strong-
identifiers. Finally, identification and contempt seem to influence recuperative 
responding in light of damning information about humanity. Specifically, strong-
identifiers provide more solutions to the problems they read about, and were quick to 
defend humanity, even when strong feelings of contempt were present. This is 
encouraging, although one must be cautious in generalizing these findings.  
 The sample used in this study was mostly educated, white Americans, who might 
respond differently to questions about humanity than other individuals from different 
backgrounds. As Wrightsman (1992) suggested, beliefs about humanity—in this case, 
beliefs about humanity’s moral discrepancies—develop via a long learning history 
characterized by one interacting with other people and the interactions he or she observes 
around them. It stands to reason then, that individuals from similar demographic 
backgrounds likely share similar learning histories, which could influence the extent to 
which individuals of the same ilk believe humanity is morally discrepant and the extent to 
which these beliefs correspond to specific emotional responses. It could be that folks with 
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varying degrees of education, SES, and diverse learning histories also possess a variety of 
beliefs about humanity and emotional responses. There is, however, still evident 
suggesting that the phenomena of interest are worthy of further consideration. Study 3 
does so by focusing in on the effects of experimentally manipulated identification with all 
of humanity.  
Study 3: Experimentally Manipulated Identification with Humanity 
 Study 2 found that the effects of discrepancy information on feelings of contempt 
and disappointment were moderated by identification with all of humanity. Thus, the 
primary objective of Study 3 was to examine whether similar effects occur when both 
discrepancy information and identification with all of humanity are experimentally 
manipulated. The secondary objective was to further examine whether identification and 
IT related to differences in causal attributions. The tertiary objective was to take another 
look at the potential moderating effects of IWAHr and IT on causal attributions. The 
quaternary objective was to reexamine the potential effects of disappointment and 
contempt on prosocial behavior, moderated by IWAHr and attributions of controllability.  
Method 
 Participants. Two hundred participants were recruited on-line via the Mechanical 
Turk interface created by Amazon and paid $.75 for their participation. Twenty-six 
participants were excluded from the analysis after failing the attention check question 
(described below), leaving 174 participants (88 females). All participants were American 
citizens over 18 years old (M = 35.90, SD = 12.12), and the majority was well educated 
(i.e., 59% held a bachelor’s degree or higher) and Caucasian (83.90%); thus the findings 
94 
might not generalize beyond well educated, White people with access to the Internet. All 
participants provided informed consent prior to their participation. 
 Procedure. Participants were first introduced to a study of “aesthetic and social 
judgments.” After participants provided informed consent, they were presented with an 
“attention check” question in which they were instructed NOT to answer the question and 
skip to the next one, so as to demonstrate that they were reading the instructions 
carefully. Again, twenty-six participants failed to read the instructions and answered the 
attention-check question. These participants were excluded from the following analyses.   
 After the attention check, participants were told that the first part of the study 
would involve providing aesthetic judgments of several images. Actually, participants 
were placed into different conditions depending on the content of 5 images they received. 
The images were taken from Moytl et al. (2012) and Oveis et al. (2011), depicting either 
shared human experiences (Common Humanity condition; N = 59), nationality prime 
images (American Identity condition; N = 58), or neutral non-descript images (Neutral 
condition; N = 57). In keeping with the cover story, participants rated the attractiveness 
(M = 4.53, SD = 1.03), color contrast (M = 4.54, SD = 1.15), and sharpness (M = 3.6, SD 
= 1.26) of each image. Ratings of the actual images had no effect on the variables of 
interest so will not be discussed further. See Appendices P and Q.  
 After the aesthetics judgments task, the remaining procedures were almost 
identical to Study 2; however, participants were randomly assigned only to the three 
discrepancy conditions without causal explanations, as causal attributions were not 
manipulated (see Appendix L). After reading their assigned passage, participants 
answered five questions about their causal attributions of the behaviors they read about 
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(see Appendix R). Specifically, participants were asked whether human nature was the 
root cause of the pattern of behavior they read about, whether people could potentially 
change the pattern of behavior they read about, and whether people have control over the 
pattern of behavior they read about. Participants then provided their emotional responses 
on the same measures of disappointment (M = 2.75, SD = 1.14, α = .88) and contempt (M 
= 2.02 SD = .86, α = .93) as described in Study 2. See Appendices M and N.  
 Implicit theory (IT) was measured using the Implicit Theories of Stability of 
Personality Scale (ITSPS; Levy & Dweck, unpublished measure; see Appendix J). The 
measure had good reliability (M = 3.45, SD = 1.36, α = .97).  Finally the Identification 
with All Humanity Scale (IWAH; McFarland Webb, & Brown, 2012; see Appendix I) 
was included as a check of the identification manipulation and as an alternative measure 
of identification. The IWAH provided a relatively reliable gauge of the extent to which 
people resonate with their community (M = 3.02, SD = .75, α = .91), country (America; 
M = 3.11, SD = .73, α = .88), and humanity (M = 2.91, SD = .80, α = .91). As in Studies 1 
and 2, the standardized residual score of human identity (IWAHr) was used as the 
continuous measure of identification with humanity.  
 Measuring causal attributions. After appropriate reverse coding, responses to the 
five attribution questions (see Appendix R) were subjected to an exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) with ML extraction and promax rotation. The scree plot (see Figure 21) 
suggested that a either a two-factor or three-factor solution fit the data well; however, 
only factors one and two had eigenvalues greater than one (2.58 and 1.03), and together 
they accounted for 72.25% of the variance in the data: factor 1 accounted form 51.60%; 
factor 2 accounted for 20.65% of variance in the data. SAS output did not provide factor 
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loadings for a potential third factor, so the two-factor solution was adopted. Factor 1 
included both “control” items and one “change” item (.800 and higher). Factor 2 included 
only the human nature item (.843). The final reverse-coded “change” item did not load 
strongly on either factor (.367, -.061), and so it was excluded from further analysis. Thus, 
items that did load on factor 1 were combined to create a composite score reflecting the 
belief that people have control over their behavior, and therefore could change their 
discrepant behavior (M = 5.2 SD = 1.13, α = .75). Finally, one item was left as the sole 
measure of attributions of human nature (M = 4.67, SD =1.41). 
 In final portion of Study 3, participants were given the same opportunity to act 
prosocially as described in Study 2. Responses were coded for word-count, having 
provided a potential “solution” to the problems they read about, and, finally, having 
written their response “in defense” of humanity, coded on a 1 to 5 scale (see Study 2 
above for coding scheme). The same blind raters from Study 2 coded these items. Inter-
rater reliability was good (Krippendorff’s alpha = .77; Freelon, 2013). 
Results  
 Identification manipulation check. In order to determine whether the identity 
manipulation had the intended effect, responses to the Identification With All Humanity 
Scale (IWAH; McFarland et al., 2012) were examined. Critically, participants in the 
Common-Humanity condition should report identifying with all of humanity to a greater 
extent than participants in the Control and American-pride conditions if the manipulated 
worked. Similarly, if the manipulation worked, participants in the American-pride 
condition should report identifying with America to a greater extent than participants in 
the Control and Common-Humanity conditions. To this end, a one-way multivariate 
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analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted. The identification manipulation 
(Common Humanity, American, Neutral) was the independent variable and the human 
identity and American identity subscales from the IWAH were the dependent variables. 
Unfortunately, the test was not significant (Wilks’ Λ = .99, F(2, 170) = .28 p = .75; see 
Figure 22), indicating that the identity manipulation did not work. Despite this 
unfortunate result, the proposed analyses were conducted.   
 Primary analysis: Common Humanity and discrepancies. Here the 
hypothesized manipulated discrepancies by manipulated identity interaction was tested in 
a 3(Discrepancies: AI, AO, Neutral) X 3(Identification: Common Humanity, American 
identity, neutral) factorial analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), with emotional responses 
(disappointment, contempt) as the dependent variables and covariates. Age was unrelated 
to feelings of contempt (r = -.12, p = .13) and feelings of disappointment (r = -.03, p  = 
.62), and therefore was excluded from these analyses.  
 The test failed to support the predicted two-way interaction between discrepancies 
and identification on contempt and disappointment (F(9, 163) = .73, p = .57), likely 
because the identification manipulation did not work. However, the test did reveal a 
significant main effect of the discrepancies manipulation on contempt (F(2, 163) = 7.76, 
p < .001), and the effect approached significance on disappointment (F(2, 163) = 2.3, p = 
.10). Because this effect was not significant, follow-up tests used Tukey’s HSD 
adjustments to alpha.   
 Planned contrasts revealed that, as predicted, participants in the AO-discrepancies 
condition (Madj = 2.35, SDadj = .11) reported greater contempt for humanity than 
participants in both the AI-discrepancies condition (Madj = 1.95, SDadj = .10), t(163) = 
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3.85, p < .001, and the control group (Madj = 1.83, SDadj = .94), t(163) = 2.75, p = .006), 
effectively replicating the findings in Study 2.  
Planned contrasts also revealed that participants in the AI-discrepancies condition 
(Madj = 2.86, SDadj = .08) reported marginally greater disappointment in humanity than 
participants in the control group (Madj = 2.62, SDadj = .08), t(163) = 2.15, p = .08, but 
their reported disappointment in humanity was statistically indistinguishable from 
disappointment reported by participants in the AO-discrepancies condition (Madj = 2.76, 
SDadj = .08), t(163) = 1.35, p = .37), whose disappointment was indistinguishable from 
the control group (t(163) = .69, p = .77). See Figure 23. 
 IWAHr. Because the identification/common-humanity manipulation failed, a 
multiple regression analysis was conducted, exchanging the identification/common-
humanity manipulation with measured identification with all of humanity (IWAH; 
McFarland Webb, & Brown, 2012); all other variables remained the same. Interestingly, 
for contempt, the analysis revealed that the moderating effect of IWAHr only trended 
towards significance (F(2, 165) = 2.11, p = .12). Because this effect was not significant, 
the follow-up tests used Tukey’s HSD adjustments to alpha. Examination of the 
interaction found that the effect of the discrepancies manipulation was significant only 
among weak-identifiers (F(2, 169) = 2.73, p = .02) not among strong-identifiers (F(2, 
165) = 1.59, p = .21). Here, the weak-identifiers (IWAHr -1 SD) in the AO-discrepancies 
condition expressed more contempt for humanity than weak-identifiers in the control and 
AI-discrepancies conditions (B = .89, t(165) = 4.45, p < .001; B = .59, t(165) = 2.74, p = 
.007), while strong-identifiers (IWAHr +1 SD) expressed similar levels across all three 
conditions (ts ≤ 1.05, ps > .36), essentially reversing the effects found in Study 2, in 
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which strong-identifiers showed increased contempt in the AO condition. See Figure 24. 
Next, the effects of IWAHr within each manipulation condition were examined, but these 
effects were not significant (ps > 41). No other effects on contempt or disappointment 
were significant (ps > .58). See Figure 25. 
 Attributions. Next, the moderating effects of causal attributions on the 
discrepancies manipulation were tested while continuing to control for the effects of each 
emotion in an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with discrepancies as the between-
subject factor and attributions of controllability and human nature as continuous 
moderating variables. Unfortunately, neither attributions of controllability or human 
nature moderated the effects of the discrepancies manipulation on contempt or 
disappointment (ps > .15). 
 Implicit Theory (IT). Next, the potential moderating effects of implicit theories 
of personality on the discrepancies manipulation were tested while again controlling for 
each emotion and age. Unfortunately, no moderating effects of IT were detected (ps > 
.39). 
 Prosocial behavior. Prosocial behavior was measured by asking participants to 
provide open-ended responses to the information they read about; they were free not to 
write or to write at length. They were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed 
with the information they read about, and to provide ideas for solutions to the problems 
they read about. Because participants in the neutral condition did not write in response to 
any discrepant or “negative” information about humanity, their responses were excluded 
from analyses.  
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 Prosocial behavior, then, was defined in three ways: (1) whether participants 
provided a “solution” to the problem they read about (coded as 0 or 1; 48.15% provided 
solutions); (2) whether they responded in “defense of humanity” (M = 2.20, SD = 1.50; 
Krippendorff’s alpha = .77), and (3); total word-count (M = 35.28, SD = 22.70).  
Providing a solution to the problem. Testing began by examining whether 
participants provided a “solution” to the problem they read about as a function of the 
discrepancies manipulation, feelings of disappointment, contempt, IWAHr, and all two 
and three-way interactions in a logistic regression analysis. Again, following the 
suggestions of Field (2009), -2LL (i.e., -2 log-likelihood) was the measure of model fit.  
The model fit the data well (-2LL χ2(15) = 21.36,  p = .13). Contempt was associated with 
an decreased probability of providing a solution (B= -6.29, χ2(1) = 4.36, p =.04; see 
Figure 26). There was also a marginal IWAHr by discrepancies manipulation interaction 
effect (B = .64 χ2(1) = 2.99, p =.08; see Figure 27). Further analysis suggested that 
strong-identifiers were likely to provide a solution regardless of discrepancies condition 
(B = -2.18 χ2(1) = .37, p = .57), while weak-identifiers were more likely to provide a 
solution in the AO-discrepancies condition than in the AI-discrepancies condition (B = 
.63 χ2(1) = 4.64, p =.03), which is interesting because this is where weak-identifiers 
experience increased contempt.  Furthermore, there was a marginal effect of 
identification within the AI-discrepancies condition (B = .58 χ2(1) = 3.29, p =.06), 
suggesting that strong-identifiers were more likely to provide a solution to AI-
discrepancies than weak-identifiers. No other effects approached significance (ps > .30).  
One alternative hypothesis that was explored in Studies 1 and 2 was that 
disappointment might lead to prosocial behavior among participants who believe 
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humanity has control of their discrepant behavior. Here that hypothesis was tested again, 
but with new discrepant information, rather than enduring beliefs. Once again using 
logistic regression, solution was regressed on discrepancies manipulation, attributions of 
controllability, and disappointment in an additional logistic regression. While there was a 
marginal effect of the discrepancies manipulation χ2(1) = 3.25, p = .08); unfortunately, 
none of the main effects or interactions of interest were significant (χ2s < 1, ps > .33). 
 Writing in defense of humanity. Next, in a multiple regression analysis, “In 
defense” was regressed on the same combination of variables and interactions as in the 
analysis of “solution.”  Although, the overall model provided a poor fit to the data (R2 = 
.20; F(15, 91) = 1.58, p = .10), there was a marginal effect of IWAHr (B = .55, t(91) = 
1.80, p  = .07), suggesting that strong-identifiers might have been more defensive than 
weak-identifiers, which is similar to the findings in Study 2. However, there was a 
significant contempt by discrepancies interaction (B = -.77, t(91) = -2.13, p  = .03). 
Follow-up analysis suggested that within the AI-discrepancies condition, contempt was 
associated with decreased defending of humanity (B = -.80, t(56) = -3.82, p = .0003). 
Participants in the AI-discrepancies condition were also far less defensive than 
participants in the AO-discrepancies condition, but only when contempt was high (B = -
.90, t(91) = -2.05, p  = .04; see Figure 28). No other effects approached significance (ps > 
.23).  
 The alternative hypothesis, that disappointment might lead to prosocial behavior 
among participant who believe humanity has control of their discrepant behavior, was 
tested again using writing “in defense” of humanity as the dependent variable. In a 
multiple regression analysis, “in defense” was regressed on the discrepancies 
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manipulation, attributions of controllability, disappointment, and all two- and three-way 
interactions. Unfortunately, these effects were not significant (Fs ≥ 1.00, ps > .31). 
 Word-count. As a final test of prosocial behavior, participants’ word-count (i.e., 
the number of words participants contributed to the collective response) was examined 
with the same combination of variables and interactions described in the previous two 
analyses, with the addition of writing “in defense” of humanity.  
 These data were analyzed in a multiple regression analysis. The model was a poor 
predictor of word-count (R
2
 = .22, F(20, 106) = 1.22, p = .26). The defending humanity 
by IWAHr interaction was the only significant effect (B = -9.26, t(106) = -2.26, p  = .03). 
Further analysis revealed that defending humanity was only positively associated with 
word-count when IWAHr was low (-1 SD; B = 13.93, t(106) = 2.30, p = .02, while 
IWAHr was positively associated with word-count, but only when defending humanity 
was low (-1 SD, B = 14.75, t(106) = 2.75, p = .007). See Figure 29. No other effect 
approached significance (ps > .19).  
 Again, the alternative hypothesis regarding the interaction of attributions and 
disappointment was tested here. Word-count was regressed on the discrepancies 
manipulation, attributions of controllability, disappointment, writing in defense, and all 
two-, three-, and four-way interactions. Only the effect of controllability was significant 
(B = 15.05, F(1, 105) = 9.81, p = .002), partially replicating the findings of Studies 1 and 
2, suggesting that attributions of controllability can at times predict prosocial responding. 
No other effect was significant (Fs ≤ 1.17, ps > .28). 
 Measuring causal attributions. Finally, IWAHr and IT were tested as possible 
predictors of causal attributions.  Attributions of human nature and controllability were 
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regressed on IWAHr scores and IT. Unfortunately, the only significant relationship was 
between attributions of controllability and IT (B = -.2, t(167) = -2.59, p = .01) suggesting 
that entity-theorists were less likely to attribute the cause of discrepancies to controllable 
factors. No other relationship was significant (ps > .20). 
Discussion 
 The primary objective of Study 3 was to take an experimental approach in order 
to examine the discrepancies by common-humanity interaction effect on feelings of 
disappointment in and contempt for humanity. The second was to further examine 
whether identification and IT related to differences in causal attributions. The final 
objective was to further explore the relationship between negative emotions and prosocial 
behavior. 
 Disappointment. It was hypothesized that participants in the AI-discrepancies 
condition would likely express significant feelings of disappointment in humanity. 
However, given the findings of Study 2, disappointment might not be unique to AI-
discrepancies. Participants in the AO-discrepancies might also express significant 
feelings of disappointment. This was not exactly the case: the effect of  
 Common Humanity. Unfortunately, because the manipulation failed, one cannot 
come to any conclusions about manipulated common humanity. However, non-
significant results were found when IWAHr was measured. It could simply be that 
regardless of identity, participants expressed feelings of disappointment when they 
learned that people pervasively fail to be kind to one another, even if those feelings were 
not acute.   
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 Attributions. It was predicted that participants in the AI-discrepancies condition 
would express greater disappointment in humanity to the extent that they attributed the 
discrepant behavior to controllable causes. Unfortunately, this prediction was not 
confirmed. Indeed, these results replicated the (non)findings in Study 2 (see discussion 
above). 
 Implicit Theory (IT). It was predicted that AI-discrepancies would lead to 
feelings of disappointment among incremental-theorists. This prediction was not 
supported. Indeed, even when examined in relationship to causal attributions, IT failed to 
moderate the relationship between AI-discrepancies and disappointment.   
 Contempt. It was hypothesized that participants would likely express feelings of 
contempt for humanity when they learned that people often fail to meet minimum moral 
standards of conduct (AO-discrepancies/proscriptive moral violations). This prediction 
was again confirmed, replicating the findings of Study 2. Indeed, participants in the AO-
discrepancies condition responded with significantly more contempt for humanity than 
participants in both the AI-discrepancies and control condition. Again, these findings 
suggest that contempt is a unique consequence of AO-discrepancy beliefs, as discussed in 
Study 2 (see discussion above).  
 Common Humanity. The identification manipulation was ineffective; therefore, 
coming to any conclusion about the effects of manipulated Common Humanity is 
unrealistic. However, using IWAHr, the analyses did suggest that identification with all 
of humanity moderated the effects of AO-discrepancies on contempt. However, the 
pattern found in Study 2 essentially reversed in Study 3. Recall that in Study 2, strong-
identifiers responded with much more contempt in the AO-discrepancies condition, while 
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the weak-identifiers maintained across conditions, seemingly unaffected by the 
discrepancies manipulation. Here in Study 3, strong-identifiers were unaffected by the 
discrepancies manipulation, maintaining relatively low levels of contempt across 
conditions, whereas weak-identifiers responded with more contempt in the AO-
discrepancies condition. It appears that in Study 3, IWAHr might have blocked the 
contempt-evoking effects of AO-discrepancies. In a sense, strong-identifiers behaved as 
they were expected to: rejecting contemptuous feelings for their group. But why did this 
take place in Study 3 and not Study 2?  
 One reason could be the content of the identity manipulation. While the Common 
Humanity condition was predicted to instill a sense of oneness with humanity through 
pictures of diverse peoples and planet Earth, pictures in the other conditions might have 
primed positive feelings for humanity as well.  In the American Identity condition, 
participants were exposed to patriotic images, including pictures of fireworks, the 
American flag, and the Statue of Liberty. For American participants, these images might 
have been interpreted as depicting humanity at its best. In the Control condition, 
participants were exposed to images of modern art, depicting humanity’s ability to be 
creative. In hindsight, images in all of these conditions could have primed some positive 
feelings towards humanity, but to an even greater extent among participants who already 
strongly identified with humanity. This initial dose of positive humanness might have 
been enough to motivate strong-identifiers to reject AO-discrepancies and the feelings of 
contempt associated with them. In concert with the potential “reverse causal path” 
(Petrocelli & Smith, 2005) detected in Study 2, in which strong-identifiers responded 
with greater contempt than weak-identifiers, the results thus far suggest a dynamic 
106 
relationship between common humanity, AO-discrepancy beliefs, and the negative 
emotions they influence.   
 Attributions. Beyond identification, it was predicted that the effect of AO-
discrepancies on feelings of contempt would be moderated by causal attributions of 
human nature. Unfortunately, this prediction was not confirmed. Indeed, these results 
replicated the (non)findings in Study 2 using measurement data (see discussion above).  
 Implicit Theory (IT). It was hypothesized that the effects of AO-discrepancies on 
feelings of contempt would be moderated by IT. It was predicted that AO-discrepancies 
would lead to contempt among entity-theorists. However, given the findings of Study 2, it 
might actually be that AO-discrepancies lead to feelings of contempt, regardless of one’s 
implicit personality theory, and that any difference in contempt between entity- and 
incremental-theorists is isolated to the Control condition. The reason is that contempt 
among entity-theorists was relatively consistent across discrepancy conditions, while 
incremental-theorists responded like entity-theorists when confronted with highly toxic 
information about humanity. Here in Study 3, incremental and entity-theorists responded 
similarly across all conditions. Failure to replicate the IT effect within the Control 
condition might have been a matter of statistical power; there were far more participants 
in Study 2 than in Study 3.    
 Prosocial Behavior. Recall that the literature suggests a potential distinction 
between contempt and disappointment is their associated behavior (see work reviewed 
above). Specifically, feelings of contempt for humanity might lead to social avoidance, 
while disappointment might lead to prosocial behavior. However, it was also suggested 
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that identification might moderate this relationship, such that feelings of disappointment 
might lead to prosocial behavior, but only among strong-identifiers.  
 To test these hypotheses, just as in Study 2, participants were asked to write a 
response to the discrepancy information they read about. Responses were again coded for 
providing a “solution” to the problem they read about, writing “in defense” of humanity, 
and, finally, their overall word-count.  
Although only marginally significant, the relationship between contempt and 
providing a solution was consistent with predictions: the probability of providing a 
“solution” to humanity’s moral shortcomings decreased as feelings of contempt became 
more acute. This finding might suggest that contempt not only influences the extent to 
which one will avoid a target, but also the extent to which he or she will even provide a 
means for that target to recoup some moral credit. Perhaps with contempt comes the 
belief that the target of one’s contempt has no hope. 
The probability of providing a solution was also marginally influenced by an 
unexpected IWAHr by discrepancies manipulation interaction. Here, we found that 
among strong-identifiers, the probability of providing a solution was relatively stable 
across discrepancy conditions. Weak-identifiers were far less likely to provide a solution 
in the AI-discrepancies condition than in the AO-discrepancies condition. The reason 
could be that weak-identifiers are less invested in decreasing AI-discrepancies, because 
they do not see the benefit. Weak-identifiers might also be less likely to see AI-
discrepancies as a problem in need of solution in the first place, for similar reasons. In the 
AO-discrepancies condition, weak-identifiers might have seen the benefit in reducing the 
rate of murder, rape, theft, etc. 
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More evidence was found suggesting that strong-identifiers are more defensive in 
their responses to damning information about humanity, essentially replicating the 
findings of Study 2. We also found that defending humanity was influenced by contempt, 
but this effect was dependent on the discrepancies manipulation. Within the AI-
discrepancies condition, contempt was negatively associated with defending humanity. 
This is a rather interesting finding, as AI-discrepancies are generally less contempt-
evoking than AO-discrepancies. It suggests that people who might be more prone to 
contempt also feel less compelled to defend humanity when humanity is at least meeting 
minimum moral standards. Perhaps, like weak-identifiers who might not see a need to 
provide a solution to AI-discrepancies, participants prone to contempt might not see the 
need to defend humanity when humanity is not being highly prosocial—not being bad 
might be good enough. 
Defending humanity and IWAHr interacted to predict word-count. The nature of 
the interaction was interesting. Defending humanity was only predictive of word-count 
among weak-identifiers, while IWAHr was only predictive when defending humanity 
was low. These findings seem to suggest that strong-identifiers will write at length to 
respond to negative information about humanity, but defending humanity might have no 
effect among strong-identifiers, because these folks tend to be more defensive already. 
Weak-identifiers, on the other hand, might only write at length to respond to negative 
information about humanity when they are motivated to defend humanity. This raises the 
question: when will weak-identifiers be motivated to defend humanity? It could simply 
be that weak identification does not necessarily mean one is opposed to the group in 
question. For example, some Americans might not identify with Palestinians, but they 
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might still defend their rights to exist with dignity in their own state. The same might be 
true with identification with humanity: one might not identify with  humanity, but still be 
willing to defend it. 
Finally, like in Studies 1 and 2, attributions of controllability were associated with 
increased prosocial behavior. Participants who strongly believe humanity has control 
over its discrepant behavior also provided more words to the collective response. Unlike 
in Studies 1 and 2, this effect was not moderated by feelings of disappointment. These 
findings seem to suggest that people who believe humanity has a high degree of control 
over its behavior are also more proactive, or at least more engaged.  
 Predicting causal attributions. While Weiner (2006) suggests that controllable 
causes are the most blameworthy causes, Costarelli (2012) pointed out that such 
explanations also imply that a group can change in the future—they have the potential to 
overcome their discrepancy—which can protect one’s positive identity. Thus, it was 
predicted that strong-identifiers should be motivated to ignore explanations that imply 
humanity has a flawed humanity, turning instead to explanations that imply the potential 
for change via attributing the flaw to controllable causes. It was thought that incremental-
theorists might make the same causal attributions as strong-identifiers, not because they 
are motivated to protect their positive identity, but because such attributions are theory-
consistent. Weak-identifiers should be less invested in humanity’s image as it has little 
connection to their own positive self-image, and so they should be less motivated to resist 
attributing human nature as the cause of moral discrepancies. Entity-theorists might do 
so, because such attributions are theory-consistent  
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Unfortunately, the only significant relationship was between attributions of 
controllability and IT. Identification had no relationship with causal attributions. These 
findings are consistent with Study 1; however, in Study 1, IT was related to both 
attributions of controllability and attributions of human nature.  Again, this finding is 
simply theory-consistent, suggesting entity-theorists are less likely to attribute behavior 
to controllable causes. 
There were several findings in Study 3 that contributed to the overall story about 
feelings of disappointment and contempt in humanity. Study 3 replicated the effect of 
discrepancies on disappointment and contempt found in Study 2. Study 3 also found that 
IWAHr moderated the effects of manipulated discrepancies on contempt, but in the 
opposite direction as found in Study 2. Identification and contempt influenced prosocial 
responding in light of damning information about humanity. Contempt decreased the 
probability of providing a solution to the problems folks read about, and contributed to 
less defending humanity in the AI-discrepancies condition. Strong-identifiers were quick 
to defend humanity, and strong-identifiers were more likely to contribute more words to 
the collective response, but weak-identifiers were willing to contribute more words to the 
collective response, when they were motivated to defend humanity.  
Finally, once again, no evidence of the proposed moderating effects of causal 
attributions or IT could be found. Study 4 provided one final test to reexamine their 
potential moderating effects. However, in Study 4, IT was manipulated.  
Study 4: Implicit Theories of Personality and Social Avoidance 
 The primary objective of Study 4 was to examine the interaction effects of 
experimentally manipulated discrepancies and experimentally manipulated implicit 
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theory (IT) on feelings of disappointment and contempt. Study 4 also provided an 
additional test of the proposed moderating effects of causal attribution and identification 
with all of humanity (IWAHr). Finally, Study 4 provided a novel test of the proposed 
effects of contempt and disappointment on prosocial behavior, moderated by IWAHr. 
Method 
 Participants. One hundred and seventy-six undergraduate students from Lehigh 
University participated in order to fulfill the requirements of an introductory psychology 
course. Participants were mostly in their late teens and early twenties (Mage = 18.97, 
SDage = 1.22), mostly Caucasian (65.48%), and politically left-leaning (M  = 3.26, SD = 
1.01). Data from seven participants were removed prior to analysis, as these participants 
either voiced suspicion regarding the study manipulations or had provided questionable 
data (finished the entire study in under 10 minutes, a time in which it would be difficult at 
best to fully process the study materials). In sum, data from one hundred and sixty-nine 
participants (90 females) were included in the following analyses.  
 Procedures. Participants learned that they were participating in a two-part study 
investigating reading comprehension and social judgments. After providing informed 
consent, participants read a short excerpt from a “scientific article” about which they 
would later answer comprehensive questions.  However, the short excerpt they read was 
actually part of a manipulation of implicit theories adapted from Chiu, Hong, and Dweck 
(1997; Study 5; see Appendix S). The authors in that study manipulated whether 
participants were in either an entity or incremental orientation.  Participants in the Entity 
condition (N = 54) were presented information describing human behavior as stemming 
from fixed characteristics of human nature: 
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 “In his talk at the American Psychological Association’s annual convention held 
at Washington, D.C., in August, Dr. George Medin argued that ‘in most of us, by the age 
of ten, our character has set like plaster and will never soften again.’ He reported 
numerous large longitudinal studies which show that people ‘age and develop, but they 
do so on the foundation of enduring dispositions.’” 
 Participants in the Incremental condition (N = 59) were given information 
suggesting that human characteristics are changeable and therefore patterns of behavior 
can change: 
 “In his talk at the American Psychological Association’s annual convention held 
at Washington, D.C., in August, Dr. George Medin argued that ‘no one’s character is 
hard like a rock that cannot be changed. Only for some, greater effort and determination 
are needed to effect changes.’ He reported numerous large longitudinal studies, which 
show that people can mature and can change their character. He also reported research 
findings showing that people’s personality characteristics can be changed even in their 
late sixties.” 
  For my purposes, participants in the Control condition (N = 56) read: 
 “In his talk at the American Psychological Association’s annual convention held 
at Washington, D.C., in August, Dr. George Medin argued that ‘in most of us, by the age 
of ten, our limbic system is fully developed.’ He reported numerous studies showing that 
limbic activation in response to emotional arousing stimuli is nearly the same in 10-year-
olds as it is older adults.”  
 After they completed the IT priming manipulation, participants were given a 
paper-and-pencil packet that contained the same vignettes and measures as described in 
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Study 3. Participants read a passage from an excerpt from an article purporting to 
document theories about “patterns of human behavior,” based on several scholarly 
sources. In that passage, participants were presented information suggesting that 
humanity, in general, fails to meet moral standards (A-O discrepancies condition, N = 
54), fails to live up to moral ideals (A-I discrepancies condition, N = 58), or general 
demographic information about humanity (Control condition, N = 57). As in Study 3, no 
causal information was presented (see Appendix L).  
 After reading their assigned passage, participants answered five questions about 
the causal attributions of the behaviors they read about (see Appendix R). Specifically, 
participants were asked whether human nature was the root cause of the pattern of 
behavior they read about, whether people could or could not potentially change the 
pattern of behavior they read about, and whether people have control over the pattern of 
behavior they read about. 
After appropriate reverse coding, responses to the five attribution questions (see 
Appendix R) were subjected to an exploratory factor analysis with ML extraction and 
promax rotation. The scree plot (Figure 30) suggested that a either a two-factor or three-
factor solution fit the data well; however, only factors one and two had eigenvalues 
greater than one (1.90 and 1.04), accounting for 58.75% of the variance in the data: factor 
1 accounted for 37.90%; factor 2 accounted for 20.85%. Thus, the two-factor solution 
was adopted. Factor 1 included both control items and the positively coded change items 
(.500, .753 and .706). Factor 2 included only the human nature item (.791). The final 
reverse-coded change item did not load strongly on either factor (.196, -.063), so it was 
excluded from further analysis. Thus, items that did load on factor 1 were combined to 
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create composite scores reflecting the belief that people have control over their behavior, 
and therefore could change their discrepant behavior (M = 4.50 SD = .91, α = .69). 
Finally, one item was left as the sole measure of attributions of human nature as the cause 
of discrepant behavior (M = 3.90, SD =1.13), which unfortunately, could decrease the 
reliability to measure attributions of human nature.  
 Next, participants completed the measures of disappointment and contempt 
previously described, but in the context of how they feel “right how” (see Appendices M 
& N). On average, participants reported relatively low levels of both disappointment (M 
= 2.48, SD = .89, α = .9) and contempt (M = 1.94, SD = .75, α = .88). Again, 
disappointment and contempt were strongly associated (r = .61, p < .0001).  
 Next, IT was measured using the Implicit Theories of Stability of Personality 
Scale (ITSPS) as a manipulation check. After appropriate reverse coding, the measure is 
structured such that high scores indicate an entity theory, while low scores indicate an 
incremental theory. The measure had good reliability (M = 3.64, SD = 1.13, α = .91).   
 The Identification with All Humanity Scale (IWAH; McFarland Webb, & Brown, 
2012; see Appendix I) was included. The IWAH measures the extent to which people 
resonate with their community (M = 4.07, SD = .75, α = .58), country (America; M = 
3.41, SD = .67, α = .72), and humanity (M = 3.04, SD = .62, α = .82). Again, the IWAHr 
(standardized residual score) was measure of humanity identity used in the subsequent 
analyses.  
 Prosocial Behavior. In order to measure prosocial behavior, after providing 
informed consent, participants were told that they would be given $5 for their 
participation. After participants finished the paper-and-pencil packet, participants were 
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asked if they would be willing to donate part or all of their $5 to UNICEF, an 
organization that aids needy people around the globe. The amount of money in dollars 
participants were willing to donate (M  = 4.43, SD = 1.39) was the measure of prosocial 
behavior. In all, 84% of participants were willing to donate all of the $5. 
Results 
 IT manipulation check. If the IT manipulation worked, then participants in the 
Entity theory condition should have scored high on the ITSPS relative to participants in 
the Incremental theory condition. To examine this, a one-way analysis of variance was 
conducted with the IT manipulation (Entity, Incremental, Control) as the independent 
variable and scores on the ITSPS as the dependent variable; high scores on the ITSPS 
indicate an entity theory of personality. The analysis revealed a significant effect of the 
IT manipulation (F(2, 166) = 5.03, p = .008; see Figure 31). Planned contrasts revealed 
that participants in the Incremental condition (M = 3.31, SD = .97) scored significantly 
lower on the ITSPS than participants in both the Entity condition (M = 3.70, SD = 1.07), 
t(166) = 1.91, p = .05,  and the Neutral condition (M = 3.95, SD = 1.24), t(166) = 3.14, p 
= .002, who did not significantly differ from each other (t(166) = 1.18, p = .24). While 
these results confirm that the manipulation had the desired effect on participants in the 
Incremental condition, it is less certain whether the manipulation primed an Entity theory 
per se, as participants in this condition were statistically indistinguishable from 
participants in the control condition. Nevertheless, it is still possible to test the hypothesis 
that AO-discrepancies should lead to feelings of contempt and AI-discrepancies lead to 
feelings of disappointment differently among incremental-theorists than among entity-
theorists.  
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 Primary analysis: Discrepancies and IT. Testing began by examining the 
effects of the discrepancies and implicit theory manipulations and their interactions. Data 
was analyzed in a 3(Discrepancies: AI, AO, Neutral) X 3(Implicit Theory: Entity theory, 
Incremental theory, neutral) factorial analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), with emotional 
responses (disappointment, contempt) as the dependent variables and standardized 
covariates. 
  The test revealed a significant main effect of the discrepancies manipulation on 
feelings of contempt (F(2, 157) = 9.95, p < .0001; see Figure 32). Planned contrasts 
revealed that as predicted, participants in the AO-discrepancies condition (Madj = 2.20, 
SDadj = .08) expressed more contempt for humanity than participants in both the AI-
discrepancies condition (Madj = 1.70, SDadj = .07), t(157) = 4.46, p < .0001, and the 
control condition (Madj = 1.83, SDadj = .94), t(157) = 2.37, p = .02, who also expressed 
more contempt than participants in the AI-discrepancies condition, t(157) = 2.03, p = .05. 
However, the effect of the discrepancies manipulation on contempt was not moderated by 
the implicit theory manipulation (F(4, 157) = 1.71, p = .15). No other effect on contempt 
was significant (p > .35).    
 There was a main effect of the discrepancies manipulation on feelings of 
disappointment (F(2, 159)=  6.21, p = .003).  Planned contrast revealed that participants 
in the AI-discrepancies condition (Madj = 2.62, SDadj = .05) expressed greater 
disappointment in humanity than participants on both the AO-discrepancies condition 
(Madj = 2.35, SDadj = .06), t(159) = 3.47, p = .0007, and the control condition (Madj = 2.45, 
SDadj = .94), t(159) = 2.21, p = .03, which did not statistically differ from one another 
(t(159) = 1.26, p = .15). However, this main effect was moderated by the implicit theories 
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manipulation (F(4, 159) = 2.52, p = .04). As shown in Figure 33, the effect of AI-
discrepancies on feelings of disappointment was limited to participant in the IT control 
condition F(2, 159) = 9.87, p < .0001). No other effects were significant (p > .30). 
 Attributions. Next, testing began by examining whether the effects of the 
discrepancies manipulation on feelings of contempt and disappointment were moderated 
by causal attribution in an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with the discrepancies 
manipulation entered as the between-subjects factor and attributions (of control and 
human nature, respectively) as a continuous moderating variable; emotional responses 
(disappointment, contempt) were the dependent variables and standardized covariates. 
The test revealed only the significant effect of attributions of controllability (B = .16, t(1, 
162) = 3.38, p = .0009; see Figure 34) on disappointment, suggesting that people feel 
more disappointment (not contempt) when they believe moral discrepancies are 
controllable. This fits well with classic attribution theory (see Weiner, 2006, for a 
review), in which targets are more blameworthy when they have control over their bad 
behavior. Here, it appears that participants were also more likely to feel disappointed in 
humanity for the same reason. No other effects on disappointment or contempt were 
significant (ps > .12 for controllability; ps > .67 for human nature).  
 IWAHr. Next, testing began by examining whether the effect of the discrepancies 
manipulation on feelings of contempt and disappointment was moderated by 
identification with humanity (IWAHr) after controlling for the effect of each emotion and 
age. Unfortunately, the analysis failed to reveal any significant effects of IWAHr (ps > 
.25). 
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 Prosocial behavior. As a novel measure of prosocial behavior, participants were 
asked if they would donate all or a portion of the $5 they were to receive for their 
participation. Again, the original hypothesis was that feelings of disappointment and 
contempt would have different effects on prosocial behavior (donating in this case). 
Specifically, it was predicted that contempt would decrease prosocial behavior while 
disappointment might motivate prosocial behavior. However, this prediction was later 
qualified, suggesting that disappointment might only lead to prosocial behavior among 
participants who strongly identify with humanity.  
 In a multiple regression analysis, the number of dollars participants were willing 
to donate was regressed on the discrepancies manipulation, contempt, disappointment, 
IWAHr, and all interaction terms, controlling for age. The model provided a poor fit to 
the data (R
2
 = .14, F(24, 142) = 1.16, p = .29). There was, however, a significant 
contempt by IWAHr interaction (F(1, 142) = 5.81 p = .02). As seen in Figure 35, among 
strong-identifiers contempt was associated with a decrease in donating (B = -.65, t(142) = 
-1.73, p = .08). However, among weak-identifiers, contempt was associated with an 
increase in donating (B = .88, t(142) = 2.26, p = .03. No other effect was significant (ps > 
.18). 
The alternative hypothesis that was explored in Studies 1, 2, and 3, that 
disappointment might lead to prosocial behavior among participants who believe 
humanity has control of their discrepant behavior was once again tested here with 
donations as the dependent variable. Thus, donation was regressed on the discrepancies 
manipulation, attributions of controllability, and disappointment. Unfortunately, none of 
the effects or interactions were significant ( ps > .30). 
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 Measuring causal attributions. It has been suggested that identification with 
humanity and implicit theory of personality should influence the type of causes one 
attributes to discrepant behavior. Specifically, it was proposed that strong-identifiers 
should be motivated to make attributions that limit the negative consequences for the 
group (or themselves), while incremental theorist would do the same, but only because 
such attributions are theory-consistent. In contrast, entity-theorists and participants who 
do not identify with all of humanity should be more likely to attribute discrepancies to 
human nature, because participant who do not strongly identify with humanity should not 
be motivated to limit negative consequences, and such attributions are consistent with an 
entity theory.  
 To examine these predictions, a multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) 
with Implicit Theory groups (IT) included as a between-subject variable and IWAHr 
included as a continuous-moderating-variable was conducted. Attributions of human 
nature and attributions of controllability were the dependent variables. The analysis failed 
to reveal a significant effect of IWAHr (Wilks’ Λ = .99, F(2, 162) = 1.00, p = .38). The 
analysis did, however, reveal a multivariate effect of the IT manipulation (Wilks’ Λ = 
.90, p = .002). Univariate analyses revealed a main effect of the IT manipulation on 
attributions of human nature (F(2, 163) = 3.96, p = .02) and controllability (F(2, 163) = 
3.95, p = .02).  
 As can be seen in Figure 36, participants in the Control condition (M = 4.21, SD = 
1.07) attributed the discrepancies to human nature more so than participants in the Entity 
condition (M = 3.63, SD = 1.32), t(163) = 2.8, p = .006, demonstrating that participants in 
the control condition were much more entity-driven than participants thought to have 
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been primed to be. Also, contrary to predictions, participants in the Incremental condition 
(M = 3.86, SD = .93) did not significantly differ from participants in either the Control 
condition (t(163) = 1.65, p = .11) or the Entity condition (t(163) = 1.2, p =.23), although 
the mean of the participants in the Incremental condition was higher. As ratings of 
attributions of human nature were highest among participants in the Control condition, 
and statistically indistinguishable between the participants in the Entity and Incremental 
conditions, it would seem that the IT manipulation did not have the predicted effect on 
attributions of human nature.  
 Regarding attributions of controllability, a planned contrasts revealed that 
participants in the Incremental condition (M = 4.76, SD = .77) made more attributions of 
controllability than both participants in the Control  (M = 4.33, SD = .88) (t(168) = 2.78, 
p = .006) and Entity conditions (M = 4.38, SD = 1.03) (t(163) = 2.78, p = .007), 
suggesting that the IT manipulation did have an effect on causal attributions, but the 
effect was only as expected when examining attributions of controllability, because 
theory suggests that incremental-theorists believe more is controllable.  
Discussion 
 The primary objective of Study 4 was to take an experimental approach in order 
to examine the predicted and so-far-elusive moderating effects of IT. The second 
objective was to further examine the moderating effects of identification with all of 
humanity (IWAHr) and the— even-more-elusive—moderating effects of causal 
attributions. The final objective was to further examine the effects of contempt and 
disappointment on prosocial behavior, moderated by IWAHr, using a novel measure of 
prosocial behavior.  
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 Disappointment. It was predicted that participants in the AI-discrepancies 
condition would likely express stronger feelings of disappointment in humanity than 
participants in the Control condition. Furthermore, given the findings of Studies 2 and 3, 
it was also expected that participant in the AO-discrepancies condition would feel more 
disappointed in humanity than participants in the Control condition, but similar levels of 
disappointment as participants in the AI-discrepancies condition. This time, however, the 
pattern was as originally predicted: disappointment was elevated only among participants 
in the AI-discrepancies condition. Participants in the AO-discrepancies and Control 
conditions did not statistically differ from one another.  What is most interesting here is 
not that disappointment was strongest among participants in the AI-discrepancies 
condition, but that it was not elevated among the participants in the AO-discrepancies 
condition, but even slightly lower than participants in the Control condition.   
 Looking across Studies 2 through 4, disappointment in the AO-discrepancies 
condition is much lower here in Study 4 than the previous studies, while contempt in this 
condition is relatively similar. Why did this occur only in Study 4? The age range of the 
sample of participants might be responsible. In Study 4, the age range was restricted to 
college-aged participants, while in the previous studies the age range was much wider. 
College-aged participants in Study 4 reported less disappointment overall than 
participants in the other studies, especially in the AO-discrepancies condition. College-
age participants were much less disappointed in humanity when humanity was described 
as generally villainous, but expressed just as much contempt for humanity as participants 
in the other studies. This difference might be tapping into a difference in perspective, or 
position, from which people express these emotions. For example, contempt is expressed 
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from the position of perceived moral or intellectual superiority. The potential to think 
oneself superior, especially intellectually superior, might not be all that uncommon 
among students at a prestigious private university in Northeastern United States. In 
contrast, disappointment might be more often expressed from a position of actual moral 
or intellectual authority rather than perceived superiority, much like when a teacher or 
parent is disappointed in their student who fails to earn the grade the teacher or parent 
believed the student was capable of earning. This perspective might only come on strong 
with age. Of course, this is speculation and would need to be tested. 
 Implicit theory (IT). In Study 4, we found evidence suggesting that when IT is 
manipulated, it has the potential to moderate the effects of discrepancy on feelings of 
disappointment, albeit not in a manner that was predicted, but in a manner that might 
actually complement the findings in Study 2. Recall that in Study 2, incremental- and 
entity-theorists did not differ in and across the AI and AO conditions. Where they 
differed was in the Control condition, with entity-theorists expressing more 
disappointment in humanity than incremental-theorists, suggesting that incremental-
theorists behave like entity-theorists when confronted with damning information about 
humanity. Here in Study 4, incremental- and entity-theorists responded similarly across 
all conditions. Indeed, they appeared unmoved by humanity’s moral discrepancies. It 
turned out that elevated disappointment in response to AI-discrepancies was only evident 
among participants in the IT-control condition. Activated entity and incremental theories 
seemed to block the effects of the discrepancies manipulation on disappointment. This is 
a difficult finding to reconcile.  
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Why was the effect isolated to disappointment in response to AI-discrepancies in 
the IT-control condition? It could be that the content in the paragraphs caused 
participants to be less responsive to AI-discrepancies. For example, it could be that Entity 
and Incremental conditions might have caused people to focus on “individual 
differences,” which might have reduced the tendency to conceptualize people in a 
collective sense, while the control condition paragraph might have increased this 
tendency. Alternatively, in the Entity condition, participants might not have expressed 
disappointment because the potential for becoming more prosocial is less evident; there 
might have been less cause to feel disappointed (i.e., there is no disconfirmation of a 
positive expectation or outcome). On the other hand, in the Incremental condition, it is 
made explicit that people can mature and change. As such, AI-discrepancies might not 
signal the disconfirmation of a positive expectation or outcome; rather, the incremental 
theory paragraph might have implied that the positive outcome will come.  
Another matter to consider is the fact that disappointment among entity- and 
incremental-theorists was equivalent in the discrepancies control condition, which was 
not the case in Study 2. In Study 2, incremental-theorists in the Control condition were 
far less disappointed in humanity than entity-theorists. Perhaps this was due to the fact 
that implicit theory was measured in Study 2, not primed. Measured and manipulated 
implicit theory might not be completely the same. When IT is measured, not only does 
one learn something about the ways in which people reason about personality, but 
perhaps a good deal about how and when they more generally experience certain 
emotions as well (Dweck & Molden, 2008).  Thus, our manipulation of IT might not have 
primed the emotional side of the IT coin. Rather, the manipulation might have only 
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touched on the cognitive side—the reasoning side—that in turn influenced participants to 
interpret the discrepancy information in such a way that mitigated the experience of 
negative emotions. On the other hand, it could simply be that IT has little influence on the 
way people emotionally responded to humanity’s moral shortcomings. However, it did 
have an effect on whether participants attributed the moral shortcoming to controllable 
causes, which in turn influenced feelings of disappointment. It seems that these findings 
could be distilled into a simple path model (IT  Control/Choice  Disappointment) 
that resembles the model originally predicted (see Figures 2 and 4). 
Attributions. Finally, in Study 4, evidence of the predicted moderating effects of 
causal attributions with regards to disappointment was found. Indeed, participants in the 
AI-discrepancy condition reported elevated feelings of disappointment in humanity, but 
only when they attributed those discrepancies to controllable causes. Thus, when one 
believes or perceives that people, in general, are far less kind to one another than they 
should and could be, he or she will respond with disappointment in humanity. This is, of 
course, consistent with research on disappointment (Carroll et al., 2007; De Cremer, 
2006; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002; Wubben et al., 2009), SDT Higgins, 1987, 1989; 
Petrocelli & Smith, 2005). This finding also contributes to the literature on attribution 
theory and the work by Weiner and colleagues (Weiner, 2006; Weiner & Kukla, 1970). 
Weiner and Kukla demonstrated that blame and anger increase to the extent that negative 
behavior is controllable. Here, we found that disappointment increased to the extent that 
the failure to engage in positive behavior was controllable. These findings build on 
Weiner’s previous work by demonstrating that, while failing to engage in highly 
prosocial behavior is not the same as engaging in immoral behavior, explanations 
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influence emotional responses to those behaviors in much the same way; the only 
difference is the specific negative emotion activated by the explanation. 
Summarizing, in Study 4, IT influenced controllability attributions and 
controllability attributions, in turn, moderated the effects of AI-discrepancies on feelings 
of disappointment. More specifically, incremental-theorists attributed discrepancies to 
controllable causes, and attributing AI-discrepancies to controllable causes increased 
disappointment. In shape and sound, this pattern resembles the originally predicted paths 
between these variables (see Figures 2 and 4). There seems to be a glimmer of hope for 
the model, even if not all of the parts fit snugly. 
Finally, no effect of causal attributions of human nature was detected. One 
potential explanation for this lack of findings could be the fact that one line item was the 
sole measure of attributions of human nature, which calls into question the reliability of 
the measure. Future research should consider a more broad measure of attributions of 
human nature.  
IWAHr. Unfortunately, a moderating effect of IWAHr on the discrepancies 
manipulation with regards to disappointment was not detected. In short, the results of 
Study 4 were disappointing when it came to IWAHr. This non-significant effect will be 
considered further in the limitations section. 
 Contempt. It was predicted that participants would likely express feelings of 
contempt for humanity when they learned that people often fail to meet minimum moral 
standards of conduct (AO-discrepancies/proscriptive moral violations). This prediction 
was again confirmed, replicating the findings of Studies 2 and 3. Indeed, participants in 
the AO-discrepancies condition who learned that people are often murderous ne’er-do-
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wells responded with significantly greater feelings of contempt for humanity than 
participants who learned that people typically fail to be highly prosocial and participants 
in the Control condition who were only given basic demographic information about 
humanity. This finding, again, contributes to the literatures on discrepancy theory and 
contempt. Indeed, these findings suggest that AO-discrepancies lead to emotions beyond 
agitation-related emotions (i.e., fear, anxiety, and/or nervousness; Bizman, Yinon, & 
Krotman, 2001; Higgins, 1987, 1989); indeed, they lead to feelings of contempt.  
 Unfortunately, the main effect was the only prediction that was confirmed 
regarding contempt. No evidence was collected to suggest that IT, causal attributions, or 
IWAHr moderated the effect of AO-discrepancies on contempt. Again, these non-effects 
might be due to the sample of participants. These non-significant effects will be 
addressed further in the limitations section below. 
 Prosocial Behavior. It was predicted that disappointment should motivate strong-
identifiers to seek opportunities to recoup moral credit on behalf of humanity. However, 
given the potential reverse causal path demonstrated in Study 2, contempt might motivate 
strong-identifiers to avoid prosocial behavior even more so than weak-identifiers.  
 To examine these predictions, participants were given the opportunity to donate 
all or some of $5 to UNICEF. Unfortunately, no effect of disappointment was detected, 
regardless of IWAHr. There was, however, a very peculiar contempt by IWAHr 
interaction effect. Among strong-identifiers, contempt was associated with decreased 
donating, which is somewhat different than what was found in the previous studies, in 
which strong-identifiers were unwavering in their prosocial behavior despite feelings of 
contempt. It could be that when money is brought into the equation, contempt caused 
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strong-identifiers to become less prosocial. Even more odd was the increased donating 
among weak-identifiers. If this latter finding does represent reality, then perhaps what 
appeared to be prosocial behavior was not intentionally prosocial at all, but a stratagem 
meant to remove one’s self from the social situation at hand: To get out of the lab as 
quickly as possible.  
 By the end of the study, $5 might not have been enough to lure weak-identifiers—
“non people-persons”—experiencing a heightened sense of contempt for others to stick 
around. It would have been easier to quickly say “keep it” and run out as quickly as 
possible. If that were the case, then their “donation” was not intentionally prosocial: They 
paid to be socially avoidant. Of course, these are merely speculations and would require 
further testing to confirm or disconfirm.  
 Limitations. Had Study 4 been more successful, the limited sample of college 
students would have made one question the extent to which the findings apply to the 
general population. Nonetheless, the restricted sample of participants might have 
contributed to the minimal success enjoyed in Study 4. The participants in Studies 1 
through 3 were sampled from across the United States and were far more diverse in age 
and education than the participants in Study 4, all of whom were undergraduate students 
from Lehigh. Perhaps the phenomenon of interest requires a more diverse sample than 
what could be drawn from the student population.  
Among college students, learning that humanity is chock full of bandits bent on 
theft, rape, and murder might be enough to get a contemptuous response, which could 
have been why none of the proposed moderators moderated the effect of AO-
discrepancies on contempt. Furthermore, as the sample was first year college students in 
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an introductory psychology course, their identity as Lehigh students might have been 
more salient than their human identity, which might explain why IWAHr did not 
moderate the effects of the discrepancies manipulation on either emotion. It was not until 
the prosocial behavior portion that IWAHr influenced how participants responded. It 
could be that asking participants to donate to UNICEF, a global relief organization, 
activated their own sense of connection—or lack thereof—with humanity.   
Finally, a large majority of participants (84%) were willing to donate all of the $5 
to charity. There could be several reasons for this. First, it could be, as suggested 
previously, that participants might have been motivated to leave the study quickly. 
Refusing the $5 might have facilitated this. On the other hand, when participants were 
assigned to the study, they only knew that they were going to receive partial course credit 
for participating. Because they were not expecting to receive $5 in the first place, they 
might have felt that the $5 was just an added bonus, painless to relinquish. Or it could 
simply be that $5 is “pocket change” for these particular students, and therefore donating 
a pittance to charity was an easy decision. Unfortunately, the lack of variability in 
donating might have contributed to the scant findings in this study. 
 Despite these limitations, Study 4 contributed to the hypothesis about feelings of 
disappointment in and contempt for humanity. Disappointment was a unique 
consequence of perceived AI-discrepancies, while contempt was a unique consequence of 
AO-discrepancies. The relationship between AO-discrepancies and contempt was not 
moderated by any of the proposed moderators in this study, but that might have been due 
to the restricted sample of participants. However, the relationship between AI-
discrepancies and disappointment was strongest when those discrepancies were attributed 
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to controllable causes and when one’s IT was not activated.  Finally, we again found a 
relationship between contempt and prosocial behavior: contempt seems to restrict strong-
identifiers’ desire to donate to charity, whereas it might have motivated weak-identifiers 
to donate as a way to buy their way out of a potentially uncomfortable social situation. 
General Discussion 
 Beliefs about humanity are powerful. What we think and feel about humanity 
have the potential to influence many aspects of our lives. Psychologists and philosophers 
alike have considered how our beliefs about humanity shape our politics, our ethics, and 
our intergroup and interpersonal relationships. At their best, beliefs about humanity can 
inspire us to act with compassion and kindness towards one another. At their worst, they 
can move us to violence or to turn way from one another.  
 The study of beliefs about humanity has been dominated by the study of 
humanity’s traits, also described as the human traits framework. The human traits 
framework examines people’s answer to the question “What are humanity’s 
characteristics?” Here the focus is on people’s mental representations of humanity and 
the effects that holding different mental representation might have on thought and 
behavior. Within this framework, researchers have found that people differentiate 
humanity’s unique characteristics (i.e., traits shared only between individual humans), 
from humanity’s essential qualities (i.e., characteristics that humanity might share with 
other species) and that variation in these attributed characteristics influences political 
behavior (Rosenberg, 1956), prosocial behavior (Gill & Getty, in prep; Wrightsman, 
1992), intergroup behavior (Haslam, 2006; Haslam et al., 2005; Loughnan & Haslam, 
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2007; Morton & Postmes, 2011), trust (Sharma & Dubey, 1986), and even the practice of 
research (Antes et al., 2007).  
 There is another approach to the study of beliefs about humanity. This alternative 
approach focuses on the emotions people expressed towards humanity. The feelings 
towards humanity framework focuses on evaluative beliefs and the emotions people 
express towards humanity. This approach is fairly new and so has enjoyed less emphasis 
in the literature. In its infancy, research on emotions towards humanity has focused only 
on general positive versus negative emotions and the effects these broad categories of 
emotions have on intergroup dynamics (Luke & Maio, 2009). While this framework is 
limited, it does suggest something very important: both our thoughts and feelings about 
humanity shape or social behavior. Until now, however, specific emotions and their 
effects have been neglected in this literature.  
 The purpose of this work was to move beyond the broad categories of positive 
and negative emotions by focusing on two specific negative emotions: disappointment 
and contempt. Here, the potential psychological mechanism responsible for the 
expression of disappointment in and contempt for humanity, and the potential influence 
these emotions have on social behavior have been examined. This dissertation represents 
the first work to examine these specific emotions, their elicitors, and behavioral 
consequences in the context of beliefs about humanity. 
 Guided by literature on unique social emotions (De Cremer, 2006; Ekman & 
Friesen, 1971, 1986; Ekman & Heider, 1988; Haidt, 2003; Lelieveld, van Dijk, van Beest, 
Steinel, & van Kleef, 2011; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Roseman, Antoniou & Jose, 
1996; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002; van Doorn, Heerdink, & van Kleef, 2012; Wubben, 
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De Cremer, & van Dijk, 2009), moral psychology (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 
2009), and Self-Discrepancy Theory (SDT; SDT; Higgins, 1987, 1989; Petrocelli & 
Smith, 2005), it was proposed that disappointment and contempt are specific moral 
emotions and their unique expressions are influenced by the perception that humanity 
possesses specific moral shortcomings. As contempt is often expressed towards those for 
whom one believes are morally or intellectually inferior (Ekman, 1994a. 1994b; Izard, 
1977; Haidt, 2003), it was been argued here that elevated feelings of contempt for 
humanity should follow perceived discrepancy between the way humanity actually 
behaves and the way one believes humanity ought to behave, because these “AO-
discrepancies” represent proscriptive moral violation (i.e., the failure to inhibit immoral 
behavior like murder, rape, theft, etc.), which suggest humanity fail to meet minimal 
standards of morality. In contrast, as disappointment is often expressed towards those for 
whom one believes fail to fulfill a desired expectation or outcome (De Cremer, 2006; 
Hoffman, 1963; Krevan & Gibbs, 1996; Patrick & Gibbs, 2007, 2012; Wubben et al., 
2009), it has further been argued here that elevated feelings of disappointment should 
follow perceived discrepancies between the way one believes humanity actually behaves 
and the way he or she would ideally like humanity to behave. The reason is that in moral 
terms, “AI-discrepancies” represent prescriptive moral violations, or the failure to behave 
with compassion and care, which communicates a lack of expected positive behavior and 
a lack of potential positive outcomes.   
The relationship between disappointment, contempt, and an eliciting discrepancy 
was predicted to be moderated by the extent to which one identifies with all of humanity 
(McFarland, Webb, & Brown, 2012) and one’s implicit theory of personality (Costarelli, 
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2012; Chu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Dweck, 2008; Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1995; Dweck 
& Leggett, 1988; Hewstone, 1990; Lau & Russel, 1980; Pettigrew, 1979), because these 
traits should influence the types of causes one attributes to a given moral discrepancy. 
Thus models for both feelings of disappointment in humanity and contempt for humanity 
were proposed. The model of disappointment proposes that identification with all of 
humanity (IWAH) and implicit personality theory (IT) moderate the effect of AI-
discrepancies on feelings of disappointment via the controllable/unstable causes to which 
one attributes humanity’s perceived AI-discrepancies. Similarly, the model of contempt 
proposes that IWAH and IT moderate the effects of AO-discrepancies on feelings of 
contempt, via the uncontrollable/stable causes (i.e., human nature) to which one attributes 
humanity’s perceived AO-discrepancies. In either case, the strength with which one 
identifies with humanity should motivate a person to explain those discrepancies in such 
a way as to minimize damage to one’s own positive self-image. Theory consistency 
should be the force behind the relationship between a given IT and the causal attributions. 
Entity-theorists often attribute behavior and personality to uncontrollable/stable causes, 
while incremental-theorists often attribute behavior and personality to controllable/stable 
causes. Thus, incremental-theorists should have resembled strong-identifiers in their 
causal attributions, while entity-theorists should have resembled weak-identifiers.  
Finally, a key difference between disappointment in and contempt for humanity 
might be their influence on social behavior. Specifically, it has been suggested that 
contempt should motivate social avoidance, and disappointment might motivate prosocial 
behavior if one is motivated to recoup moral credit on behalf of humanity. The body of 
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work presented here was meant to test the components of both models of disappointment 
and contempt and their potential for influencing social behavior. 
Study 1: Testing the two models 
Study 1 was designed to test the models of both contempt and disappointment. 
Unfortunately, in terms of support for the two complete models, Study 1 was not very 
successful. However, the ultimate purpose of this work was to learn something new about 
disappointment and contempt for humanity. In that sense, Study 1 did provide some 
insight.  
As predicted, participants who felt a sense of connection and oneness with 
humanity were also those participants who reported feeling more disappointed in 
humanity when they believed that humanity was not as compassionate and kind as they 
would ideally have liked humanity to be (AI-discrepancies). This is, of course, consistent 
with the previous work, suggesting that strong-identifiers are more strongly effected by 
group-level discrepancy (Pectrocelli & Smith, 2005), because they have more at stake 
when their group is found wanting. In this case, strong-identifying folk might have felt 
doubly disappointed because AI-discrepancies signal that humanity is not doing as well 
as they would ideally like humanity to do with respect to prosocial behavior, and because 
humanity is failing to benefit from highly prosocial behavior. This effect was 
independent of causal attribution of human nature. Indeed, a separate relationship 
between disappointment and attributions of human nature was revealed, suggesting that 
people who generally explain moral discrepancies in terms of an effect of human nature, 
also express more disappointment in humanity, regardless of whether humanity is failing 
to be highly compassionate or not.  
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What was also interesting is that the effect of AI-discrepancies on disappointment 
was independently moderated by causal attributions, but not in the predicted way. In 
Study 1, we found that AI-discrepancy beliefs were more highly associated with feelings 
of disappointment when they were believed to be uncontrollable. So when one believes 
that humanity is not as compassionate as he or she would ideally like humanity be, he or 
she might express more disappointment when he or she believes humanity has little 
power to change its general lack of compassion and kindness. Again this was independent 
of attributions of human nature, which was directly associated with disappointment and 
contempt. What makes this so odd is that human nature is an uncontrollable cause—
people do not have control over their nature. It is what it is. Nevertheless, these findings 
seem to suggest that people might feel disappointed in humanity when they held the 
general belief that immorality is due to human nature. 
With regards to contempt, Study 1 provided minimal insight. Of the hypothesized 
predictors of contempt for humanity only implicit theory of personality (IT) and 
attributions of human nature had any effect. Entity-theorists were more likely to express 
contempt for humanity, and participants who had a tendency to explain immoral behavior 
in terms of human nature also expressed more contempt for humanity. What is interesting 
here is that it had been predicted that these two variables would indeed predict increases 
in contempt, but not independently. The model suggested that entity-theorists would 
express feelings of contempt for humanity in response to AO-discrepancies, but that 
effect would be carried by attributions of human nature. Given insight from Dweck and 
Molden (2008), the reason attributions failed to mediate the effect of IT on contempt 
might simply have been that IT directly affects it.  
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Unexpectedly, age was revealed to be an important predictor of contempt. 
Specifically, it appeared that older participants expressed less contempt for humanity. Of 
course, they were also less likely to be entity-theorists and/or attribute moral shortcoming 
to human nature. These findings might suggest a maturing process, suggesting that 
through years of experiences dealing with life’s difficulties, people learn to “cut 
humanity some slack.” Alternatively, these findings might suggest a cohort effect in 
which older generations have a tendency to “cut humanity some slack,” looking instead 
to the individual as both the source of moral discrepancies and the source of overcoming 
those discrepancies. However, the gerontological literature might tell a slightly different 
tale.  
Research suggests that older adults tend to attribute personal shortcoming (failed 
memory, poor motor skills) to varying causes, depending on the age of the target 
behaving (Lackman & McArthur, 1986). Older adults tend to attribute personal 
shortcoming to uncontrollable causes, like a lack of ability, when the target is an older 
adult (or themselves). However, they attribute the same behavior to controllable causes, 
like a lack of effort, when the target is young (Lackman & McArthur, 1986).  If older 
adults’ heuristic of “people as a whole” is biased towards perceiving humanity as mostly 
full of young people, it could explain why older adults were incremental leaning in the 
studies reported here. If that is the case, it stands to reason that older adults experienced 
less contempt for humanity because they were more likely to believe humanity can put in 
more effort to change its behavior.  On the other hand, it might not necessarily be that 
older adults fail to experience contempt for humanity; it might be that they were able to 
down-regulate it. Indeed, research suggests that older adults are often highly efficient 
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emotion regulators, and this ability to regulate negative emotions has been associated 
with a heightened sense of optimism (Larcom & Isaacowitz, 2009). In sum, a sense of 
optimism that comes from the ability to regulate negative emotions, coupled with a 
tendency to believe young people have control over their shortcomings might account for 
these findings. 
Finally, the most compelling findings in Study 1 might have been with regard to 
the associations between social avoidance and disappointment and contempt, 
respectively, and how those associations were moderated. Contrary to predictions, both 
disappointment and contempt were positively associated with social avoidance. Although 
it had been predicted that contempt would be associated with a general tendency to avoid 
social interaction and disappointment would motivate strong-identifiers to recoup moral 
credit on behalf of humanity, this was not the case. However, the reason disappointment 
was positively associated with social avoidance could be because feelings, beliefs, and 
behavior were being measured as general tendencies, not as discrete reactions to 
information. Enduring disappointment or an enduring belief that humanity is not 
prosocial enough might wear on even the most ardent identifier, so much so that they 
might begin to avoid others. However, if a strong-identifier is confronted with new 
information that evokes disappointment, he/she might be motivated to combat those 
feelings by doing something prosocial to recoup moral credit on behalf of humanity. 
Study 1 did provide some insight about feelings of disappointment and contempt, 
although there were many unsupported predictions. One of the reasons for this could be 
that disappointment and contempt might be both reactionary responses and enduring 
feelings. Study 1 might have been measuring enduring feelings rather than reactionary 
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responses. Thus, in Studies 2 through 4 moral discrepancies were introduced and paired 
with experimentally manipulated moderators, so as to measure disappointment and 
contempt as reactionary emotions.  
Experimental manipulations (Study 2 through 4).  
Studies 2 through 4 were designed to test the effects of experimentally 
manipulated discrepancy information on feelings of disappointment in and contempt for 
humanity. In each of these studies, manipulated discrepancy information was paired with 
an experimentally manipulated moderator. Causal attributions were manipulated in Study 
2, common humanity in Study 3, and implicit theory in Study 4. Those variables that 
were not manipulated were measured, with the exception of Study 3, which included a 
measure of IWAH in addition to the common humanity manipulation.   
Study 2 found the first evidence suggesting that AO-discrepancies cause 
participants to express both feelings of contempt and disappointment; AI-discrepancies 
seem to cause participants to express only feelings of disappointment. These effects were 
pronounced among strong-identifiers, such that strong-identifiers responded with more 
disappointment in response to AI-discrepancies than weak-identifiers, and more contempt 
in response to AO-discrepancies, which might be evidence of a “reverse causal path” 
(Petrocelli & Smith, 2005), in which strong-identifiers respond to severally negative 
information by distancing themselves from the group; significant feelings of contempt 
might be indirect evidence of this effect. Finally, prosocial responding to humanity’s 
moral discrepancies was affected by identification with all of humanity and contempt. 
Strong-identifiers consistently defend humanity and provide solutions to humanity’s 
moral shortcomings, regardless of whether they felt contempt for humanity, which might 
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have been evidence of an attempt to reverse the reverse causal path. Weak-identifiers 
who expressed high contempt did not defend humanity.  
In sum, the findings of Study 2 were critical in supporting the argument that 
feelings of disappointment and contempt are connected to humanity’s moral 
shortcomings, although only contempt in humanity leads to social avoidance. The extent 
to which moral shortcomings lead to disappointment and/or contempt and whether 
contempt leads to social avoidance was regulated by the extent to which one identified 
with all of humanity. 
Study 3 replicated several of the findings of Study 2: AO-discrepancies caused 
participants to express feelings of contempt and disappointment, while AI-discrepancies 
caused participant to only express disappointment. While the common humanity 
manipulation failed, identification with all of humanity emerged as the sole significant 
moderator of discrepancies on feelings of contempt. However, the direction of the 
moderation reversed in Study 3. Here, strong-identifiers responded with less contempt 
than weak-identifiers and were less influenced by the discrepancies information. Also the 
moderating effects of identification did not extend to feelings of disappointment in the 
same way as they did in Study 2. Strong-identifiers expressed no more disappointment 
than weak-identifiers in response to AI-discrepancies, but the effect of AO-discrepancies 
was isolated to weak-identifiers. That is, in Study 3 only weak-identifiers reported 
significant disappointment in response to AO-discrepancies.   
Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, in Study 3, identification and contempt were 
shown to influence prosocial responding in light of damning information about humanity. 
Specifically, contempt contributed to less defending of humanity in the AI-discrepancies 
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condition and reduced the probability of providing a solution to humanity’s moral 
shortcomings. Finally, strong-identifiers were quick to defend humanity and oftentimes 
contributed significantly more words to the collective response than weak-identifiers. 
However, when weak-identifiers were actually motivated to defend humanity, they 
contributed even more words to the collective response than strong-identifiers.  
Study 3 provided additional evidence that feelings of disappointment and 
contempt are indeed dependent on discrepancy beliefs, and contempt has a significant 
impact on curtailing prosocial behavior. Identification was again revealed to be an 
important moderator; crucially, Study 3 demonstrated that identification’s moderating 
effects might be quite dynamic.   
The findings in Study 4 were somewhat consistent with Studies 2 and 3 in the 
sense that AI-discrepancies caused participants to experience elevated feelings of 
disappointment, while AO-discrepancies caused participants to experience elevated 
feelings of contempt. Unfortunately, the findings in Study 4 were also quite inconsistent 
with the previous two experiments. First, AO-discrepancies did not cause elevated 
feelings of disappointment as they did in the previous two studies. Second, IWAH did not 
moderate any of the effects of the discrepancies manipulation.  Third, the effect of AI-
discrepancies on disappointment was moderated by causal attributions, such that 
disappointment was higher among participants who believed humanity could be more 
caring and compassionate. Fourth, the effects of AI-discrepancies were disrupted by the 
IT manipulation, such that AI-discrepancies caused elevated disappointment, but only 
when IT was not activated. It seemed that IT, whether entity or incremental, blocked the 
effects of AI-discrepancies. Fifth and finally, we again found a relationship between 
140 
contempt and prosocial behavior: contempt seemed to restrict strong-identifiers’ desire to 
donate to charity, while it appeared to motivate weak-identifiers to donate; however, 
weak-identifiers might have had more selfish motives for donating. 
In sum, Study 4 provided corroborating evidence that disappointment and 
contempt are indeed consequences of humanity’s moral discrepancies, even in a limited 
sample of participants. Study 4 once again demonstrated the negative effect of contempt 
on prosocial behavior, although this time, the effect was isolated to strong-identifiers. 
Disappointment and contempt: Unique human emotions.  
One purpose of this dissertation was to learn more about two unique negative 
emotions, disappointment and contempt, the psychological mechanisms that cause people 
to express disappointment in and contempt for humanity, and about how disappointment 
in and contempt for humanity influence social behavior. 
 Disappointment and contempt are distinct negative emotions, with their own 
facial expressions, determinants, and consequences. Discrepancies between the ways in 
which one perceives that humanity actually behaves, in moral terms, and the ways in 
which one believes humanity ought or ought not behave, in moral terms, and/or how one 
would ideally like humanity to behave, in moral terms, greatly influences the extent to 
which one feels disappointment in and/or contempt for humanity. Individuals might feel 
elevated disappointment in humanity when they learn that people often fail to be kind and 
compassionate to one another. However, they might express both disappointment and 
contempt for humanity when they learn that people are often cruel and murderous. These 
are very interesting and important findings for three reasons. First, this work is the first to 
successfully apply SDT to beliefs and feelings about humanity. Second, this work is the 
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first to document that AO-discrepancies elicit feelings of contempt in addition to agitated 
related emotions. Third, these findings further contribute to the SDT literature (Higgins, 
1987, 1989; Petrocelli & Smith, 2005), by demonstrating that, at times, two unique 
discrepancy beliefs can give rise to the same emotion. At times, both AI and AO-
discrepancies lead to feelings of disappointment. Perhaps what this means is that AO and 
AI-discrepancies can activate feelings of disappointment via two divergent pathways. 
 Failing to act with compassion towards one another means that humanity is also 
failing to benefit from high-level cooperation. In other words, AI-discrepancies result in 
the failure of a positive outcome.  However, the effect of AO-discrepancies, or the failure 
to meet minimum moral standards by hurting one another, might be considered the 
disconfirmation of a positive expectation. Separate discrepancies might activate 
disappointment from two different sources of information: failed outcomes and failed 
expectations, respectively. Of course, disappointment in the AO-discrepancies condition 
was less pronounced than disappointment in the AI-discrepancies condition, likely due to 
the fact that AO-discrepancies are also influencing feelings of contempt.  
 The determinates of contempt align a bit more easily with AO-discrepancies, such 
that contempt is associated with looking down on a target from a position of moral or 
intellectual superiority. All else being equal, people not in jail for murder or for rape, etc., 
probably believe that they at least meet minimal moral standards. So when they learn that 
a significant portion of people do not meeting this same standard, they might 
automatically be put in to a position of superiority, which might cause them to feel 
contempt for humanity.  
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 Of course, not everyone responds to the same discrepancies in the same way (with 
disappointment and/or contempt), at the same time, or for the same reasons. Indeed, 
while the findings were somewhat inconsistent, this work suggests that human identity 
might at times moderate these effects. Either believing or learning that humanity is not as 
compassionate as it should be can cause strong-identifiers to feel disappointed in 
humanity. What we cannot tell, however, is whether in these instances strong-identifiers’ 
disappointment stems from the perception that humanity is not living up to their positive 
expectations, or whether it stems from the perception that humanity is failing to fully 
benefit from highly prosocial outcomes. A simple solution to tease these perceptions 
apart might be to simply ask participants why they feel disappointment in humanity.  
 Human identity’s role as a moderator of the effect of AO-discrepancies on 
contempt was also inconsistent. At times, strong-identifiers responded with more 
contempt than weak-identifiers (Study 2), while at other times, they responded with less 
contempt than weak-identifiers (Study 3). When strong-identifiers responded with less 
contempt, it could be because they rejected the information, deciding instead to rely on 
their own schema to reaffirm humanity’s positive image. When strong-identifiers 
responded with more contempt, it might have been symptomatic of an underlying 
emotional break from humanity associated with the “reverse casual path” described by 
Petrocelli and Smith (2005).  This difference might be better understood after a follow-up 
study that measures contempt and humanity identification, both pre- and post-
presentation of the AO-discrepancies. We might find that the strong-identifiers who 
report greater feelings of contempt for humanity also show a greater decrease in the 
extent to which they still identify with humanity after they learn the discrepant behavior. 
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Of course, even when strong-identifiers felt contempt for humanity, they were willing to 
defend humanity, which might have been an attempt to reverse the reverse causal path. 
Thus, one could test whether identification remains when participants are given the 
opportunity to defend humanity and whether identification decreases when they are not 
give the opportunity. In sum, while human identity might be important in determining if 
and when people will respond with disappointment and contempt, the reasons why 
human identity might be important most certainly remains a mystery. Additional research 
is required. 
 Implicit personality theory’s (IT) role in these studies was even less consistent 
than the role of human identity. The best we can tell is that entity-theorists have a 
tendency to feel more contempt (Study 1) and disappointment (Study 2) in humanity than 
incremental-theorists, which is consistent with previous work (Dweck & Molden, 2008). 
However, when faced with damning information about humanity, incremental-theorists 
respond like entity-theorists, with significant disappointment and contempt (Study 2). 
Finally, when IT is manipulated, it seems to have a tendency to block the effects of AI-
discrepancies on disappointment (Study 4).  
 When we measure IT, not only are we learning something about the way people 
generally reason about personality and moral behavior, but we are also learning 
something about their emotional lives, about the emotions entity-theorists and 
incremental-theorists typically express (Dweck & Molden, 2008). However, when IT is 
manipulated (Study 4), it seems to operate differently. The reason could be that when IT 
is primed, it might only activate the reasoning side of the IT coin, leaving the emotional 
tendencies inactive. If that is the case, manipulated IT might have led participants to 
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remain objective when reading the rather damning information about humanity, which in 
turn mitigated the experience of negative emotions. One way to begin examining this 
might be to compare participants who are primed to make decisions subjectively or 
objectively versus participants who are primed to think like entity- or incremental-
theorists and then measure their emotional responses to discrepancies. If manipulated IT 
activates reasoning rather than emotional responding, then participants in the entity and 
incremental theorist conditions should not differ emotionally from each other or from 
participants in the objective condition.    
 Causal attributions moderated the effects of AI-discrepancies on feelings of 
disappointment in Studies 1 and 4; however, the nature of that interaction was different 
across the two studies. In Study 1, disappointment was greater when AI-discrepancies 
were uncontrollable. In Study 4, disappointment was greater when AI-discrepancies were 
highly controllable. The pattern in Study 1 could suggest that if people believe that 
humanity has no control over being highly prosocial—that is, they believe that people 
could not become more prosocial with extra effort—disappointment could still be a 
reasonable response, because people still see benefit in others being highly 
compassionate. In other words, they are disappointed in humanity because it is not able to 
benefit from highly prosocial behavior. The pattern in Study 4 would suggest that when 
humanity has the capability to be highly prosocial, the tendency to feel disappointment is 
consistent with the failure to meet positive expectations. Taken together, the effects of 
controllability attributions on AI-discrepancies might be similar to the effect of AO-
discrepancies’ effect on disappointment: When AI-discrepancies are controllable, 
disappointment might stem from the disconfirmation of a positive outcome. When AI-
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discrepancies are not controllable, disappointment might stem from the disconfirmation 
of expected behavior. This, of course, is speculative and would require further testing.  
 An important aspect of the proposed models of disappointment and contempt was 
that causal attributions were thought to carry the moderating effects of IWAH and IT. 
This, however, was not the case. There could be several reasons why the quasi-mediation 
effect of causal attributions was not evident. First, if causal attribution were to carry the 
effects of IWAH, IWAH would have had to predict causal attributions. This was not the 
case. The extent to which people identified with humanity was unrelated to the specific 
types of explanations offered in these studies (i.e., human nature, or controllable 
causes)—the fact that humanity is not being compassionate enough is enough to cause 
strong-identifiers to feel disappointment in humanity. Strong-identifiers do not seem to 
need to reason about why humanity is not being compassionate enough. That being said, 
had we looked at external explanations, we might have come to a different conclusion.  
 As external explanations suggest that outside forces have driven a target to a 
behavior or outcome, the target is less blameworthy and is therefore less likely to take the 
brunt of negative emotions (Gill, Andreychik, & Getty, 2013). In the context of 
disappointment in and contempt for humanity, if humanity is seen as not compassionate 
enough because of external forces—of course, it is hard to imagine what forces are 
external to humanity that would cause them to be less compassionate, beyond natural 
disasters—observers would likely respond with less disappointment, especially if they are 
strong-identifiers. Similarly, if humanity is murderous and vile because of external 
forces, both strong and weak-identifiers would likely respond with less contempt. 
However, external explanations were deliberately left out because the purpose of this 
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work was to uncover when people respond with disappointment versus contempt. It 
makes little sense to think that external explanation would make one respond with one 
negative emotion versus another for the simple reason that external explanations help 
decrease negative response.   
 Causal attributions did not seem to carry the moderating effects of IT, presumably 
because when IT does moderate the effects of discrepancy beliefs on emotional 
responses, it does so directly. While the nature of one’s IT might be revealed through the 
types of explanations he or she makes, the influence that one’s IT has on his or her 
emotional responses to others might not depend on the explanation he or she generates. 
 There is one more alternative to consider with regards to the relationship between 
causal attributions and feelings of disappointment in and contempt for humanity. Given 
the highly inconsistent findings, it could very well be that disappointment in and 
contempt for humanity are indifferent to causal attributions. That is, causal attributions 
might not moderate the effects of discrepancies on feelings of disappointment and 
contempt. Consider, first, that the primary determinate of disappointment is the absence 
of a positive expectation or outcome. Indeed, as Higgins (1987, 1989) points out, it might 
not be the discrepancy, per se, that brings about a certain emotion, but the outcome. In a 
sense, the fact that nuances between different internal causal attributions had no effect 
was consistent with Higgins’s and Petrocelli and Smith’s (2005) findings. When 
discrepancies are internal, the effect of the discrepancy seems to elicit the emotional 
response, but when discrepancies are external, the focus shifts to the external cause, 
which then elicits the emotional response. Thus, in the absence of an external cause, the 
focus remains on the outcome, or in the case of disappointment, the lack of a desired 
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outcome or expectation. In short, it might only be the effect that matters when it comes to 
disappointment, because regardless of whether humanity had control or not, the desired 
outcome was not present. The reasoning might be the same for contempt. When a target 
is deemed mentally or morally inferior, the cause of that inferiority might not matter. 
When it comes to contempt, a target’s present state of being might be all that is required 
for a contempt response.  
 These possibilities are interesting and speak to how disappointment and contempt 
might be quite different from anger and blame, the negative emotions that have been the 
focus of much work in the attribution literature (see discussion above). The attribution 
literature shows that anger and blame are significantly affected by perceived differences 
in controllability and the internal/external distinction (see discussion of attribution theory 
above). Here, it might very well have been demonstrated that disappointment and 
contempt are not affected by these same causal attributions. If that is true, the (lack of) 
findings might suggest that there is a limit to the influence of causal attributions on 
emotional response. Of course, the purpose of this work was never to compare the effects 
of causal attributions on anger and blame versus disappointment and contempt. However, 
what this could mean is that one could feel sequential emotions towards humanity. For 
instance, one could express both anger and disappointment towards humanity if one 
believes AI-discrepancies stem from controllable causes. He or she might express 
disappointment because of the lack of a positive outcome or expectation and anger 
because the responsibility for that lack of the positive outcome or expectation rests with 
humanity. There might be several combinations of emotions one might respond with 
when discrepancy information is combined with different causal attributions. These 
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possibilities could have implications for SDT, which suggests a one-to-one relationship 
between a specific discrepancy and a specific emotion, only moderated by the internal-
external causal distinction. Here we expand on SDT to suggest that a unique discrepancy 
might evoke a number of emotions. Different aspects or details related to the specific 
discrepancy information being examined might evoke different emotions.  
 In sum, the relationship between causal attributions and feelings of 
disappointment and contempt might be a very distant one, or even non-existent. Causal 
attributions do not seem to carry the moderating effects of IWAH or IT, presumably 
because emotional responses from strong-identifiers are not necessarily dependent on 
nuances between different internal explanations, and because causal attributions are 
already an important aspect of implicit theory. However, this does not mean that 
attributions of human nature influence the extent to which one expresses contempt for 
humanity, only that people who have a tendency to explain humanity’s immoral behavior 
as a function of human nature also have a tendency to express contempt. Causal 
attributions, specifically those that address controllability implications, might moderate 
the effects of AI-discrepancies on feelings of disappointment, but given the inconsistency 
in the pattern of findings across studies, the results speak against it. Indeed, what we 
might ultimately conclude is that the effects of causal attributions are limited to certain 
emotions, and disappointment and contempt might fall beyond their influence. This is an 
important possibility because it could contribute to the literature on attribution theory (see 
Weiner, 2006, for a complete review). Previous work has focused on the fact that when 
negative behavior is perceived as controllable, people respond with anger and blame 
towards a target. Here, we have shown that the failure to be compassionate and kind can 
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lead to feelings of disappointment, whether it is controllable or not. Similarly, the failure 
to meet minimum moral standards can lead to feelings of contempt, whether other people 
have control over their behavior or not.  
Disappointment, contempt, and social avoidance.  
Disappointment and contempt were expected to differ with regards to their effect 
on social behavior. Disappointment was thought to have the potential to motivate folks 
(especially strong-identifiers) to recoup moral credit on behalf of humanity. On the other 
hand, contempt was thought to motivate social avoidance in order to distance oneself 
from members of a tainted humanity. It turned out that this was only half right. 
 Disappointment did not seem to motivate recuperative responding, not even in 
strong-identifiers. This effect might have been evidence of the “long term” effects of 
disappointment on social behavior. That this, when one experiences an enduring sense of 
disappointment in humanity, they might tend to avoid others. However, this tendency was 
moderated by attributions of controllability, such that participants who have a general 
sense that humanity’s moral depravity is controllable become less prosocial when they 
feel disappointment in humanity.   
 In the remaining studies, in only one instance was disappointment related to social 
avoidance. In Study 2, strong feelings of disappointment in humanity were associated 
with a decrease in word-count, but only among participants who strongly believe moral 
discrepancies are controllable, replicating the finding is Study 1. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to take much stock in its validity. Beyond these two instances, disappointment 
was unrelated to changes in prosocial behavior, whether it was providing a solution to 
humanity’s moral shortcomings, writing in defense of humanity, contributing words to a 
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collective work, or donating to a charity. Thus, disappointment as a reactive emotion 
might be a healthier negative emotion in that it does not seem to cause one to avoid social 
interaction or prosocial behavior, unless perhaps among people who have a strong sense 
that moral discrepancies are highly controllable. This might be why the effect of 
disappointment on social avoidance was strongest in Study 1. When disappointment is 
enduring, it might have the most acute negative consequences for prosocial behavior. 
 Contempt, on the other hand, was consistently associated with social avoidance—
with the exception of weak-identifiers in Study 4, which has already been addressed. 
These findings are consistent with previous work suggesting that feelings of contempt are 
associated with avoiding those for whom one feels contempt (Mackie et al., 2000). In that 
work, contempt was usually expressed in an interracial context. Here we see that 
contempt for all of humanity has a more generic effect, which might be even more 
damaging. But the contempt effect was moderated by identification, such that strong-
identifiers were resistant to the negative effects of contempt, at least most of the time. 
With the exception of Study 4, strong-identifiers remained prosocial regardless of feeling 
contempt for humanity. Perhaps this partially explains why Haidt (2003) suggested that 
contempt has no clear behavioral tendency, because the tendency can be moderated by 
other factors, namely identification with the target of one’s contempt.  
 The take-away here might be that disappointment and contempt have unique 
behavioral consequences. Contempt often motivates one to avoid social situations or 
prosocial behavior more generally. In contrast, while disappointment might not activate 
prosocial behavior, it rarely causes one be less prosocial. There seems to be far fewer 
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negative consequences associated with disappointment. In this sense, it might be far 
better to feel disappointment in humanity than contempt for humanity.  
Limitations.  
There were several limiting factors that might have influenced the results of these 
studies. The literature on unique emotions makes a convincing argument for a division 
between disappointment and contempt. However, measuring disappointment and 
contempt as unique emotional responses was much more difficult. In every study, 
contempt and disappointment shared a great deal of negativity. Indeed, in Study 1, when 
the model of each emotion was tested, neither model was significant, but one emotion 
was always accounting for the “lion’s share” of the variance in the other. The problem 
might have been that people often have a difficult time distinguishing their own 
emotions. Indeed, Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner and Gross (2007) suggest that people vary 
greatly in their ability to differentiate between different emotions. Some people rely on 
broad categories (e.g., feeling good versus feeling bad), while others can be quite specific 
(i.e., feeling disappointed in someone rather than anger). Thus, people who have 
difficulty differentiating emotions and experience general negative feelings in response to 
humanity's bad behavior might have scored high on both contempt and disappointment. 
So there is still convincing evidence in the literature that disappointment and contempt 
are unique emotions. In future studies of this kind, it might be beneficial to pretest 
participants for their ability to distinguish between emotions. 
 There is also the question of whether participants were truly focused on humanity 
as a whole, both when completing the measure and when performing the task. Of course, 
there is always the question of whether or not participants are focused on humanity as a 
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whole or some subset of humanity, both when completing the measure and when 
performing the task, especially given the types of behaviors examined—very few people 
would believe that the entirety of humanity is murderous. However, as in previous studies 
examining cynicism for humanity (Getty, 2012), the availability heuristic might be at 
work here, and steps were taken in order to bolster the connection between the available 
information and people in general.  For example, participants were always asked to 
respond to questions about “people in general.” In Study 3, pictures of the Earth were 
included so that participants would think of people in a more global sense. Finally, global 
statistics about people were included in the fictitious study conducted on behalf of the 
United Nations. Beyond these measures, future studies might want to explicitly ask 
participants to think of humanity both when performing the task and completing the 
tasks. 
 The participants in Studies 1 through 3 were diverse in age, but most of them 
were educated Caucasian Americans (albeit from all over the country) with Internet 
access. The participants in the pilot study and Study 4 were young-adult undergraduate 
students from a private university in Northeastern United States. Responses provided by 
these samples might not reflect the responses of individuals from different educational 
backgrounds, races, or socio-economic status. Thus, caution must be taken in 
generalizing these findings to the population at large. 
Conclusion 
 What we think we know about humanity shapes the emotions we express towards 
humanity, which in turn influences the ways in which we interact with one another. One 
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focus of this work was to better understand when humanity is the target of 
disappointment and contempt and how these emotions might influence social behavior.  
 While the relationships between what we think about humanity and what we feel 
for humanity are at times dynamic, we might conclude this: when we believe or 
otherwise learn that humanity is not as prosocial as we think humanity should be, we 
might express feelings of disappointment. While disappointment might be defined as a 
negative emotion, it does not seem to drive a wedge between the one who expresses 
disappointment and other people.  
 We might also conclude this: when we believe or otherwise learn that humanity is 
murderous, vile, evil, and overly capable of horrid acts of violence, we respond with 
disappointment and contempt for humanity. Contempt might drive the wedge deep, 
cutting us off from one another, that is, unless we have a strong sense of communion with 
our fellow human beings. This sense of oneness might not always alleviate feelings of 
contempt, but they might help us to avoid the potential negative consequences of 
contempt. Of course, if we can avoid contempt altogether and instead opt for 
disappointment, then perhaps we will not be overly prosocial, but at least we might not 
go out of our way to avoid one another.  
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Footnotes 
1. Strong-identifiers might also experience feelings of disappointment in humanity 
in response to AO-discrepancies, if they attribute those discrepancies to unstable 
causes, for similar reasons. On the other hand, AO-discrepancies might lead to a 
reverse causal path (see Petrocelli & Smith, 2005, Study 2) in which the 
realization of such discrepancies lead to a decreased sense of identification with 
humanity. If that is true, then, previously strong-identifiers might respond 
similarly to weak-identifiers: with contempt. 
2. Velicer and Fava (1998; as referenced by Costello and Osborne, 2005) suggested 
that a factor loading .8 and greater can be considered high. However, Costello and 
Osborne (2005) noted that factor loading above .8 might be less likely to occur in 
“real data.” They suggest that low to moderate loading between, .4 and .7 might 
be more likely, and adequate, in research conducted in the social sciences. 
Because contempt and disappointment share some negativity, low factor loadings 
might not help to differentiate the two emotions. Again, the goal was to find 
adjectives that uniquely related to disappointment and contempt; therefore, the 
threshold for inclusion was adjusted up to .5 and standardized for all exploratory 
factor analyses.  
3. Disgust was dropped from the contempt measure. The removal of disgust from 
the measure of contempt is in keeping with previous research suggesting that 
disgust, contempt, and anger represent distinct emotions that are often confused 
(Ekman, 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994b; Ekman & Friesen, 1971, 1986; Ekman & 
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Heider, 1988, Haidt, 2003; Izard, 1977; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; 
Roseman, Antoniou & Jose, 1996; van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002).  
4. Note that the external dimension of causal attributions is not included in the 
equation. This was done intentionally. The reason is that we wanted to learn more 
about explanations that might cause people to respond with disappointment versus 
contempt. Given the exonerating effects of external explanations often 
demonstrated in the literature (see Weiner, 2006, for a review; also see Gill & 
Andreychik, 2009; Andreychik & Gill, 2012; Gill, Andreychik, & Getty, 2013), it 
did not seem likely that external explanation would cause someone to express one 
negative emotion over another. 
5. In a separate study conducted with a majority of Indian subjects, the emotion 
adjective “displeased” was strongly associated with the disappointment items 
noted in the pilot study and loaded strongly on the same factor (factor loading was 
greater than .7) This was taken as good evidence, at the time, for including 
“displeased” in the measure of disappointment for the remaining studies. What is 
interesting about this is displeasure was included in the pilot study but was 
removed because it loaded strongly on both factors. It is difficult to say why 
“displeased” would load strongly on one factor while “displeasure” loaded on 
both. It could be that “displeased” is more prominent in daily use than 
displeasure. That is, people might say “I’m displeased with X” more often than 
“I’m experiencing displeasure because of X.” Alternatively, cultural differences 
might explain the change: “Displeased” might be more greatly associated with 
disappointment in India than in the United States. Finally, the difference might 
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have been due to statistical power. The pilot study might not have had the 
necessary number of participants to accurately place displeasure on a single 
factor.  
6. One alternative that was explored was that IWAH only predicts specific causal 
attributions in light of specific types of discrepancy information. To test this 
alternative hypothesis, attributions of controllability and human nature were 
regressed on IWAH, AI- and AO-discrepancy beliefs, and the interactions 
between IWAH and the two types of discrepancy beliefs. Unfortunately, this was 
not the case. Neither interaction was significant (ts < 1, ps < .7). This hypothesis 
was also tested in Studies 3 and 4, but to no avail (ts < 1, ps < .4). 
7. Preacher and colleagues suggest that the “classical causal-steps approach” might 
not be the preferred method for testing indirect effects (Preacher, Rucker, & 
Hayes, 2007; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Instead, they advocate the use of 
bootstrapping methods in path analysis. Thus, the models of disappointment and 
contempt illustrated in Figures 4 and 5 were tested two different ways: (1) via the 
causal steps approach, the procedures and results of which are presented here in 
detail, and (2) via structural equation modeling (SEM), which applied 
bootstrapping techniques to test for indirect effects. Unfortunately, the results 
from the SEM approach were no better than what was reported here using the 
causal-steps approach. Indeed, neither the model of disappointment 
(bootstrapping N = 5000; χ2(46) = 536.42, p < .001; CFI = .36, TLI = .21, 
RMSEA = .15) or contempt (bootstrapping N = 5000χ2(46) = 517.82, p < .001; 
CFI = .37, TLI = .21, RMSEA = .15) fit the data well.  
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8. There was concern that human identity might be confounded with political 
ideology, such that those who identify strongly with humanity might have strong 
liberal leanings. To answer this question, the correlations between political 
ideology (measured by a single item with high scores indicating more liberal 
views) and identification with humanity were examined and then political 
ideology was included in each model to determine if political ideology impacted 
the models. While political ideology and identification with all of humanity was 
correlated (Study 1, r = .29, p = .02; Study 2, r = .17, p = .02; Study 3, r = .39, p < 
.0001; Study 4, r = .27, p = .004), none of the models were impacted. Indeed, 
even individually, political ideology had no relationship with either contempt or 
disappointment in humanty (rs < .07, ps > .3) 
9. These analyses were rerun excluding age as a covariate. Removing age did not 
significantly change the results of the analysis.  
10. Again, age was a significant predictor of contempt (B = -.27, t(66) = 4.66, p < 
.0001) and disappointment (B = .31, t(66) = 3.71, p < .0001) and therefore was 
included as an additional covariate.  
11. It is important to acknowledge that typically when there is more than one 
dependent variable, multivariate procedures are preferred. However, these studies 
presented a special case in which the effect of one dependent variable needed to 
be strictly controlled when analyzing the other. Specifically, the rise in any single 
emotion needs to be separated from rise in “overall negativity.” After consulting 
sources, including Howell (2007), Field (2009), and Stevens (2009), I was not 
certain that multivariate analyses provided this type of control, which is why I 
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turned to ANCOVA. It is also important to acknowledge that in a typical situation 
in which ANCOVA is being used, there is an assumed independence between the 
independent variables and the covariates, and that the experimental manipulation 
should not have an effect on the covariates. While this might be true in most case, 
here I am trying to isolate the unique effects of each emotion, which requires 
controlling the influence of the non-target emotion by co-varying it out, which is 
why I have chosen to use ANCOVA here and in the remaining studies. 
12. Because the results of attributions of controllability by disappointment resembled 
what would be expected from contempt (i.e., withdrawal), I tested the exact same 
model described here, but replaced disappointment with contempt. None of these 
alternative analyses approached significance (for Solution, X
2
 = 1, p = .30; for “in 
defense” and word-count, Fs < 1.5, ps > .20). 
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Appendix A: Negative Emotions Towards Humanity 
 
 
“Please circle a number that best describes the frequency you feel the 
following emotions towards people as a whole.” 
 
Please respond with a number from this scale: 
 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
    Never           Rarely         Sometimes       Often        Very 
Often 
 
________________________________________________________________________
_________________________ 
 
____ disappointment ____ anger  ____ let down  ____ contempt  
 
____ disdain  ____ irritation  ____ aggravation  ____ dissatisfaction 
 
____ hate  ____ hostility  ____ disgust  ____ upset 
 
____ frustration ____ disapproval ____ scorn  ____ loathing 
 
____ detestation ____ disenchantment ____ disillusion ____ derision   
 
____ sadness  ____ discouragement ____ displeasure ____ disheartenment
 
____ disrespect    
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Appendix B: Disappointment in Humanity Scale 
 
 
Please circle the number that best describes the frequency you feel the 
following emotions “towards” People as a whole. 
 
1. Disappointment 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
Never           Rarely         Sometimes       Often        Very Often 
    
 
2. Let Down 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
Never           Rarely         Sometimes       Often        Very Often 
    
 
3. Frustration 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
Never           Rarely         Sometimes       Often        Very Often 
    
 
4. Irritation 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
Never           Rarely         Sometimes       Often        Very Often 
    
 
5. Dissatisfaction 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
Never           Rarely         Sometimes       Often        Very Often 
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Appendix C: Contempt for Humanity Scale 
 
 
Circle the number that best describes the frequency you feel the following 
emotions “towards” People as a whole. 
 
1. Contempt 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
Never           Rarely         Sometimes       Often        Very Often 
    
 
2. Disgust 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
Never           Rarely         Sometimes       Often        Very Often 
    
 
3. Scorn 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
Never           Rarely         Sometimes       Often        Very Often 
    
 
4. Aggravation 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
Never           Rarely         Sometimes       Often        Very Often 
    
 
5. Loathing 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
Never           Rarely         Sometimes       Often        Very Often 
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Appendix D: Contempt, anger, and fear items from Mackie et al. (2000) 
 
 
Circle the number that best describe the frequency you feel the following 
emotions “towards” People as a whole. 
 
1. Repelled 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
Never           Rarely         Sometimes       Often        Very Often 
    
 
2. Sick 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
Never           Rarely         Sometimes       Often        Very Often 
    
 
3. Anger 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
Never           Rarely         Sometimes       Often        Very Often 
    
 
4. Displeased 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
Never           Rarely         Sometimes       Often        Very Often 
    
 
5. Furious 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
Never           Rarely         Sometimes       Often        Very Often 
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6. Worry 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
Never           Rarely         Sometimes       Often        Very Often 
 
 
7. Anxiety 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
Never           Rarely         Sometimes       Often        Very Often 
 
8. Fear 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
Never           Rarely         Sometimes       Often        Very Often 
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Appendix E: Positive items from the Social Emotions Scale  (Created by Dr. Gill) 
 
 
Circle the number that best describes the frequency you feel the following 
emotions “towards” People as a whole? 
 
1. Sympathy 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
Never           Rarely         Sometimes       Often        Very Often 
    
 
2. Compassion 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
Never           Rarely         Sometimes       Often        Very Often 
    
 
3. Caring 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
Never           Rarely         Sometimes       Often        Very Often 
    
 
4. Concern 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
Never           Rarely         Sometimes       Often        Very Often 
    
 
5. Love 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
Never           Rarely         Sometimes       Often        Very Often 
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Appendix F: Ought Behaviors 
 
 
“Your ought representation of humanity is the representation of humanity in which all 
people fulfill their duties and obligations. It’s defined by people behaving in ways you 
believe people should or ought to behave, or feel obligated to behave. It’s not necessary 
that people actually behaves this way now, only that you believe people ought to behave 
this way.” 
 
Please rate the extent to which you agree that each of the following acts represent ways in 
which humanity should not behave using the following scale: 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6 
Disagree                                                                                                                                   
Agree 
 
_____People should not act dishonestly 
_____People should not sleep around 
 
_____People should not steal 
 
_____People should not act selfishly 
 
_____People should not intentionally harm each other 
 
_____People should not discriminate against each other 
 
_____People should not drink to excess 
 
_____People should not manipulate each other 
 
_____People should not be wasteful 
 
_____People should not be cruel 
 
_____People should not be aggressive/violent 
 
_____People should not act with arrogance 
 
_____People should not be lazy 
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Appendix G: Ideal Behaviors 
 
 
“Your ideal representation of humanity is the representation in which all people behave 
in a way you’d really like them to behave. It’s defined by the way you would ideally like 
people to behave. It’s not necessary that people actually behaves this way now, only that 
you want people to behave this way.” 
 
Please rate the extent to which you agree that each of the following acts represent ways in 
which humanity should behave using the following scale: 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6 
Disagree                                                                                                                                   
Agree 
 
_____People should act with kindness/consideration for each other 
_____People should admit their mistakes 
_____People should donate to charity 
_____People should save money 
_____People should behave honestly 
_____People should act faithfully 
_____People should work hard 
_____People should treat each other fairly 
_____People should stand up for each other 
_____People should act with generosity towards each other 
_____People should help others in need 
_____People should respond with care/compassion for others 
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Appendix H: Discrepancies and Attributions questionnaire 
 
For each item below, please rate the extent to which you believe humanity meets its 
moral obligation regarding the behavior in question. Next, please rate the extent to which 
you agree with each statement about the potential cause of humanity failing to meet each 
moral obligation. 
  
Dishonesty 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
People completely meet                                               People completely fail 
the obligation                                                                                                                                to meet the obligation 
to avoid dishonestly                                                                                                                        to avoid dishonestly 
 
Dishonesty is caused by human nature 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                     Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
Because of human nature, people will always act dishonestly 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                  Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                      Agree 
 
People could make the choice to act less dishonestly 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People can control whether to act dishonesty 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People act dishonestly because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that 
they have encountered in life 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
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Sleeping Around 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
People completely meet                                                           People completely fail 
the obligation                                                                                                                                to meet the obligation 
to avoid sleeping around                                                                                                       to avoid sleeping around 
 
Sleeping around is caused by human nature 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
Because of human nature, people will always sleep around 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People could make the choice not to sleep around 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People can control whether they sleep around 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People sleep around because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that they 
have encountered in life 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
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Stealing 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
People completely meet                                               People completely fail 
the obligation                                                                                                                                to meet the obligation 
to avoid stealing                                                                                                                                     to avoid stealing                                                                                                                         
 
Stealing is caused by human nature 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
Because of human nature, people will always steal from each other 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
 
People could make the choice to stop stealing 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People can control whether they steal 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People steal because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that they have 
encountered in life 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
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Selfishness 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
People completely meet                                                               People completely fail 
the obligation                                                                                                                                to meet the obligation 
to avoid selfishness                                                                                                                            to avoid selfishness                                                                                                                         
 
Selfishness is caused by human nature 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
Because of human nature, people will always act selfishly 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
 
People could make the choice to stop acting selfishly 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People can control whether they act selfishly 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People act selfishly because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that they 
have encountered in life 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
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Intentional harm 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
People completely                                      People completely  
meet the obligation                      fail to meet the to 
avoid intentional                                                                                                                               obligation to avoid 
harm                                                                                                                                                         intentional harm                   
 
Intentional harm is caused by human nature 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
Because of human nature, people will always cause intentional harm to each other 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
 
People could make the choice to stop causing intentional harm to each other 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People can control whether they intentionally harm each other 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People cause each other intentional harm because of the external circumstances/personal 
experiences that they have encountered in life  
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
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Discrimination 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
People completely                                      People completely  
meet the obligation                                                         fail to meet the to 
avoid Discrimination                                                                                                                        obligation to avoid 
                                              Discrimination 
 
Discrimination is caused by human nature 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
Because of human nature, people will always discriminate against each other 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People could make the choice to stop discriminating against each other 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People can control whether they discriminate against each other 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People discriminate against each other because of the external circumstances/personal 
experiences that they have encountered in life 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
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Drinking to excess 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
People completely                                      People completely  
meet the                                              fail to meet the 
obligation to avoid                                                                                                                            obligation to avoid 
Drinking to excess                                                                                                                              Drinking to excess 
 
Drinking to excess is caused by human nature 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
Because of human nature, people will always drink to excess 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People could make the choice to stop drinking to excess 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People can control whether to drink to excess 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People drink to excess because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that 
they have encountered in life 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
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Manipulation 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
People completely                                      People completely  
meet the                                              fail to meet the 
obligation to avoid                                                                                                                            obligation to avoid 
Manipulating each others                                                                                                   Manipulating each others 
 
Manipulating each other is caused by human nature 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
Because of human nature, people will always manipulate each other 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People could make the choice to stop manipulating each other 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People can control whether they manipulate each other 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People manipulate each other because of external circumstances/personal experiences 
that they have encountered in life 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 234 
Wastefulness 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
People completely                                      People completely  
meet the                                             fail to meet the 
obligation to avoid                                                                                                                            obligation to avoid 
Wastefulness                         Wastefulness 
 
Wastefulness is caused by human nature 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
Because of human nature, people will always be wasteful 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People could make the choice to stop being wasteful 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People can control whether they are wasteful 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People are wasteful because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that they 
have encountered in life 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
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Cruelty 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
People completely                                      People completely  
meet the obligation                                            fail to meet the   
to avoid Cruelty                    obligation to avoid  
             Cruelty 
 
Cruelty is caused by human nature 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
Because of human nature, people will always be cruel to each other 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People could make the choice to stop being cruel to each other 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People can control whether they are cruel to each other 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People are cruel to each other because of the external circumstances/personal experiences 
they have encountered in life 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
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Aggression/Violence 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
People completely                                      People completely  
meet the obligation                                                 fail to meet the  
to avoid                                                                    obligation to avoid               
Aggression/Violence                                                 Aggression/Violence 
 
Aggression/violence is caused by human nature 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
Because of human nature, people will always be aggressive/violent to each other 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People could make the choice to stop being aggressive/violent to each other 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People can control whether they are aggressive/violent to each other 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People are aggressive/violent to each other because of external circumstances/personal 
experiences that they have encountered in life 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
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Arrogance 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
People completely                                      People completely  
meet the obligation                                            fail to meet the   
to avoid                                                                    obligation to avoid               
Arrogance                                                                                      Arrogance 
 
Arrogance is caused by human nature 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
Because of human nature, people will always act arrogantly 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People could make the choice to stop acting arrogantly  
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People can control whether they act arrogantly 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People act arrogantly because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that 
they have encountered in life 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
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Laziness 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
People completely                                      People completely  
meet the obligation                                            fail to meet the   
to avoid                                                                     obligation to avoid               
Laziness           Laziness 
 
Laziness is caused by human nature 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
Because of human nature, people will always be lazy 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People could make the choice to stop being lazy  
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People can control whether they are lazy 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People are lazy because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that they have 
encountered in life 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
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Kindness/Consideration for others 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
People always                                                                                 People often  
act with                                                                              fail to act with 
Kindness/Consideration                                                                                                            Kindess/Consideration 
 
Failing to act with Kindness/Consideration is caused by human nature 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
Because of human nature, people will rarely act with Kindness/Consideration 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People could make the choice to act with Kindness/Consideration  
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People can control whether they act with Kindness/Consideration 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People do not act with Kindness/Consideration because of the external 
circumstances/personal experiences that they have encountered in life 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
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Admit Mistakes 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
People always                                                          People often fail  
Admit Mistakes                        to Admit Mistakes 
 
Failing to Admit Mistakes is caused by human nature 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
Because of human nature, people will rarely Admit Mistakes 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People could make the choice to Admit Mistakes more often 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People can control whether they Admit Mistakes 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People do not Admit Mistakes because of the external circumstances/personal 
experiences they have encountered in life 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
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Donate to Charity 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
People always                                                                 People often                 
Donate to Charity                           fail to Donate to Charity 
 
Failing to Donate to Charity is caused by human nature 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
Because of human nature, people will rarely Donate to Charity 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People could make the choice to Donate to Charity 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People can control whether they Donate to Charity  
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People do not Donate to Charity because of the external circumstances/personal 
experiences that they have encountered in life 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
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Save Money 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
People always                                                          People often fail  
Save Money                              to Save Money 
 
Failing to Save Money is caused by human nature 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
Because of human nature, people will rarely Save Money 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People could make the choice to Save Money 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People can control whether to Save Money 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People do not Save Money because of the external circumstances/personal experiences 
that they have encountered in life 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
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Act with Honesty 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
People always                                                           People often fail  
Act with Honesty                                                                                                                               to Act with Honesty 
 
Failing to Act with Honesty is caused by human nature 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
Because of human nature, people will rarely Act with Honesty 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People could make the choice to Act with Honesty more often  
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People can control whether to Act with Honesty 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People do not Act with Honesty because of the external circumstances/personal 
experiences that they have encountered in life 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
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Act Faithfully 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
People always                                                          People often fail 
 Act Faithfully                                          to Act Faithfully 
 
Failing to Act Faithfully is caused by human nature 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
Because of human nature, people will rarely Act Faithfully 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People could make the choice to Act Faithfully more often 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People can control whether to Act Faithfully 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People do not Act Faithfully because of the external circumstances/personal experiences 
that they have encountered in life 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
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Work Hard 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
People always                                                          People often 
fail Work Hard                                                       to Work Hard 
 
Failing to Work Hard is caused by human nature 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
Because of human nature, people will rarely Work Hard 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People could make the choice to Work Hard more often 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People can control whether to Work Hard 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People do not Work Hard because of the external circumstances/personal experiences 
that they have encountered in life 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
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Act Fairly 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
People always                                                          People often fail               
Act Fairly                                                                 to Act Fairly 
 
Failing to Act Fairly is caused by human nature 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
Because of human nature, people will rarely Act Fairly 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People could make the choice to Act Fairly more often 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People can control whether to Act Fairly 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People do not Act Fairly because of the external circumstances/personal experiences that 
they have encountered in life 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
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Stand up for each other 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
People always                                                          People often fail   
Stand up for each other                      to Stand up for each other 
 
Failing to Stand up for each other is caused by human nature 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
Because of human nature, people will rarely Stand up for each other 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People could make the choice to Stand up for each other more often 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People can control whether to Stand up for each other 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People do not Stand up for each other because of the external circumstances/personal 
experiences that they have encountered in life 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
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Behave Generously  
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
People always                                                          People often fail       
Behave Generously                               to Behave Generously 
 
Failing to Behave Generously is caused by human nature 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
Because of human nature, people will rarely Behave Generously 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People could make the choice to Behave Generously more often 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People can control whether to Behave Generously 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People do not Behave Generously because of the external circumstances/personal 
experiences that they have encountered in life  
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
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Help Others in Need 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
People always                                                          People often fail   
Help others in Need                                                             to Help others in Need 
 
Failing to Help others in Need is caused by human nature 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
Because of human nature, people will rarely Help others in Need 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People could make the choice to Help others in Need more often 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People can control whether they Help others in Need 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People do not Help others in Need because of the external circumstances/personal 
experiences that they have encountered in life 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
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Act with Care/Compassion  
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
People always                                                          People often fail 
Act with Care/Compassion                           to Act with Care/Compassion 
 
Failing to Act with Care/Compassion is caused by human nature 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
Because of human nature, people will rarely Act with Care/Compassion 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
 
People could make the choice to Act with Care/Compassion more often 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People can control whether to Act with Care/Compassion 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
 
People do not Act with Care/Compassion because of the external circumstances/personal 
experiences that they have encountered in life 
 
1----------------2----------------3----------------4----------------5----------------6----------------7 
Strongly                                                                                                                                   Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                                       Agree 
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Appendix I: Identification With All Humanity Scale (IWAHR) 
 
1. How close do you feel to each of the following groups? Please use the following scale: 
 
              1--------------------2--------------------3--------------------4--------------------5 
            not at all                 not very            somewhat          pretty                     very  
           close                       close                      close                       close                     close 
 
______People in my community 
 
______Americans  
 
______People all over the world 
 
 
2. How often do you use the word “we” to refer to the following groups of people? Please 
use the following scale: 
 
1--------------------2--------------------3--------------------4--------------------5 
   almost never             rarely                 occasionally              often                  very often 
 
 
______People in my community  
 
______Americans  
 
______People all over the world 
 
 
3. How much would you say you have in common with the following groups? Please use 
the following scale: 
 
1--------------------2--------------------3--------------------4--------------------5 
   almost nothing             little                       some                  quite a bit            very much  
      in common           in common          in common              in common         in common 
 
 
______People in my community 
 
______Americans  
 
______People all over the world 
 
 
******************************** 
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Please answer all remaining questions using the following choices: 
 
1--------------------2--------------------3--------------------4--------------------5 
 not at all                 just a little          somewhat            quite a bit               very much 
 
 
4. Sometimes people think of those who are not a part of their immediate family as 
“family.” To what degree do you think of the following groups of people as “family”? 
 
______People in my community  
 
______Americans  
 
______All humans everywhere 
 
5. How much do you identify with (that is, feel a part of, feel love toward, have concern 
for) each of the following? 
 
______People in my community  
 
______Americans  
 
______All humans everywhere 
 
6. How much would you say you care (feel upset, want to help) when bad things happen 
to 
 
______People in my community  
 
______Americans  
 
______People anywhere in the world 
 
7. How much do you want to be: 
 
______a responsible citizen of my community  
 
______a responsible American citizen  
 
______a responsible citizen of the world 
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8. How much do you believe in: 
 
______being loyal to my community  
 
______being loyal to America  
 
______being loyal to all mankind 
 
9. When they are in need, how much do you want to help: 
 
 
______People in my community  
 
______Americans  
 
______People all over the world 
 
 
10. Please mark the letter for the pair of circles that best describes your relationship with 
each group. 
 
 
______People in my community  
 
______Americans  
 
______People all over the world 
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Appendix J: Implicit theories about Stability of Personality 
(Levy & Dweck, unpublished measure)  
 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the items below using 
the following scale. 
 
1------------2------------3------------4------------5------------6------------7 
           Strongly                                                                                             Strongly 
           Disagree                                                                                               Agree 
 
 
 
 
______ (1) The kind of person someone is something basic about him/her, and it cannot 
be changed very much. 
 
 
______ (2) People can do things differently, but the important parts of who they are 
cannot really be changed. 
 
 
______ (3) Everyone is a certain kind of person, and there is not much they can really do 
to change that. 
 
 
______ (4) As much as I hate to admit it, you cannot teach an old dog new tricks. People  
cannot really change their deepest attributes. 
 
 
______ (5) Everyone, no matter who they are, can significantly change his/her basic 
characteristics. 
 
 
______ (6) People can substantially change the kind of person they are. 
 
 
______ (7) No matter what kind of person someone is, they can always change very 
much. 
 
 
______ (8) People can change even their most basic qualities. 
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Appendix K: Social Behavior Questions  
 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements 
using the following scale: 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6 
Disagree                                                                                                  Agree 
 
 
______ I live an active social life 
 
______ I often help others in need 
 
______ I rarely seek out opportunities to socialize 
 
______ I often ignore requests to socialize 
 
______ I often avoid opportunities to help others 
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Appendix L: Discrepancy stimuli with causal attributions manipulated  
(adapted from Andreychik, 2009) 
 
 
AO-discrepancies, Uncontrollable cause (i.e., human nature) 
  
 
 According to a recent study conducted on behalf of the United Nations, 
approximately 26.3% of the population consists of people below the age of 15; 
approximately 65.9% are between the ages of 15 and 64, while approximately 7.9% are 
above the age of 64. The average life span is 67.07 years, with females averaging 69 
years, while men average 65 years. Of this population, approximately 520,000 people are 
brutally murdered every year, while another 250,000 are violently raped. Approximately 
2 in every 10 people admit committing acts of adultery, while another 2 in 10 admit that 
they would cheat on their spouse if they did not fear being caught and punished. Finally, 
nearly 7 in 10 people admit that they have stolen property from family members, 
businesses, or their employers.  
 
Facts like these have motivated many researchers to try and understand the nature 
of immoral behavior and the psychological mechanisms responsible for humanity’s 
rampant moral failings. In an article published in the February, 2006, issue of the Journal 
of Moral Behavior (Vol. 149, pp. 1178-1196), Dr. Lawrence Peterson and his colleagues 
from Stanford University concluded that, “we have observed repeatedly that human 
behavior often falls short of the most minimal moral standards of conduct, and these 
failings are most certainly linked to the nature of human nature.” He found that negative 
behaviors, such as infidelity, stealing, selfishness, discrimination, rape, incest, and even 
violence and murder can be conceived of largely as a product of human nature. “What 
people are, how they behave, what type of outcomes they achieve, are all constrained by 
human nature.” He further argued that, “it is clear that people consistently behave 
immorally throughout their lives, because the causes of behavior we deem immoral are 
rooted in human nature.”  
 
 Dr. Paula McCormack, an evolutionary clinical psychologist at the National 
Institute of Mental Health, drew similar conclusions. In her speech at the American 
psychological Association’s annual convention in Washington, DC in August 2005, Dr. 
McCormack argued that, “immoral action is the product of our shared evolutionary 
history. Humanity as a species has gained reproductive success by means of the most 
egregious moral acts. For example, stealing resources from competing bands, infidelity, 
and murdering potential reproductive competitors have evolutionary value, and in the 
long run, they have contributed to humanity’s evolutionary success.” She concludes that 
“our data indicate that immoral acts are caused by factors rooted in our evolved 
genome—our human nature—Whether we like it or not, human nature is the cause of 
immoral behavior.”  
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AO-discrepancies, Controllable cause (i.e., Lack of effort) 
 
  
 According to a recent study conducted on behalf of the United Nations, 
approximately 26.3% of the population consists of people below the age of 15; 
approximately 65.9% are between the ages of 15 and 64, while approximately. 7.9% are 
above the age of 64. The average life span is 67.07 years, with females averaging 69 
years, while men average 65 years. Of this population, approximately 520,000 people are 
brutally murdered every year, while another 250,000 are violently raped. Approximately 
2 in every 10 people admit committing acts of adultery, while another 2 in 10 admit that 
they would cheat on their spouse if they did not fear being caught and punished. Finally, 
nearly 7 in 10 people admit that they have stolen property from family members, 
businesses, or their employers.  
 
Facts like these have motivated many researchers to try and understand the nature 
of immoral behavior and the psychological mechanisms responsible for humanity’s moral 
failings. In an article published in the February, 2006, issue of the Journal of Moral 
Behavior (Vol. 149, pp. 1178-1196), Dr. Lawrence Peterson and his colleagues from 
Stanford University reported that, “we have observed repeatedly that human behavior 
often falls short of minimal moral standards of conduct, and these failings could be 
significantly decrease if people would harness their inherited ability to adapt and 
change...humanity can be less immoral if only people put forth the effort needed to do 
so.” He found that immoral acts, such as infidelity, stealing, selfishness, discrimination, 
rape, incest, and even violence and murder can be conceived of largely as a product of 
humanity’s lack of effort to curtail these activities. “What people are, how they behave, 
what type of outcomes humanity achieves is in our hands, the species is in control of its 
fate,” he wrote. He argued that, “it is clear that people consistently behave immorally 
throughout their lives, and that they do so because they choose to.” “Moreover,” he 
added, “we have also found that a strong willpower can overcome immoral impulses.” 
  
 Dr. Paula McCormack, a clinical psychologist at the National Institute of Mental 
Health, drew similar conclusions. In her speech at the American psychological 
Association’s annual convention in Washington, DC in August 2005, Dr. McCormack 
argued that, “for most of us, immoral action can be eliminated if people are willing to put 
out the necessary work to eliminate negative impulses.” She reported numerous 
longitudinal studies conducted by her research team, which show that as “people age and 
develop, their sense of willpower grows, as does their ability to inhibit immoral behavior. 
” She added that, “our data indicate that people’s behaviors and outcomes are mostly a 
function of factors such as effort and perceived control over one’s outcomes—only action 
can break the cycle of immorality.”  
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AO-discrepancies, No explanation  
 
 According to a recent study conducted on behalf of the United Nations, 
approximately 26.3% of the population consists of people below the age of 15; 
approximately 65.9% are between the ages of 15 and 64, while approximately. 7.9% are 
above the age of 64. The average life span is 67.07 years, with females averaging 69 
years, while men average 65 years. Of this population, approximately 520,000 people are 
brutally murdered every year, while another 250,000 are violently raped. Approximately 
2 in every 10 people have admit committing acts of adultery, while another 2 in 10 admit 
that they would cheat on their spouse if they did not fear being caught and punished. 
Finally, nearly 7 in 10 people admit that they have stolen something from family 
members, businesses, or their employers.  
 
Facts like these have motivated many researchers to try and understand the nature 
of immoral behavior and the psychological mechanisms responsible for humanity’s moral 
failing. In an article published in the February 2006, issue of the Journal of Moral 
Behavior (Vol. 149, pp. 1178-1196), Dr. Lawrence Peterson and his colleagues from 
Stanford University reported recent findings. Dr. Peterson concluded that, “we have 
observed repeatedly that human behavior often falls short of minimal moral standards…” 
He found that people often report immoral acts, such as infidelity, stealing, selfishness, 
discrimination, incest, and even violent, criminal acts.  
  
 Dr. Paula McCormack, a psychologist at the National Institute of Mental Health, 
drew similar conclusions. In her speech at the American psychological Association’s 
annual convention in Washington, DC in August 2005, Dr. McCormack argued that, “for 
most human beings, immoral behaviors is quite reliable…when presented with an 
opportunity to cheat, steal, or otherwise act selfishly, people often seize that opportunity.” 
Dr. McCormack’s conclusions about human immorality are based on six longitudinal 
studies published between 1988 and 2002, including two of her own. All six had 
considerably different samples and rationales, but “were surprisingly unanimous” in their 
conclusions about the extent of humanity’s immorality depravity.  
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AI-discrepancies, Uncontrollable/stable cause (i.e., human nature) 
  
 
 According to a recent study conducted on behalf of the United Nations, 
approximately 26.3% of the population consists of people below the age of 15; 
approximately 65.9% are between the ages of 15 and 64, while approximately. 7.9% are 
above the age of 64. The average life span is 67.07 years, with females averaging 69 
years, while men average 65 years. Of this population, approximately 2 in every 10 
people admit that they are not very kind to others. Another 2 in 10 believe that people are 
far less trustworthy than they would like them to be. Finally, nearly 7 in 10 people admit 
that they are not as generous (i.e., they do not donate their money, time, etc.) as they 
would ideally like to be.   
  
 Facts like these have motivated many researchers to try and understand the nature 
of moral behavior and the psychological mechanisms responsible for humanity’s lack of 
prosociality. In an article published in the February, 2006, issue of the Journal of Moral 
Behavior (Vol. 149, pp. 1178-1196), Dr. Lawrence Peterson and his colleagues from 
Stanford University concluded that, “we have observed repeatedly that human behavior 
often falls short of its ideals…these failings are most certainly linked to the nature of 
human nature” He found that people often report feeling that they often fail to be kind, to 
be honest, to admit mistakes, to be generous, to donate to charity, to stand up for others, 
or to help others in need, which can be conceived of largely as a product of human nature 
“What people are, how they behave, what type of outcomes they achieve, are all 
importantly constrained by human nature.” he wrote. He further argued that, “it is clear 
that people consistently fail to reach their desired level of prosociality throughout their 
lives, and that they do so because of human nature.” 
  
 Dr. Paula McCormack, an evolutionary clinical psychologist at the National 
Institute of Mental Health, drew similar conclusions. In her speech at the American 
psychological Association’s annual convention in Washington, DC in August 2005, Dr. 
McCormack argued that, “failing to produce ideal moral action is a product of our shared 
evolutionary history. Humanity as a species has gained reproductive success by not being 
exceedingly prosocial. For example, refraining from helping others in need or otherwise 
reserving kind and compassionate has reproductive value, and in the long run, they have 
contributed to humanity’s evolutionary success.” She concludes that “our data indicate 
that the lack of ideal moral behavior found throughout the human species is caused by 
factors rooted in our evolved genome—our human nature—whether we like it or not, 
human nature is the cause of humanity’s inability to reach moral ideals. 
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AI-discrepancies, Controllable/unstable cause (i.e., Lack of effort) 
 
  
 According to a recent study conducted on behalf of the United Nations, 
approximately 26.3% of the population consists of people below the age of 15; 
approximately 65.9% are between the ages of 15 and 64, while approximately. 7.9% are 
above the age of 64. The average life span is 67.07 years, with females averaging 69 
years, while men average 65 years. Of this population, approximately, 2 in every 10 
people admit that they are not very kind to others. Another 2 in 10 believe that people are 
far less trustworthy than they would like them to be. Finally, nearly 7 in 10 people admit 
that they are not as generous (i.e., they do not donate their money, time, etc.) as they 
would ideally like to be. 
 
Facts like these have motivated many researchers to try and understand the nature 
of moral behavior and the psychological mechanisms responsible for humanity’s lack of 
prosociality. In an article published in the February, 2006, issue of the Journal of Moral 
Behavior (Vol. 149, pp. 1178-1196), Dr. Lawrence Peterson and his colleagues from 
Stanford University concluded that, “we have observed repeatedly that human behavior 
often falls short of its moral ideals… these failing could be significantly decrease if 
people would be willing to put in the effort it takes to be more compassionate.” He found 
that people report feeling that they often fail to be kind, to be honest, to admit mistakes, 
to be generous, to donate to charity, to stand up for others, or to help others in need, 
which can be conceived of largely as a product of humanity’s lack of effort. “What 
people are, how they behave, what type of outcomes humanity achieves, is in our hands, 
the species is in control of its fate,” he wrote. He argued that, “it is clear that people 
consistently fail to reach their desired level of prosociality throughout their lives, and that 
they do so because they choose not to.” “Moreover,” he added, “we have also found that 
intense willpower could lead to greater levels of enacted compassion.” 
  
 Dr. Paula McCormack, a psychologist at the National Institute of Mental Health, 
drew similar conclusions. In her speech at the American psychological Association’s 
annual convention in Washington, DC in August 2005, Dr. McCormack argued that, “for 
most of us, failing to produce ideal moral action can be eliminated if people are willing to 
put out the necessary work to eliminate negative impulses.” She reported numerous 
longitudinal studies conducted by her research team, which show that “people age and 
develop, and as they do, they sometimes lose much of their motivation to become more 
prosocial.” She added that, “our data indicate that people’s behaviors and outcomes are 
mostly a function of factors such as effort and perceived control over one’s outcomes—
only through our own effort can we break the hold of inertia, and become a more 
compassionate human race.” 
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AI-discrepancies, No explanation  
 
 According to a recent study conducted on behalf of the United Nations, 
approximately 26.3% of the population consists of people below the age of 15; 
approximately 65.9% are between the ages of 15 and 64, while approximately. 7.9% are 
above the age of 64. The average life span is 67.07 years, with females averaging 69 
years, while men average at 65 years. Of this population, approximately, 2 in every 10 
people admit that they are not very kind to others. Another 2 in 10 believe that people are 
far less trustworthy than they would like them to be. Finally, nearly 7 in 10 people admit 
that they are not as generous (i.e., they do not donate their money, time, etc.) as they 
would ideally like to be. 
 
Facts like these have motivated many researchers to try and understand the nature 
of moral behavior and the psychological mechanisms responsible for humanity’s lack of 
prosociality. In an article published in the February, 2006 issue of the Journal of Moral 
Behavior (Vol. 149, pp. 1178-1196), Dr. Peterson and colleagues reported recent 
findings. Dr. Peterson concluded that, “we have observed repeatedly that human behavior 
often falls short of its moral ideals…” He found that people report that they often fail to 
be kind, to be honest, to admit mistakes, to be generous, to donate to charity, to stand up 
for others, or to help others in need. 
  
 Dr. Paula McCormack, a psychologist at the National Institute of Mental Health, 
drew similar conclusions. In her speech at the American psychological Association’s 
annual convention in Washington, DC in August 2005, Dr. McCormack argued that, “for 
most human beings, moral behaviors is unreliable…when presented with an opportunity 
to live up to moral ideals of charity and compassion, people rarely seize that 
opportunity.” Dr. McCormack’s conclusions about human immorality are based on six 
longitudinal studies published between 1988 and 2002, including two of her own. All six 
had considerably different samples and rationales, but “were surprisingly unanimous” in 
their conclusions on the failure to produce prosocial behavior.  
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Control Condition, Uncontrollable/stable cause (i.e., human nature) 
 
 According to a recent study conducted on behalf of the United Nations, it is 
estimated that more that 107 billion people have lived on the Earth. As of 2012, the 
human population was estimated to have reached around 7.077 billion. Approximately, 
26.3% of the population consists of people below the age of 15; approximately 65.9% are 
between the ages of 15 and 64, while approximately. 7.9% are above the age of 64. The 
average life span is 67.07 years, with females averaging 69 years, while men average 65 
years. 
 
Facts like these have motivated many researchers to examine the complexities of 
human behavior. In an article published in the February, 2006, issue of the Journal of 
Social Behavior (Vol. 149, pp. 1178-1196), Dr. Lawrence Peterson and his colleagues at 
Stanford University concluded that, “we have observed repeatedly that people’s 
behaviors and outcomes are strongly linked to the nature of human nature.” He found that 
people’s behaviors and life outcomes could be conceived of largely as a product of 
human nature. “What an individual can become, how that individual will behave, what 
type of outcomes she will achieve are all constrained by human nature.”  
 
 Dr. Paula McCormack, an evolutionary clinical psychologist at the National 
Institute of Mental Health, drew similar conclusions. In her speech at the American 
psychological Association’s annual convention in Washington, DC in August, 2005, Dr. 
McCormack argued that, “who we become is a product of our shared evolutionary 
history. Shared human behaviors exist at present because they have helped the species 
gain reproductive success; their existence is testament to that fact. She concludes, “Our 
data indicate that human behavior is caused by factors rooted in our evolved genome—
our evolved human nature.” 
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Control Condition, Controllable/unstable cause (i.e., Lack of effort)  
 
 According to a recent study conducted on behalf of the United Nations, it is 
estimated that more that 107 billion people have lived on the Earth. As of 2012, the 
human population was estimated to have reached around 7.077 billion. Approximately, 
26.3% of the population consists of people below the age of 15; approximately 65.9% are 
between the ages of 15 and 64, while approximately. 7.9% are above the age of 64. The 
average life span is 67.07 years, with females averaging 69 years, while men average 65 
years. 
 
Facts like these have motivated many researchers to examine the complexities of 
human behavior. In an article published in the February, 2006, issue of the Journal of 
Social Behavior (Vol. 149, pp. 1178-1196), Dr. Peterson and colleagues reported recent 
findings. Dr. Peterson concluded that, “we have observed repeatedly that people’s 
behaviors and outcomes are strongly linked to the deliberate choices they make the effort 
with which they act.” He found that people’s behaviors and life outcomes can be 
conceived of largely as a product of the effort. “What an individual can become, how that 
individual will behave, what type of outcomes she will achieve, are all importantly 
constrained by the intensity of her actions,” he wrote. He argued that, “it is clear that 
individuals behave inconsistently throughout their lives.” 
 
 Dr. Paula McCormack, a psychologist at the National Institute of Mental Health, 
drew similar conclusions. In her speech at the American psychological Association’s 
annual convention in Washington, DC in August 2005, Dr. McCormack argued that, “for 
most of us, our patterns of behavior might change over time…our outcomes come down 
to our choices.” She reported numerous longitudinal studies conducted by her research 
team, which show that “as people age and develop, their patterns of behavior change.” 
She added that, “our data indicate that people’s behaviors and outcomes are mostly a 
function of factors such as effort and perceived control over one’s outcomes—only 
through our own effort can we break the hold of inertia.” 
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Appendix M: Disappointment in Humanity (“right now”) 
 
To what extent do you feel the following emotions “towards” People as a 
whole, right now? 
 
1. Disappointment 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
                         No                                    Some                                  Strong 
                Disappointment               Disappointment                   Disappointment 
   
 
2. Let Down 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
                  Not at all                               Some what                             Extremely 
                  Let Down                               Let Down                              Let Down 
    
 
3. Frustration 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
                          No                                    Some                                    Strong 
                    Frustration                       Frustration                        Frustration 
    
 
4. Irritation 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
                    No                                        Some                                     Strong 
                   Irritation                             Irritation                              Irritation 
    
 
5. Dissatisfaction 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
                        No                                     Some                                    Strong 
                Dissatisfaction                 Dissatisfaction                     Dissatisfaction 
 
 
6. Displeased 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
                         No                                   Some                                     Strong 
                 Displeasure                        Displeasure                           Displeasure 
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Appendix N: Contempt for Humanity (“right now”) Scale 
 
To what extent do you feel the following emotions “towards” People as a 
whole, right now? 
 
1. Contempt 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
                         No                                     Some                                  Strong 
                   Contempt                              Contempt                        Contempt 
    
 
2. Scorn 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
                          No                                    Some                                    Strong 
                       Scorn                                 Scorn                                     Scorn 
    
    
 
3. Aggravation 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
                        No                                      Some                                  Strong 
                 Aggravation                        Aggravation                       Aggravation 
    
    
 
4. Loathing 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5 
                        No                                     Some                                    Strong 
                    Loathing                            Loathing                              Loathing 
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Appendix O: Prosocial Behavior, Studies 2 & 3 
 
 
Earlier in the study, you read a passage from a noted periodical describing 
“patterns of human behavior.” We are compiling responses to that information that 
will be sent to the editor of that periodical. We would like to include your response 
in our compilation.  
 
If you are willing, in the space below, please write a response to the information you 
read about.  
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Appendix P: Photo manipulations  
 
 
Example: Common Humanity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example: Neutral 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examples: American Pride 
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Appendix Q: “Aesthetic judgments” 
 
 
Please provide your “aesthetic judgments” of the photo/painting  
 
 
 
1. Attractiveness 
 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6 
    very unattractive                                                                                    very attractive 
 
 
 
2. Quality of color contrast 
 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6 
    very low quality                                                                                     very high quality 
 
 
 
 
3. Quality of sharpness. 
 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6 
    very dull                                                                                           very sharp 
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Appendix R: Causal Attribution Questions for Studies 3 and 4 
 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements 
using the following scale: 
 
1---------------2---------------3---------------4---------------5---------------6 
Disagree                                                                                                     Agree 
 
 
______ Human nature is the root cause of the pattern of behavior I read about  
 
 
______ People have no control over the pattern of behavior I read about  
 
 
______ People could potentially change the pattern of behavior I read 
 
 
______ The pattern of behavior I read about could not possibly change in the 
future 
 
 
______ People have control over the pattern of behavior I read about  
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Appendix S: Implicit Theories Manipulation & Manipulation check questions 
 
Comprehension paragraph: please carefully read the paragraph below.  You will 
later be tested on how well you remember the concepts this paragraph contains. 
 
Incremental theory prime: 
 
In his talk at the American Psychological Association’s 
annual convention held at New York City in August, Dr. 
George Medin argued that ‘no one’s character is hard like a 
rock that cannot be changed. Only for some, greater effort 
and determination are needed to effect changes.’ He 
reported numerous large longitudinal studies, which show 
that people can mature and can change their character. He 
also reported research findings showing that people’s 
personality characteristics can be changed even in their late 
sixties. 
 
Entity theory prime: 
 
In his talk at the American Psychological Association’s 
annual convention held at New York City in August, Dr. 
George Medin argued that ‘in most of us, by the age of ten, 
our character has set like plaster and will never soften 
again.’ He reported numerous large longitudinal studies 
which show that people ‘age and develop, but they do so 
on the foundation of enduring dispositions.’  He also 
reported research findings showing that people’s 
personality characteristics are fixed and cannot be changed. 
 
Control condition: 
 
In his talk at the American Psychological Association’s 
annual convention held at New York City in August, Dr. 
George Medin argued that ‘in most of us, by the age of ten, 
our limbic system is fully developed.” He reported 
numerous studies showing that limbic activation in 
response to emotional arousing stimuli is nearly the same 
in 10-year-olds as it is older adults.   
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Instructions: Please answer the following questions about the paragraph you read at the 
beginning of this study. 
 
What is the name of the convention mentioned in the article? 
 
 
 
 
Where does it take place? ______________________________________________ 
 
 
What was the main concept described in the article? 
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Appendix T: Demographic Information 
 
 
(1) Your sex:      _____ Male        _____ Female 
 
 
(2) Your age:   ____________ 
 
 
(3) Your predominant ethnicity: 
 
_____ Asian       _____ Hispanic      _____ Black       
 
_____ White       _____ Other (specify: _________________) 
 
 
(4) What is your occupation? 
 
_________________________________________________ 
 
 
(5) What is your highest level of education? (Circle one) 
 
 Some high school  High school   Trade     
 
 
 BA/BS/BFA   MA/MS/MFA  Ph.D./Psy D/MD   
 
 
(6) Please describe your political beliefs using the following scale 
 
1--------------------2---------------------3--------------------4-------------------5 
Very                           Somewhat                         Moderate                       Somewhat                     Very  
Conservative            Conservative                                                                Liberal                     Liberal 
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